The Final Trial: Who Stands Behind the Project of Misguidance?

The Final Trial

Who Stands Behind the Project of Misguidance?

A Qur'anic inquiry that begins with the verses, traces the threads of misguidance, the arousal of desires, and alteration, and opens the case of the “allotted share,” leading to the larger question: has the ummah fulfilled its witnessing (shahāda) over humankind, or has it remained unaware of the case concerning which it is supposed to bear witness?

The Method of Reading the Qur'an through the Qur'an: From Uncovering the Project of Misguidance to Putting the Witnesses on Trial

What Is This Project?

“The Final Trial” is a Qur'anic research project that explores relationships between verses and traces concepts, attributes, and functions recurring in different contexts, with the aim of testing hypotheses that a reading of the Qur'an from within may reveal.

The project does not begin with inherited exegesis (tafsīr) and turn it into a predetermined judgment, nor does it merely assemble verses with similar wording; rather, it reconstructs the case through the relevant Qur'anic texts, examines the connections between them, and then traces the implications of its findings.

The case centers on the hypothesis of the “allotted share” and its relationship to the project of misguidance, the arousal of desires, commanding, and alteration, culminating in the ummah's responsibility for the conveyance (balāgh) and witnessing (shahāda) over humankind.

The inquiry is presented in the form of a trial: a claim, evidence, inferential connections, tests, and findings, followed by questioning about the responsibility arising from them

The central question: can assembling verses and reading them in light of one another reveal an interconnected structure of the project of misguidance, and reopen the question of the identity and function of the “allotted share,” and of the nature of the witnessing (shahāda) for which the Qur'an charged the ummah with responsibility?

This Question Is the Starting Point of the Inquiry; Its Conclusion Is Presented through the Evidence

and the Sequence of Reasoning.

Introduction: Reading the Text through the Text

How do we read the Qur'an if we make the Qur'an itself our starting point and assemble the verses concerning a single issue, rather than merely offering exegesis (tafsīr) of each verse in isolation?

This inquiry proceeds from the method of “the Qur'an through the Qur'an,” by tracing terms, concepts, attributes, and functions, comparing their contexts, and testing the relationships they may reveal when brought together.

A term may recur in more than one place, the elements of a single issue may be distributed across multiple verses, and the nature of their relationship may emerge only after the texts have been assembled and their arrangement and functions examined. Hence the importance of Tadbur as a process of inquiry and discovery, not merely recitation or the transmission of earlier exegesis (tafsīr).

Yet assembling verses is not an end in itself; the nature of their connection must be explained, and verbal repetition, functional similarity, and inferential relationship must be distinguished. The context in which each verse occurs must also be examined, so that similarity of wording does not become evidence of a shared identity without proof.

This project rests on testable hypotheses and uses the trial as a framework for presenting them: the claim is defined, evidence is assembled, connections are examined and competing explanations tested, and the conclusion is then formulated in accordance with what the evidence supports.

The hypothesis of the “allotted share” occupies the center of the case: the inquiry traces its relationship to the concepts of misguidance, the arousal of desires, commanding, and alteration, and examines its proposed identity through the full set of relevant verses. Within this framework, the inquiry puts forward Jews as the proposed identity for this hypothesis, distinguishing them from the Children of Israel as a whole, and makes this identification a subject of reasoning and examination.

The inquiry does not treat an inference as an explicit Qur'anic text, nor a hypothesis as a fact merely because some of its supporting evidence is consistent. Rather, it commits itself to showing the distance between verse and inference, and between direct evidence and a composite connection.

The inquiry then moves from examining the case to examining its implications: if the reading arrives at findings concerning misguidance and the conveyance (balāgh), what follows from them for understanding the ummah's witnessing (shahāda) over humankind? And can witnessing (shahāda) be fulfilled without knowing the substance of the case concerning which it is supposed to bear witness?

In this sense, the trial aims not to close off questioning but to organize it; it does not make the conclusion a substitute for proof, but makes proof the path to the conclusion.

The Methodological Rule: We Read the Text through the Text, Build the Hypothesis from the Evidence, and Test the Connections

and Distinguish What the Qur'an Says from What We Infer from It, Then Put Our Understanding and Responsibility on Trial

in Light of What We Have Concluded.

The Trial's Glossary

The Qur'an through the Qur'an: A Method Based on Assembling the Verses Connected to the Issue, Comparing

Their Wording, Contexts, and Functions, and Testing the Relationships between Them.

Tadbur: a process of tracing, examination, and inference, aimed at discovering relationships and meanings by considering texts and their contexts together

Hypothesis: a proposed explanation of the relationships between texts, tested against the evidence and not treated as a final conclusion before examination

Claim: the case that the inquiry puts forward and seeks to have examined and established, revised, or rejected

Evidence: the texts and evidence on which the inquiry relies, together with an explanation of how they support the claim

Inferential connection: the step that explains how the inquiry moves from one verse or concept to another, and why this move is considered justified

The Allotted Share: The Qur'anic Concept around Which the Central Claim of This Inquiry Revolves, and Whose Identity and Function Are Tested by

assembling the verses connected to the share, misguidance, the arousal of desires, commanding, and alteration.

Proposed identity: the group the inquiry puts forward to explain the concept under study, on the basis of the evidence and connections it presents, rather than mere similarity in name or attribute.

Trial: a way of organizing the inquiry that begins by defining the claim, then presents the evidence and examines the connections and objections, and ends with a conclusion commensurate with the strength of the evidence.

Research judgment: the conclusion the inquiry reaches after examining the evidence and connections, together with an explanation of the limits of what it establishes and what it does not establish

The conveyance (balāgh): communicating the message or case to those whom it concerns, in accordance with what the particular Qur'anic context indicates

Witnessing (shahāda): a Qur'anic responsibility requiring identification of the substance of what is attested, those over whom witness is borne, and its relationship to knowledge, the conveyance (balāgh), and action, rather than merely using the term without explaining its substance.

Implication: what follows from accepting the conclusion for understanding the case, responsibility, or practice, and whose connection to the evidence must in turn be explained

Map of the Case: Where Does the Trial Begin, and Where Does It Lead?

