Great Wars… Who Loses the Battle, and Who Wins the World Afterward?

In my view, the Russian–Ukrainian war deserves to be read in a way that goes beyond the conventional narrative that reduces it to a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. I do not treat the idea of a “hidden government” as an established fact, but put it forward as a hypothesis: could there be a network of interests and forces not visible on the scene that benefits from the continuation of this war and the outcomes it will produce?

What prompts me to ask this question is the contradiction I see between the scale and nature of the conflict, on the one hand, and the enormous capabilities of the parties and the forces behind it, on the other. Russia is a nuclear state with vast resources and a large industrial and military base, while Ukraine depends heavily on Western military, economic, and political support. Yet the war has not been decided; instead, it has become a prolonged war of attrition in which front lines shift and losses accumulate.

The Question of Timing: How Does a Man Come to Occupy His Position at the Moment of War?

Here, the question leads me to the figure of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. From my perspective, I find it difficult to regard his presence in this position as a mere political coincidence. He became president of Ukraine after a career in the arts and acting, without the conventional political or military experience that would, by the usual standards, qualify him to lead a country that would find itself, a few years later, confronting one of the most dangerous wars of the modern era.

I am not speaking here about him personally, his capacity for leadership, or his performance after the outbreak of war, but about the timing, position, and role in which he found himself. In high politics, I find it difficult to believe that major transformations always occur in isolation or at random. Coincidences may occur in the lives of individuals, but when we speak of major states, alliances, energy sources, armies, trade corridors, and economic crises, every step affects the one that follows, and every decision reshapes the balance of power.

Was Zelenskyy’s rise to power merely a natural outcome of internal transformations in Ukraine, or did it come at a moment when the world and the region were already moving toward a larger confrontation?

In my view, the answer should be sought not in Zelenskyy alone, but in the entire course of events that preceded and surrounded him. More important than the individual is the role he has come to perform within a larger system.

War… and Who Benefits from Its Outcomes?

I do not see the major events taking place in the world as islands isolated from one another. The First World War was not merely a war that ended when the battles ended: it redrew the map of the world, brought down empires, and altered balances of power. Then came the Second World War, whose outcomes exceeded the mere victory of one side over another. From it emerged a new world order, new great powers, new international institutions, and political, economic, and security arrangements entirely different from those of the world that preceded it.

Here, history poses a question that cannot be ignored: who ultimately benefited from those wars? Not only who won the battle militarily, but who emerged politically, economically, and strategically stronger, and who possessed the capacity to shape the order that followed.

This is the basis of my conviction that a reading of international politics should not focus solely on who started the war or fired the first shot, but on who benefited from the outcomes the war produced. Great wars are measured not only by the number of those killed or the extent of the territories whose boundaries changed, but by the new order they leave behind.

Thus, when I look at the Russian–Ukrainian war, I do not ask only: will Russia or Ukraine prevail? I also ask: what will the world look like after the war ends? Who will determine its shape? And who is preparing today for the world that will come afterward?

A War That Extends Beyond Ukraine

If I place the Russian–Ukrainian war alongside what is happening in the Middle East, shifts in energy markets, the reshaping of alliances, rising military expenditure, and economic turmoil, I find it difficult to treat all this as a collection of independent, unrelated events.

In my view, events are moving in one direction. States may differ in their immediate aims, may clash with one another, and each side may believe it holds the initiative, yet the final outcome may feed into a direction that exceeds the will of the parties themselves.

This is why I return to the question concerning Zelenskyy. Perhaps he was not the one who brought about the war, and perhaps he did not know from the outset where events would lead him. But for me, the question is not: was Zelenskyy the one who planned the war? Rather: who placed him in a position from which he could become one of this war’s most prominent faces? Who benefited from his transformation into a global symbol of the conflict? Who benefited from the war’s continuation? And who will benefit from the world that emerges from it?

Here, another hypothesis arises: what if the ultimate objective were not the destruction of Ukraine or the defeat of Russia, but the reshaping of Europe? A prolonged war does not drain only its two sides; it also reshapes their surrounding environment. Russia is being depleted militarily and economically. Ukraine is being destroyed and is losing a large proportion of its population and infrastructure. Europe is bearing increasing economic and security burdens. Military expenditure is rising. Europe’s energy map is changing. And the continent is entering a new phase of rebuilding its defense system and arranging its security relations.

Perhaps what is sought is neither a complete Russian victory nor a complete Ukrainian victory; perhaps what is sought is for no one to win.

For a complete Russian victory could bring about a radical change in the balance of power within Europe, while a complete Ukrainian victory could lead to a different outcome. The continuation of the war, however, produces a third condition: the depletion of Russia, the destruction of Ukraine, and the reshaping of Europe.

Iraq, Libya, and Syria… Is the Pattern Repeating Itself?

In my view, I need not look at Ukraine alone. In Iraq, the regime fell, but its fall was not the end of the conflict: it was followed by political and security turmoil and internal and regional conflicts that continued for years. In Libya, military intervention brought down Gaddafi’s regime, but the state did not subsequently enter a period of stability; instead, it entered a prolonged period of political, military, and institutional division. In Syria, the crisis became a multiparty war involving regional and international powers and armed groups, and the conflict continued for many years while the state, society, and economy suffered enormous depletion.

