The Illogical War: Perception Management and the End of the Functional Enemy’s Cycle

Introduction

Traditionally, wars are measured by the clarity of their objectives and the speed of their decisive resolution: overthrowing a regime, occupying territory, or imposing political terms. But the conflict between Iran and Israel, under the broader umbrella of the United States, does not follow this logic: there is no ground invasion, no comprehensive global mobilization, and no explicit declaration of an intention to overthrow a regime; yet tensions persist.

In conventional wars, plans are built around the worst-case scenario, followed by the implementation of a strategy of decisive resolution aimed at destroying the enemy’s center of power and minimizing losses, as occurred in Iraq in 2003. But this model has not been applied in this conflict: there is no comprehensive mobilization, no broad invasion coalition, and no announced plan to overthrow the regime. Instead, escalation is managed in a calculated manner, through limited strikes and mutual deterrence, indicating that the objective is not a fully decisive outcome but the regulation of the balance and the prevention of an all-out eruption.

First: The Iraq Model — A War of Decisive Resolution

The course was classic: a media mobilization lasting nearly a year; a discourse of weapons of mass destruction; diplomatic action in the Security Council; domestic cover from Congress; a coalition comprising dozens of countries; a ground-force buildup lasting months in the Gulf; complete air supremacy followed by the severing of communications and supply lines; and the overthrow of the regime within weeks.

The equation was clear: a declared enemy + a broad coalition + a direct invasion + a swift, decisive outcome. Although Iraq was militarily weaker than Iran, it was brought down completely.

Second: The Iran Model — Management, Not Overthrow

With Iran, the picture is reversed: no prolonged global mobilization to overthrow the regime, no broad international coalition for war, and no long-term ground-force buildup, but rather limited strikes and a controlled ceiling on escalation, with protracted sanctions instead of a full-scale invasion. If Iran is stronger than Iraq, why is it not treated in the same way? Here the hypothesis of the “functional enemy” enters the picture.

Third: The Enemy That Is Managed Rather Than Overthrown

In this conception, Iran is not a target for decisive defeat but an element within an equation of balance. Its existence as a permanent adversary justifies the American military presence in the Gulf, reinforces arms deals and alliances, keeps energy markets under calculated tension without completely disrupting them, and maintains a continuous state of political and security alignment. Tension thus becomes an operating condition, not a prelude to a final war.

Fourth: Has the Cycle of the “Functional Enemy” Ended?

But what if this model itself is approaching its end? Recurrent, low-intensity, inconclusive conflict may lose its perceptual impact over time; when the world grows accustomed to “calculated escalation,” its effect erodes.

Here the question is not: Why is the war not decisively resolved? Rather: Has the need for its old form ended? If the cycle of the old instrument of mobilization and control has ended, we may be facing a repositioning within a new phase, rather than a random collapse.

Fifth: The Fundamental Difference

Iraq was meant to be overthrown in order to reshape the political map directly, whereas Iran—within this framework—was meant to remain within the equation to regulate the balance. But if this role has been exhausted, we may witness a gradual transition: a reduction in the intensity of the conflict without an official declaration of its end; a shift in the center of gravity from the military to the economic and technological; a quiet reshaping of alliances; and a diminishing role for the “traditional enemy” in favor of more complex instruments of influence.

The Danger of Preoccupation with Unconventional War

This war is not a conventional military conflict, but an instrument of perception management and economic attrition. The danger is that the world looks only at the conflict on the ground, while the objective remains undeclared: threatening global energy passageways such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea; prolonging the conflict without a decisive resolution to ensure continuing tension; creating an escalating economic crisis that raises oil, gas, and food prices worldwide; and shifting the focus toward instruments of pressure rather than concern with achieving peace.

The result is that the world loses its way in reading the war as a conventional conflict, while the strategic objective is to wear down the global economy and control energy and food supply chains, leaving any military response incapable of addressing the true substance of the crisis.

Conclusion

The war with Iraq was a war of decisive resolution, and the conflict with Iran is a war of management. But if conflict management itself has exhausted its function, we may be facing a larger transitional phase; in this context, the “illogical war” is not chaos, but part of a deeper transformation in the structure of the system.

The question is no longer: Will an all-out war erupt? Rather: What form will the system that emerges after repositioning take?