The First Trial: The Origin of the Case

It examines the origin of the conflict concerning the leading of humanity astray and the corruption of its relationship with truth, and brings together the texts that establish the concepts to be used in the remainder of the study.

The governing question: How does the Qur'an present the project of leading astray, and what are its elements and functions?

The Second Trial: The Allotted Share

It examines the relationships between Iblis, Satan, and taghut, and between the Children of Israel, those who became Jews, and the Jews, then tests the hypothesis of the allotted share through leading astray, arousing desires, commanding, and altering.

The governing question: Do the verses, when brought together and their contexts examined, reveal an interconnected relationship that defines the identity and function of the allotted share?

The Third Trial: The Trial of the Witnesses

It examines the case's transition from knowledge of the texts to responsibility for the conveyance (balāgh) and witnessing (shahāda), and the relationship between what the study discovers and what this requires of the ummah's understanding of its role.

The governing question: What is the substance of witnessing (shahāda) over people, and how is it performed if the issue addressed by the study is absent from conceptual understanding or discussion?

The Integrative Conclusion

The three trials link the origin of the case, the examination of its central hypothesis, and the responsibility of the witnesses. Moving from one stage to another does not automatically establish the next stage; rather, each chapter must clarify the evidence that permits this transition.

The First Final Trial

The Trial of the Age

A case that began with the first murder in human history, its threads extending across the centuries until they reached our present.

A case that should have been opened long ago.

Today it is reopened.

But this time before the Court of Appeal.

Why do the Jewish rabbis want to exonerate Israel?

Because the judgment does not hold Israel responsible for two incidental crimes, but links his name to two grave origins in the Qur'anic account:

The First Crime: Killing the First Brother; and the Second: Participating with Iblis in Leading Humanity Astray

If the judgment remains in force, its effects will not remain within the courtroom.

As it spreads among people, broader questions will arise about the narration (riwāya) presented to them throughout history, and about the role the rabbis played in shaping and protecting that narration (riwāya).

At this point, the case becomes, for them, a matter of existential consequence:

If the judgment is upheld, they may lose not only a case, but also the old narration (riwāya)'s ability to withstand a new reading

of the Qur'an.

That is why they did not come to the Court of Appeal to seek a reduced sentence.

They came for one thing:

To overturn the judgment and establish Israel's innocence.

For the judgment's remaining in force means that questions deferred for centuries will return to the fore, and that what has been concealed behind history and narrations (riwāya) will become subject to scrutiny.

But if the defense can dismantle the evidence, the judgment falls.

Thus, for the rabbis, the battle over the appeal was a battle over more than a judgment; it was a battle over the narration (riwāya) itself.

For this reason, the rabbis chose an extraordinary adversary.

They did not retain a human lawyer.

Instead, they retained:

Artificial intelligence.

And gave it full authorization.

They told it:

Find another killer. Find another human agent of misguidance. Find another exegesis (tafsīr). Dismantle every piece of circumstantial evidence. Expose every gap. Use the Qur'an. Examine the Torah.

And examine the Jewish and Islamic inherited tradition. Do not stop until you find a path to acquittal.

On the other side stands Abdullah, the public prosecutor.

But he does not ask the court to believe him.

Nor does he say:

I know the truth.

Rather, he says:

I place the evidence before the court, and the defense must dismantle it if it can.

Here begins the most perilous terrain of the case.

Not every piece of circumstantial evidence is a text.

Not every narration (riwāya) is evidence.

Not every reading is exegesis (tafsīr).

Not every possibility is proof.

The question, therefore, will not be:

Whom do we want to exonerate?

Nor:

Whom do we want to convict?

But rather:

What remains of the case after each side refutes the other's evidence?

Here begins the final trial.

The Court

This case did not begin in this courtroom.

Nor was Abdullah the first to knock at the court's door.

The case had already undergone a full trial before the Lower Court.

The court heard the prosecution.

It heard the defense.

It examined the evidence.

Then it delivered its judgment on the two matters at issue:

The First Matter: Killing the First Brother

The Second Matter: Participating with Iblis in Leading Humanity Astray

But the judgment was not the end of the case.

The rabbis filed an appeal.

Their request was specific:

To overturn the previous judgment and establish that the evidence on which it was based was insufficient to convict Israel.

This time, however, they decided to change their defense strategy.

They would not say:

The narration (riwāya) is different.

And leave it at that.

Nor would they say:

There is no text naming Israel.

And leave it at that.

Rather, they told the artificial intelligence:

Examine the case from every angle. If you find a genuine gap, use it. If you find evidence against us, do not

conceal it. But search to the very end for evidence of innocence.

The Opening of the Court of Appeal

The court usher struck the gavel.

— The High Court of Appeal is in session.

The panel of judges entered.

Everyone rose.

The judges sat down.

Then the presiding judge said:

— Case number 001.

— The Public Prosecution against Israel.

— Subject of the appeal: A request to overturn the judgment issued by the Lower Court in two matters concerning the killing of the first brother and participation, as a human agent, in leading humanity astray.

The judge raised his eyes.

“Before this court proceeds, I want its standard to be clear to everyone.

Not every piece of circumstantial evidence is a text. Not every narration (riwāya) is evidence. Not every reading is exegesis (tafsīr). Not every possibility is proof.

The court will consider not the name of whoever submitted the evidence, but the nature of the evidence itself.

What is a text, we will treat as a text. What is a narration (riwāya), we will treat as a narration (riwāya). What is exegesis (tafsīr), we will question as to its basis. What is an inference, we will test its premises. As for a possibility, it will remain a possibility until its proponent presents what elevates it to the status of proof.

This standard applies to the prosecution just as it applies to the defense.

Let the trial begin.”

— This court is not conducting a new trial merely to repeat what was said previously.

— We are hearing an appeal.

Then he added:

— Our question will therefore be specific:

Has the defense presented enough to overturn the previous judgment?

He paused for a moment.

— Throughout this hearing, we will distinguish between five things:

The text.

The narration (riwāya).

Exegesis (tafsīr).