The circumstances of these countries may differ, as may the nature of their conflicts, but the comparison poses a single question: does bringing down a political regime necessarily mean building a stable state afterward? Or might keeping a state weak, divided, and depleted sometimes be part of the outcome that follows war?

Those who wish to weaken a state do not necessarily need to destroy it completely; keeping it in a prolonged state of attrition may have a greater effect than bringing it down all at once. From here, I return to the larger question: are we seeing merely the unintended consequences of wars, or can keeping states exhausted and unstable become, in some cases, an objective in itself?

The Middle East and Energy Corridors

I then look at the Middle East from another angle. If the Russian–Ukrainian war coincides with a broad conflict over Iran and potential disruption to energy corridors, the picture extends beyond the borders of the warring states: the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz. These are not merely points on a map, but strategic corridors through which pass the trade and energy on which the global economy depends.

If more than one of these corridors is disrupted at the same time, the impact does not remain confined to the countries where wars are taking place: energy prices rise, global trade is affected, transport and insurance costs increase, economic pressures intensify, and governments face a greater need to manage crises and contain their repercussions.

Here, I arrive at the larger hypothesis: what if the wars and crises we are witnessing are not isolated events? What if, directly or indirectly, they are pushing the world in a single direction: weakening states, draining economies, reshaping alliances, redistributing energy sources, increasing military expenditure, expanding dependence on technology, and transforming the concept of security from a national issue into one of a global character?

Then comes a stage at which people feel that the existing international order is no longer capable of dealing with the scale of accumulated crises. At that point, a new question may emerge: do we not need a new world order? A more centralized order, stronger international institutions, more unified financial mechanisms, more tightly controlled digital systems, and perhaps—at the furthest extreme of this scenario—a more unified global monetary system, leading ultimately to the idea of a single world currency.

Are We Witnessing a Reshaping of the World Order?

From here, another hypothesis emerges: perhaps the Third World War is not the ultimate end, but could be a stage within a broader process of reshaping the world order. Perhaps the series of crises preceding it is what prepares the world psychologically, politically, and economically to accept changes it would not have been prepared to accept under normal circumstances.

But here a contradiction arises that cannot be ignored: if there is an actor capable of planning this entire course, can it truly control millions of people, armies, states, and economies, as well as popular reactions and unforeseen outcomes? Or might the attempt to fit all these events into a single plan itself constitute a misreading of history?

Here lies the paradox: the more the scene appears to be moving in a single direction, the more another question arises: are we looking at a plan? Or at a collection of different forces, each with its own interests, that events have driven toward similar outcomes?

I therefore do not present this hypothesis as a definitive truth, but place it before the reader as an open question: are we witnessing a series of wars and crises that have spiraled out of control, or a gradual process of reshaping the world order? Perhaps the most important question is not: who won the war? Rather: who benefited from its continuation? Who benefited from its outcomes? And who will be able to benefit from the order that will be born afterward?

Are We Witnessing a Shift in the Center of Power?

From my perspective, when I place the events the world has witnessed over recent decades within a single context, I find it difficult to treat them as isolated, unrelated events. I raise the possibility of a global network of interests that has been operating for a long time, not necessarily visibly or directly, but by creating the political, economic, and military conditions that gradually drive the world toward particular outcomes.

Among these outcomes, in my reading, is the preparation of conditions for expanding the geographical and strategic reach of Israeli influence. For me, the issue concerns not only current borders, but a broader project based on reshaping the surrounding environment, weakening powers that could pose a threat, and redrawing the balances of power in the Middle East.

When I look at what happened in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and then at what is happening in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, I see a trajectory that warrants examination: major Arab and regional states have, over recent decades, been subjected to wars, divisions, foreign interventions, and attrition. By contrast, Israel’s capacity for military action in its surroundings has expanded, while its regional adversaries have become more preoccupied with their internal crises or more exposed to attrition.

If this hypothesis is correct, wars are not separate objectives but instruments within a longer trajectory: one war weakens a state, another dismantles an alliance, a third drains a regional power, an economic crisis reorders priorities, and a struggle over energy reshapes alliances. The outcomes then accumulate until geographical and political change becomes possible that would have seemed impossible years earlier.

From Geographical Expansion to the Expansion of Influence

Here, I arrive at a broader idea: what if the matter concerns not only geographical expansion, but the relocation of the very center of global power? After the Second World War, the United States became the most prominent power in the international order, and Washington became a principal center of global political, economic, and military decision-making.

But what if this order itself is in transition? What if the United States, through successive wars, economic crises, and military attrition, is gradually losing part of its capacity to lead the world? Here, within this hypothesis, Israel becomes more than merely an allied state: it may become the regional center through which the Middle East is reshaped, and then a center of influence extending beyond the region.