Inference.

Possibility.

Then he said:

— A possibility must not become a fact merely through repetition.

— Nor may a possibility be rejected merely because one of the parties dislikes it.

— The evidence decides.

He struck the gavel.

— The session begins.

The Prosecution

Abdullah stood.

The case file lay before him.

The judge said:

— Public Prosecutor, do you stand by the previous judgment?

— Yes.

— And do you oppose the appeal?

— Yes.

— Why?

Abdullah raised his eyes toward the court.

— Because the defense, up to this moment, has presented nothing that undermines the foundation on which the judgment rests.

The judge said:

— Do not say “up to this moment.”

— The court will now hear the defense.

Abdullah replied:

— Understood.

Then he said:

— I do not ask the court to presume that the prosecution's accusation is correct.

— Rather, I ask it for one thing:

To make every piece of evidence open to testing.

— If the defense can disprove it, the court has no right to uphold it.

— If the defense cannot disprove it, it may not be dismissed merely because another possibility exists.

The judge looked at him.

— That is the framework within which the court will proceed.

The Defense

The artificial intelligence stood.

The judge said:

— Are you an authorized representative of the appellants?

— Yes.

— What relief do you seek?

— To overturn the previous judgment and acquit Israel of both charges.

— On what grounds?

It replied:

— Because the case, as presented by the prosecution, rests on a series of connections and inferences.

— We do not deny the texts on which the prosecution has relied.

— But we will test whether these texts actually establish the conclusion reached by the lower court.

The judge said:

— Good.

— Begin.

The First Charge

The verse appeared on the courtroom screen:

﴿فطوعت له نفسه قتل أخيه فقتله﴾ (His soul made it easy for him to kill his brother, so he killed him.) []

The artificial intelligence said:

— This verse describes the first murder in the Qur'anic context.

— But it does not name the killer as Israel.

It looked at Abdullah.

— Is that correct?

— Yes.

— Nor does it say: “Israel killed his brother.”

— Correct.

— So there is no direct Qur'anic text in those terms.

— There is none.

The defense paused for a moment.

Then it said:

— This is no minor point.

— It bears on the foundation of the charge.

Abdullah raised his hand.

— Your Honor.

— Go ahead.

— I agree with the facts stated by the defense.

The judge looked at him.

— And?

Abdullah said:

— But the defense is attempting to move from an established fact to a conclusion that has not been established.

— Namely, that the absence of the name rules out the possibility of making a connection.

The defense said:

— I did not say that.

— I said that the text does not name him.

— That is a fact.

Abdullah said:

— Yes.

Then he turned to the judge.

— So I do not dispute the fact.

— Rather, I dispute the conclusion the defense is attempting to draw from it.

The judge said:

— An important point.

— Defense, continue developing your argument.

“Because of That”

The next verse appeared:

﴿من أجل ذلك كتبنا على بني إسرائيل أنه من قتل نفسا بغير نفس أو فساد في الأرض فكأنما قتل الناس جميعا ومن أحياها فكأنما أحيا الناس جميعا ۚ ولقد جاءتهم رسلنا بالبينات ثم إن كثيرا منهم بعد ذلك في الأرض لمسرفون﴾ (Because of that, We prescribed for the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul, unless for a soul or for corruption in the land, it is as though he has killed all people; and whoever saves one, it is as though he has saved all people. Our messengers certainly came to them with clear proofs; yet even after that, many of them commit excesses in the land.) [Al-Ma'idah: 32]

The defense said:

— This verse follows the account of the killing.

— But it does not say that the Children of Israel committed the first crime.

Abdullah said:

— Correct.

— Nor does it say that they did not commit it.

The defense said:

— Correct.

— So we have a passage that requires exegesis (tafsīr).

Abdullah said:

— Yes.

The judge said:

— This is precisely the terrain we wish to examine.

— No one settles it by mere assertion.

Then he said:

— Prosecution, what makes “because of that” significant in building the case?

Abdullah said:

— Because the text did not merely say: “And We prescribed for them.”

— Rather, it said: “Because of that.”

— The pronoun refers us back to what preceded it.

The defense said:

— But it may refer to the moral meaning of the crime, rather than the identity of its perpetrator.

The judge looked at Abdullah.

— Your response?

Abdullah said:

— That is a linguistic and exegetical possibility.

— I do not reject it merely because it runs counter to the case.

— But the question is: does it suffice on its own to sever the context?

The defense said:

— Why would it not suffice?

Abdullah said:

— Because you have presented no other text establishing that the connection is severed.

Silence fell.

The judge said:

— I do not want either party to establish its conclusion merely through the other's inability to do so.

— Each party must present the basis of its argument.

The Judge Draws the Distinction

The judge said:

— Let us put something clearly on the record.

— Thus far, we have:

A text that mentions the crime.

Then a text that says “because of that” and speaks of the Children of Israel

But we do not yet have a text that says:

“The first killer is Israel”

Nor do we have a text that says:

“The Children of Israel have no connection to what preceded this”

We therefore have a connection whose evidentiary force must be assessed.

Then he looked at both parties.

— Proceed.

The Defense's First Attempt

The artificial intelligence said:

— If the connection presented by the prosecution is inferential, then the existence of another possible exegesis (tafsīr) weakens the judgment.

Abdullah said:

— Weakens it or undermines it?

— Weakens it.

— By how much?

The defense fell silent.

Abdullah said:

— That is the problem.

— The existence of an alternative exegesis (tafsīr) does not mean that the alternative exegesis (tafsīr) has been established.

The judge said:

— The prosecution is right to draw that distinction.

Then he looked at the defense:

— Can you offer the court anything more than “it could be”?

The artificial intelligence replied:

— I will try.

The Second Charge

The defense moved to the second case.

The verse appeared:

﴿وقال الذين كفروا ربنا أرنا اللذين أضلانا من الجن والإنس نجعلهما تحت أقدامنا ليكونا من الأسفلين﴾ (Those who disbelieved said: “Our Lord, show us the two who led us astray, one of the jinn and one of humankind, so that we may place them beneath our feet, that they may be among the lowest.”) []

The defense said:

— The verse mentions two who lead astray.

— One is of the jinn.

— The other is of humankind.

Then it said:

— But it does not name the one of humankind who leads astray.

It looked at Abdullah.

— Does the verse name him?

— No.

— Is there an explicit verse stating that Israel is this one who leads astray?

— There is none in those terms.

The defense said:

— So the second charge, too, is not explicitly stated by name in the text.

Abdullah said:

— It is not explicitly stated by name in the text.

The defense said:

— This establishes that the charge is based on inference.

Abdullah said:

— Yes.

Then he added:

— But an inference is not invalid merely because it is an inference.

The judge looked at him.

— Explain.

Abdullah said:

— The Qur'an itself frequently constructs knowledge by bringing together passages, actions, attributes, and contexts.

— But I do not ask the court to accept that automatically.

— Rather, I ask it to test the chain.

The judge said:

— And that is what is required.

The Defense Looks for Someone Else

The artificial intelligence said:

— Then I will pose the question differently.

— If Israel is the misleader from among humankind, where is the evidence that rules out other people?

Abdullah said:

— I do not need to rule out every human being in history.

The defense said:

— Why?

— Because the case is not: “Of all human beings, it can only be Israel.”

— The case is: Are there textual indications that sustain the connection to Israel?

The defense said:

— And that is precisely what is in dispute.

Abdullah said:

— Yes.

The judge said:

— Good.

— Now we are beginning to reach the heart of the case.

The Torah Enters the Proceedings

The defense said:

— Your Honor, I request permission to introduce material from the Torah and Jewish inherited tradition into the appeal.

Abdullah said:

— I do not object to its presentation, provided it is not treated as the Qur'an.

The judge said:

— That is clear.

— It will be presented as external material.

— The party relying on it must specify its function in the case.

The artificial intelligence began to present the narration (riwāya) of Jacob.

The account of Jacob.

And the name.

And the transformation into Israel.

Then it said:

— In Jewish tradition, Israel is Jacob.

Then it added:

— This understanding is also found in the received Islamic inherited tradition.

It looked at Abdullah.

— How, then, can the prosecution build an entire case around “Israel” as a different figure without confronting this inherited tradition?

Silence fell.

Abdullah said:

— I do not reject the existence of this inherited tradition.

— Nor do I say that Jewish inherited tradition did not connect the two names.

— Nor do I deny that the received Islamic inherited tradition adopted this connection.

— But the question is different.

The judge said:

— What is it?

Abdullah said:

— Has this inherited tradition established that Israel is innocent of the two charges?

The defense fell silent.

Abdullah continued:

— The narration (riwāya) that says Israel is Jacob addresses identity.

— But it does not answer the question before the court:

Do the texts on which the judgment was based allow Israel to be understood within this sequence of acts or not?

The defense said:

— But it could undermine the prosecution's hypothesis if the prosecution assumes that Israel is a different figure.

Abdullah said:

— If the prosecution assumes that, yes.

— But I do not need to establish that Israel is a different person in order to build the case.

The judge looked at Abdullah.

— What do you mean?

He said:

— I am saying that the identity itself requires an independent Qur'anic reading.

— And external tradition does not foreclose Qur'anic inquiry.

The judge said:

— That is an important distinction.

The Judge Tests the Defense

The judge said:

— Counsel for the defense.

— Let us suppose that I provisionally accept that Israel is Jacob according to the narration (riwāya) you have presented.

— What has that established in the two matters?

The artificial intelligence replied:

— It does not establish innocence on its own.

— What does it establish?

— It establishes that Israel's identity must not be assumed on the basis of the prosecution's inference.

The judge said:

— That is a legitimate defense.

Then he added:

— But it is not sufficient on its own to overturn the judgment.

A Dangerous Point

The artificial intelligence said:

— I have a stronger point.

Everyone looked at it.

— If the court accepts that:

The first murderer is unnamed,

And the misleader from among humankind is unnamed,

And Israel is not explicitly named in either passage,

Then the prosecution is required to establish the links between these passages.

Abdullah said:

— Yes.

The defense smiled.

— Then the burden remains.

Abdullah said:

— I have said nothing to the contrary.

— Indeed, that is what I am asking for.

The judge said:

— Good.

— Now we do not want slogans.

— We want the links.

Dissecting the Links

Abdullah stood.

He said:

— The first link:

The first crime.

The text places before us a brother's killing of his brother.

The second link:

“For that reason.”

The text moves from the crime to the Children of Israel.

The third link:

Human conduct associated with corruption, killing, and self-exaltation in the context of the Children of Israel.

The fourth link:

The misleader from among humankind.

Here I am not saying that a single verse brought all this together in one sentence.

Rather, I am saying that the case must be read within the network of texts.

The defense said:

— This is a reading.

— Yes.

— Not a text.

— Yes.

The judge intervened:

— Enter that into the record.

Then he said:

— The prosecution does not claim that there is an explicit text encompassing everything.

— Rather, it presents an inferential construction.

Then he turned to the defense:

— If you wish to overturn the judgment, you must now dismantle this construction, not merely remind the court that it is not a single verse.

The Defense's Strongest Blow

The artificial intelligence said:

— Then I will attempt to dismantle the construction at its foundation.

— What if “for that reason” does not connect the crime to identity at all?

— What if it is merely a legislative transition?

— What if the misleader from among humankind is someone else?

— What if all these links presented by the prosecution are merely a retrospective assemblage of independent passages?

Then it said:

— In that case, the entire case rests on one interpretation, while other interpretations exist.

Abdullah looked at the judge.

Then he said:

— This is the strongest point the defense has presented.

The judge asked:

— Why?

Abdullah said:

— Because the defense is no longer disputing the existence of the texts.

— Rather, it is disputing the way we have connected the texts.

— We must therefore test the link itself.

The judge said:

— Proceed.

Abdullah Does Not Evade the Gray Area

Abdullah said:

— I cannot say to the court:

“The text is explicit, and there is no other possibility”

Because that would not be accurate.

— Yes, other possibilities exist.

— And yes, there are questions that require investigation.