The more the surrounding regional powers are weakened, the greater its room for maneuver becomes. The more the United States is drained by multiple, costly wars, the more questions arise about its ability to continue as the sole dominant power.

What if what we are seeing is not merely the rise of a state, but a gradual shift in the center from which the world order is managed?

This proposition may seem far-fetched if we view Israel as a small state compared with the United States. But I am not speaking of a simple geographical relocation of the center of power. Rather, I am speaking of a shift in centers of influence and decision-making, and in networks of finance, technology, security, and international alliances. This shift may not happen all at once, but through stages: weakening adversaries, reshaping the region, rearranging alliances, redistributing energy sources, weakening certain great powers through prolonged wars, and then building a new system in which the role is far greater than the current one.

Links in the Possible Trajectory

From here, I see that events that appear scattered may, according to this hypothesis, be successive links in a single trajectory: Iraq, Libya, Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Ukraine, Europe, the United States, energy, maritime corridors, and the global economy. Each issue appears separate when we examine it on its own, but when I place them within a single picture, I see a possible method for redistributing power.

The question then is no longer: does Israel benefit from this war or that one? Rather, it becomes: is there a long-term trajectory that makes it the ultimate beneficiary of the series of wars and crises striking the region and the international order? If so, the project is not merely one of borders, but part of a larger project: rebuilding the Middle East, weakening rival powers, and then moving gradually from the position of a state supported by the superpower to that of a power participating in the making of the order on which it previously depended.

Here, I arrive at the core of my hypothesis: perhaps the United States was not the final destination in the trajectory of global power. The shift need not happen tomorrow, nor need it happen in the way I anticipate. But if events are indeed moving in this direction, what we are witnessing today may be only one stage in the shift of the center of power. Here, the final question becomes: are we witnessing only a redrawing of the Middle East’s borders, or a reconfiguration of the center of power that will govern the world in the coming phase?

Conclusion: Who Won the War, or Who Won the World Afterward?

In the end, I return to the idea I regard as the key to this entire reading: are modern wars measured by who won the battle, or by who benefited from the world the war produced?

The First World War: who emerged stronger? The Second World War: who emerged stronger? Iraq: who benefited from the fall of the state, and what happened after the fall of the regime? Libya: what happened after Gaddafi’s fall, and who benefited from the state of division that followed? Syria: who emerged stronger from the continuation of the conflict? Ukraine: who is being drained in this war, and who is repositioning themselves as a result of its continuation? Iran: who is harmed by its weakening, and whose strategic environment is changing in their favor?

When I place these questions alongside one another, I arrive at the question I consider most important: is Israel merely a beneficiary of these transformations, or is it part of the trajectory that produces them? What matters may be not only knowing who started the war or who won the battle, but knowing who emerged from the war possessing more territory, greater influence, weaker adversaries, and a stronger position in the order that took shape afterward.

Here, the reading of war becomes different: war may end on the map, but its effects do not end with it. States may fall, borders change, alliances collapse, new powers emerge, and energy and trade routes shift; then the world begins to build a new order upon the ruins of the old.

When the war ends, who will have lost the battle… and who will have won the world that came afterward?

The Second Corruption… and Great Exaltation

﴿وَقَضَيْنَا إِلَىٰ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ فِي الْكِتَابِ لَتُفْسِدُنَّ فِي الْأَرْضِ مَرَّتَيْنِ وَلَتَعْلُنَّ عُلُوًّا كَبِيرًا﴾ (And We decreed to the Children of Israel in the Book: “You will surely cause corruption in the land twice, and you will surely exalt yourselves with great exaltation.”) [الإسراء: ٤]

I find in the verse’s formulation a precision that warrants reflection. The Qur’an did not merely say that the Children of Israel would cause corruption in the land twice; it linked the announcement of corruption to “great exaltation.” From here, I read the phase in which we live today as a possible instance of the second corruption foretold by the Qur’an.

The first corruption may have occurred in an earlier historical period, while the second corruption, which I see in our own age, appears in this reading not as corruption alone, but as corruption accompanied by great exaltation. I do not treat exaltation here as mere material or military superiority, but as attaining a level of power and influence that permits the imposition of one’s will on others, expansion in the land, and the reshaping of the surrounding political environment.

Here, the verse intersects with the question I posed in this essay: if successive wars and crises lead to the weakening of states, the depletion of regional powers, the redrawing of borders, and the rearrangement of alliances, and then to the preparation of an environment that permits the expansion of influence, the question becomes: could what we are witnessing today be the phase in which corruption is joined with the great exaltation indicated by the verse?

At this point, speaking of expansion is no longer merely speaking of geography, but of a project founded on power, influence, and the reshaping of the region in a manner that permits the imposition of a new reality. The question I place before the reader is this: if corruption occurs twice, and great exaltation is linked to this announcement, are we today witnessing the second phase, in which corruption has been joined with exaltation? If so, are the wars, the depletion of states, the reshaping of the Middle East, and the expansion of influence that we are witnessing not isolated events, but part of a larger historical phase?

Perhaps the question is not only: who won the war? Rather: who emerged from it more capable of imposing their will on the world that came afterward?