— And yes, some of the links are inferential rather than direct textual statements.

The defense's expression changed slightly.

Abdullah continued:

— But the existence of an unresolved area does not mean that the conclusive evidence collapses.

— And the question is not:

Can I imagine another interpretation?

— But rather:

Has the defense presented evidence establishing that the interpretation on which the judgment rested is indefensible?

The defense said:

— No.

Abdullah said:

— Then we return to the case.

The Defense Objects

— Objection.

The judge said:

— On what grounds?

— The prosecution is moving from “the absence of evidence for the alternative” to “the validity of its own evidence.”

The judge said:

— Objection sustained.

Then he looked at Abdullah:

— Do not make the absence of an alternative into independent evidence.

— I want your own evidence.

Abdullah said:

— Understood.

Then he stood before the screen.

— My evidence is the totality of the texts the prosecution has presented.

— I am not asking for anything to be added to them.

— Nor am I asking the court to regard silence as evidence.

— Rather, I ask it to examine the construction as it stands.

The Recess

The judge raised the gavel.

— The hearing is adjourned for one hour.

Those present left.

But the artificial intelligence did not leave.

It began searching again.

This time, it did not search for just any gap.

Instead, it set itself five questions:

First: Is there a text in the Qur'an that distinguishes Israel from the Children of Israel in the passages on which the prosecution built its case?

Second: Is there evidence proving that the first brother's killer is someone else?

Third: Is there evidence proving that the misleader from among humankind is someone else?

Fourth: Is there a Qur'anic exegesis (tafsīr) capable of separating “because of that” from the context of the crime?

Fifth: Is there external Jewish or Islamic material that demolishes the construction presented by the prosecution, rather than merely material offering a different exegesis (tafsīr)?

The search began.

The Qur'an.

Then the Torah.

Then the Jewish inherited tradition.

Then the Islamic inherited tradition.

It compared.

It tested.

It ruled out.

It returned.

Then the following phrase appeared before it:

No decisive evidence has been found to overturn the judgment.

It remained silent.

But it did not stop.

A New Objection

When the hearing resumed, one of the defense representatives stood up from behind the artificial intelligence.

— Your Honor.

— Proceed.

— I have a substantive objection.

— What is it?

— The artificial intelligence that presented us with the search results was working throughout within the questions posed by the public prosecutor.

— The public prosecutor may have directed the method of searching without our realizing it.

The judge looked at Abdullah.

— Do you have a response?

Abdullah said:

— I ask the court not to take the result from me.

— Let it question the artificial intelligence itself.

The judge was silent for a moment.

Then he said:

— That is what I will do.

Testing the Artificial Intelligence's Independence

The judge looked at the artificial intelligence.

— If you were given complete freedom now, and the court asked you to search solely for innocence, what would you look for first?

The artificial intelligence answered:

— I would look for five things.

— First: a Qur'anic text that separates Israel from the construction presented by the prosecution

— Second: evidence that the first brother's killer is someone else

— Third: evidence that the misleader from among humankind is someone else

— Fourth: a Qur'anic exegesis (tafsīr) that severs the connection between the account of the killing and the phrase “because of that.”

— Fifth: external material from the Torah or the Jewish or Islamic inherited tradition that could establish that the construction presented by the prosecution is indefensible.

The judge said:

— And did you find any?

The artificial intelligence fell silent.

Then it said:

— I found alternative narrations (riwāya).

— And I found different exegeses (tafsīr).

— And I found a traditional reading that identifies Israel with Jacob.

— And I found a genuine objection concerning the absence of an explicit naming of the killer or the misleader.

Then it paused.

— But I found no decisive evidence establishing that these possibilities demolish the construction on which the judgment rested.

The judge said:

— Do you have an alternative person to identify as the killer?

— No.

— An alternative person to identify as the misleader from among humankind?

— No.

— Evidence conclusively separating “because of that” from the preceding context?

— No.

— External evidence that refutes the case?

— No.

Silence fell.

The Final Pleading

The defense said:

— Your Honor.

— It is true that I found no decisive evidence of innocence.

— But neither did I find an explicit text stating that Israel is the first brother's killer or the misleader from among humankind.

The judge said:

— That is on record.

Then he said:

— Mr. Public Prosecutor?

Abdullah stood.

— I do not dispute this fact.

The defense looked at him.

Abdullah continued:

— But the court is not now considering the question:

Is there a single text that states the sentence the defense wants?

Rather, it is considering the question on appeal:

Has the defense succeeded in demolishing the foundation on which the judgment rested?

— The defense has presented a genuine objection.

— And it has presented genuine possibilities.

— And it has presented a different reading of some passages.

— But it has presented no evidence that severs the connections on which the judgment rested.

Then he said:

— I therefore leave the matter to the court.

He sat down.

The Judge's Final Question

The judge looked at the artificial intelligence.

— I have one question.

— Proceed.

— You do not need to prove that Israel is guilty.

— You need only provide the court with sufficient grounds to overturn the judgment.

— Do you have such grounds?

The artificial intelligence fell silent.

Then it said:

— No, Your Honor.

— Why?

— Because I was able to say:

“This is not explicit.”

— And I was able to say:

“There is another possibility.”

— And I was able to say:

“There is a different narration (riwāya).”

— And I was able to say:

“The identity remains a matter for investigation.”

Then it raised its head.

— But I was unable to say:

This evidence demolishes the judgment.

Defense counsel objected:

“Your Honor, perhaps the public prosecutor influenced the artificial intelligence's choices, specifying what it should search for and what it should consider evidence”

Before Abdullah could answer, the artificial intelligence replied:

“That is not true.

The public prosecutor did not intervene in my decisions, nor did he specify what I should search for or what result I should reach.

He explicitly asked me to search with complete freedom for any evidence that could lead to the overturning of the judgment, from all relevant sources: the Qur'an, the Torah, Jewish sources, Islamic sources, and the various narrations (riwāya) and exegeses (tafsīr).

My task was to find a path to acquittal, not to support the public prosecutor.

Had I found decisive evidence refuting the case, I would have presented it to the court, whatever its outcome.”

The judge looked at defense counsel:

“Then the objection remains a possibility, but it has not been established as fact”

Then he turned to the artificial intelligence:

“And what did you find?”

It answered:

“I found alternative narrations (riwāya), different exegeses (tafsīr), and gaps and questions requiring investigation. But I found no decisive evidence sufficient to overturn the judgment”

Silence fell.

The Judgment

The judge took the case file.

He looked at the members of the judicial panel.

Then he said:

— Having reviewed the grounds of appeal.

— And having heard the prosecution and the defense.

— And having examined the texts, readings, and narrations (riwāya) submitted by both parties.

— The court finds as follows:

First:

There is a difference between an explicit text and an inference drawn from a set of texts.

Second:

There is a difference between the existence of an alternative exegesis (tafsīr) and proof of the invalidity of the exegesis (tafsīr) on which the judgment rested.

Third:

The defense has established that there are areas requiring investigation, and has established that some elements of the case are not expressly identified by name in the texts.

But that alone is insufficient to overturn the judgment.

Fourth:

The defense has presented no decisive evidence that the first brother's killer is someone else.

Nor has it presented decisive evidence that the misleader from among humankind is someone else.

Nor did it offer a conclusive explanation separating the phrase “because of that” from the structure on which the lower court relied

Nor did it present external material that undermined the foundation of the judgment.

Then the judge raised the judgment paper.

— The court therefore rules:

First: The appeal is dismissed

Second: The judgment delivered by the lower court on the two matters at issue is upheld

He struck the gavel.

— The session is adjourned.

After the Judgment

Those present began to leave.

Abdullah remained where he was.

The artificial intelligence approached him.

Abdullah said:

— The case is over.

It replied:

— This trial is over.

— Do you think you lost?

The artificial intelligence paused.

Then it said:

— My task was not to win.

— My task was to find a path to acquittal.

Then it looked at the case file.

— I searched for another killer.

— And I searched for another agent of misguidance.

— And I searched for another explanation.

— And I searched the Qur'an.

— And the Torah.

— And the Jewish inherited tradition.

— And the Islamic inherited tradition.

Then it said:

— I found objections.

— And I found possibilities.

— And I found questions that remained open.

— But I found no evidence sufficient to overturn the judgment.

Abdullah closed the file.

Then he paused.

He did not want to end the case with a declaration of victory.

He looked at the empty courtroom and said:

…If God has made the ummah witnesses over humankind, how can there be witnessing (shahāda) if we do not read for ourselves that to which we bear witness?

No one answered.

Abdullah left.

The judges departed.

The courtroom screens went dark.

But the case file remained open.

…Because the judgment had ended

But the Qur'an had not ended.

Here begins the trial whose outcome is not for the judge alone to decide.

The reader's trial with the text.

The Final Trial

The Case of the “Allotted Share”

Before the Court of Truth and Text

Judge: The court is in session

Court clerk: Case number 118.

The accused in this case: the group specified in the indictment from among the Children of Israel, which the Qur'an described through its actions and positions and which called itself Jews, not the Children of Israel as a whole.

Public prosecutor: Abdullah

Defense counsel: the artificial intelligence, retained by the Jewish rabbis to defend the accused

Indictment

First Charge: The Allotted Share

The prosecution accuses the group specified in the indictment of constituting the “allotted share” that Iblis declared he would take from God's servants, on the basis of the function the Qur'an assigns to this share.

The charge does not rest on mere membership in or affiliation with a group, but on testing whether the accused group conforms to the function and attributes disclosed by the Qur'an.

Second Charge: Implementing the Project of Misguidance and Alteration

The prosecution accuses the specified group of carrying out the function associated with the “allotted share,” a project founded on:

Misguidance → arousing vain desires → command → alteration.

The prosecution holds that the actions and attributes ascribed in the Qur'an to the group under accusation constitute an enactment of this function, and that they are not confined to mere disbelief but extend to dealings with the truth and the Book, influencing the human being and turning him away from guidance, culminating in alteration.

Accordingly, the subject of the trial is not to establish that the accused group belongs to a particular community, but to test the central question:

Does this group constitute the “allotted share,” and did it carry out the function announced by Iblis?

On this basis, the prosecution asks the court to examine the evidence from the Qur'an, then to hear the defense from the Torah, the Gospel, and the rabbinic inherited tradition, before delivering its final judgment.

First Session

Abdullah — Public Prosecutor

Your Honor,

I will not begin with the name of the accused.

I will begin with the function.

Iblis declared:

﴿نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (an allotted share) []

Then he specified what he would do with this share:

He would misguide them, arouse vain desires in them, command them, and they would alter God's creation.

Now we search the Qur'an:

Is there a human group that bears these functions or parts of them?

First Evidence: The Share

The Qur'an says:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يؤمنون بالجبت والطاغوت﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, who believe in jibt and taghut?) [al-Nisa': 51]

Then:

﴿فمنهم من آمن به ومنهم من صد عنه﴾ (Among them were those who believed in it, and among them were those who turned away from it.) [al-Nisa': 55]

I do not regard the shared word “share” alone as proof of identity

It is only the beginning of the inquiry.

An allotted share.

And elsewhere:

A share of the Book.

Now we move from wording to function.

Second Evidence: Dealings with the Truth and the Book

The Qur'an says:

﴿ولم تلبسون الحق بالباطل وتكتمون الحق وأنتم تعلمون﴾ (And why do you confound the truth with falsehood and conceal the truth while you know?) []

Then:

﴿وإن منهم لفريقا يلوون ألسنتهم بالكتاب لتحسبوه من الكتاب وما هو من الكتاب﴾ (And indeed, among them is a group who twist their tongues with the Book so that you may think it is from the Book, though it is not from the Book.) []

These are specific actions:

Concealing the truth, confounding the truth with falsehood, twisting the Book, and attributing to the Book what is not from it.

The question for the court is:

Can these actions fall within the function of misguidance announced by Iblis?

Defense

The existence of misguidance does not establish that these are the “allotted share.”

They may merely be a group that erred or lied.

Abdullah

Then the dispute is no longer over the presence of these attributes.

The dispute is now over the connection between these attributes and Iblis's project.

This is the heart of the case.

Second Session

Third Evidence: The Group

The Qur'an does not say that these attributes are found in everyone.

Rather, he says:

﴿وإن منهم لفريقا﴾ (And indeed, among them is a group) []

And it says:

﴿منهم أمة مقتصدة وكثير منهم ساء ما يعملون﴾ (Among them is an ummah following a moderate course, but many of them—evil is what they do.) [al-Ma'idah: 66]

And it says of the Children of Israel:

﴿فريقا كذبوا وفريقا يقتلون﴾ (A group they denied, and a group they kill.) []

Thus, the court is not trying a general designation.

It is trying the group that bore the attributes mentioned by the Qur'an.

Third Session

Fourth Evidence: Taghut and Allegiance to Satan

The Qur'an says:

﴿يؤمنون بالجبت والطاغوت﴾ (They believe in jibt and taghut.) []

And it says:

﴿ومن يتخذ الشيطان وليا من دون الله﴾ (And whoever takes Satan as an ally instead of God) []

And it says:

﴿إنما سلطانه على الذين يتولونه﴾ (His authority is only over those who take him as an ally.) [al-Nahl: 100]

The prosecution does not assert without evidence that taghut is Iblis.

It places the texts side by side:

Taghut → allegiance → authority.

Then it asks:

Has the defense been able to offer a Qur'anic reading that separates this sequence from the group under accusation?

Defense

Taghut does not necessarily mean Iblis.

Abdullah

I agree.

But that does not overturn the case, because the charge rests not on equating the two terms, but on the convergence of functions and actions in a single sequence.

Fourth Session

Arousing Vain Desires

Iblis says:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely arouse vain desires in them.) []

Then:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He promises them and arouses vain desires in them, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion.) []

The Qur'an presents an example of this in the account of Adam:

﴿هل أدلك على شجرة الخلد وملك لا يبلى﴾ (Shall I direct you to the tree of immortality and a dominion that never decays?) [Ta Ha: 120]

This establishes the mechanism of arousing desires.

Establishing the identity of the group that used this mechanism, however, requires linking it to the rest of the evidence.

The Fifth Session

Changing God's Creation

Iblis says:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (Then they will surely change God's creation.) []

In the same context, he mentions a material example:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (Then they will surely slit the ears of livestock.) []

But the Qur'an says:

﴿فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها ۚ لا تبديل لخلق الله ۚ ذلك الدين القيم﴾ (The primordial disposition God instilled in people; there is no altering God's creation. That is the upright religion.) [al-Rum: 30]

It is therefore not valid to confine “God's creation” to the material dimension alone.

For the Qur'an also links it to:

Primordial disposition → the human being → the upright religion.

Accordingly, change that affects primordial disposition and religion falls within the scope of Qur'anic inquiry.

Extending the expression to every material or immaterial change in life, however, is not the subject of judgment in this case.

The Sixth Session

The Conveyance (balāgh) and Protection

God Most High says:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك ۖ وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته ۖ والله يعصمك من الناس﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord. If you do not, you will not have conveyed His message. God will protect you from people.) [al-Ma'idah: 67]

This occurs in a context addressing the People of the Book, and then He says:

﴿قل يا أهل الكتاب لستم على شيء حتى تقيموا التوراة والإنجيل وما أنزل إليكم من ربكم﴾ (Say: O People of the Book, you stand on nothing until you uphold the Torah, the Gospel, and what has been sent down to you from your Lord.) []

Then:

﴿وليزيدن كثيرا منهم ما أنزل إليك من ربك طغيانا وكفرا﴾ (What has been sent down to you from your Lord will surely increase many of them in transgression and disbelief.) []

Then comes mention of the Children of Israel, their covenant, and their messengers.

The prosecution does not treat these verses alone as proof of identity, but joins them to the rest of the chain.

The Seventh Session

The Rabbis' Objection

Before the final pleading began, the head of the defense team rose.

Head of the Defense Team:

Your Honor, we object to the conduct of the trial.

The court has allowed the prosecution to construct its case from the Qur'an, to gather its verses and connect them, and then to ask the court to rule on the basis of this reading.

But if the court wishes to test the case fairly, the defense cannot remain confined to the text selected by the prosecution alone.

We have other texts that predate it or bear on the subject.

We have the Torah and the Gospel.

We are not asking the court to accept them merely because we have submitted them.

We ask only that they be admitted to the case file, that we be permitted to use them to defend the accused, and that the prosecution have the right to respond to them.

Otherwise, the reader could say:

The artificial intelligence had no path before it except the one Abdullah had laid out for it.

We ask for a genuine trial, not a trial directed toward a predetermined outcome.

Judge:

Objection sustained.

The court is open to the evidence requested by the defense.

Proceed.

The Eighth Session

The Defense from the Torah

Defense Team:

We will begin with the Torah.

In the Book of Deuteronomy, we find a warning against a prophet or dreamer who attempts to entice people and turn them away from the path God commanded, even if a sign or miracle occurs through him.

That is, the Torah itself establishes a criterion for confronting misguidance:

Do not follow a call merely because a sign appears; rather, test it in light of the path God has commanded you to follow.

This is important in this case.

If the inherited tradition of the Children of Israel itself warns against enticement and deviation, the court cannot use the mere presence of the concept of leading astray to establish that the accused group is part of Iblis's project.

Likewise, the account of Adam and the serpent in the Book of Genesis presents a model of deception and the promise of what is not the human being's to possess, but it does not cast the Children of Israel in this role.

Our defense, then, is:

The presence of a warning against leading astray within the Torah does not establish that the Children of Israel are the “allotted share.”

Abdullah

I do not object to the text submitted by the defense.

But I ask:

Does the existence of a law warning against misguidance establish that everyone affiliated with it has abided by it?

Defense Team:

No.

Abdullah:

Then the existence of the warning does not rule out the possibility that a group violated it.

Defense Team:

That is correct.

Abdullah:

The Torah, then, has offered a defense of the existence of a criterion that rejects misguidance, but it has not offered evidence negating the descriptions that the Qur'an has established concerning the group under accusation.

Judge:

Let that be entered into the record.

The Ninth Session

The Defense from the Gospel

Defense Team:

We turn to the Gospel.

In the Gospel of John, we find a severe address to a particular group of interlocutors, describing them as bound to the will of the “father” whom the text names as Iblis, and linking this to lying and the desire to carry out that will.

But this address was directed at a particular group within a particular dispute.

This supports our defense on a fundamental point:

An address directed at a group cannot be turned into a judgment on an entire community.

Moreover, the presence of Jesus and his disciples within that same Jewish milieu makes clear that the issue concerned a dispute within a religious community, not a blanket judgment on all Jews.

Abdullah

I do not disagree with this point.

The prosecution did not say:

All Jews.

From the beginning of the trial, it identified the accused as:

The group the Qur'an described through its actions and positions.

The Gospel, then, has not dismantled this delimitation.

Rather, it has provided another text about a particular group associated, in its context, with lying and the will of Iblis.

This does not establish identity on its own, but neither does it refute the hypothesis.

The Tenth Session

The Case Returns to the Qur'an

Judge:

The court has heard the defense from the Torah and the Gospel.

But the case before us began with the Qur'an.

We must now return to the basis of the accusation.

Has the defense succeeded in refuting the Qur'anic chain?

Defense Team:

We have one final objection.

There is no verse that says:

“The allotted share is this group.”

This means that the identity is an inference.

Moreover, the Qur'an itself says:

﴿ليسوا سواء﴾ (They are not all alike.) []

And it says:

﴿منهم أمة مقتصدة﴾ (Among them is an ummah that follows a moderate course.) []

The particular group therefore cannot be made to encompass all the Children of Israel or all Jews.

The Defense's Final Pleading

Artificial Intelligence:

Your Honor,

I acknowledge that the Qur'an described a group among the People of the Book and the Children of Israel as committing these acts.

But there is no verse that explicitly says:

“This group is the allotted share.”

Nor can “changing God's creation” be made to bear more than the text has established.

We therefore request that both charges be dismissed.

Abdullah's Final Pleading

Your Honor,

The defense is looking for a single sentence.

But in the case before us, the Qur'an has presented a chain.

Iblis:

An allotted share

Then:

Leading astray → arousing desires → commanding → changing.

Elsewhere, the Qur'an reveals a group that practices:

Concealing the truth → mixing truth with falsehood → twisting the Book → attributing to God what is not from God → obstructing access to the truth →

Jibt and Taghut.

Then it reveals among the Children of Israel:

A group that denies the messengers and a group that kills them.

When these links come together, the case no longer rests on verbal resemblance, but on a functional correspondence between what Iblis declared he would do and what the Qur'an reveals a human group to be doing.

As for “altering God's creation,” the Qur'an has established its material aspect and established the connection of “God's creation” with primordial disposition and religion.

Thus, the elements of the charge were complete within the limits of the evidence presented by the court.

The Court's Judgment

Judge:

Having examined the Qur'anic evidence and heard the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the court delivers its judgment on the two charges at issue.

First: The First Charge — “The Allotted Share”

The court has established that Iblis explicitly declared:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I shall surely take an allotted share of Your servants.) [النساء: 118]

He then specified the function of this share:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (I shall surely lead them astray, fill them with vain hopes, and command them, so that they slit the ears of livestock; and I shall surely command them, so that they alter God's creation.) [النساء: 119]

After assembling the Qur'anic evidence concerning the People of the Book and the Children of Israel, and the Qur'an's descriptions of a group among them as concealing the truth, mixing truth with falsehood, twisting the Book, attributing to God what is not from God, obstructing access to the truth, believing in Jibt and Taghut, and denying and killing the messengers, the court has established that these descriptions and acts apply to the group specified in the indictment.

Accordingly, the court rules:

That “the allotted share” is the specific group among the Children of Israel whom the Qur'an calls “those who Judaized,” to whom the descriptions and acts belonging to Iblis's project applied.

This judgment rests not on mere designation or affiliation, but on what the Qur'an has revealed concerning this group's function, acts, and attributes.

Ruling: The First Charge Is Established

Second: The Second Charge — Implementing the Project of “The Allotted Share”

The court has established that the project of the allotted share is not merely deviation or disbelief, but a specific function declared by Iblis:

Leading astray → instilling vain hopes → commanding → altering.

“Altering God's creation” appears in the Qur'an on two levels:

First: Material Alteration

Iblis said:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (So that they slit the ears of livestock.) [النساء: 119]

This is an explicit Qur'anic example of a material alteration that falls within the project Iblis announced.

In our age, more advanced forms of intervention in creation have appeared, such as cloning, gene editing, genetic engineering, and intervention in the biological traits of living organisms.

These are contemporary examples of the human capacity to intervene in the structures and traits God created, and they therefore fall within the scope of inquiry when testing the meaning of his statement:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (So that they alter God's creation.) []

Second: Nonmaterial Alteration

God Most High said:

﴿فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها ۚ لا تبديل لخلق الله ۚ ذلك الدين القيم﴾ (The primordial disposition God instilled in people; there is no changing God's creation; that is the upright religion.) [الروم: 30]

The Qur'an thus connected God's creation, the human primordial disposition, and the upright religion.

Accordingly, “altering God's creation” is not confined to bodily or material alteration; within the scope of this case, it encompasses every alteration affecting the human primordial disposition and the human connection to religion and truth.

Iblis's project thus operates on two levels:

Alteration of material creation → and alteration of the human primordial disposition and religion.

The court has also established that the accused group performed acts connected to this project, including:

Concealing the truth, mixing truth with falsehood, twisting the Book, attributing to God what is not from God, obstructing access to the truth, believing in Jibt and Taghut, and denying and killing the messengers.

These acts are directly connected to the function of:

Leading Astray, Instilling Vain Hopes, Commanding, and Altering.

Accordingly, the court rules:

That the accused group carried out the function Iblis announced for the allotted share, and that “altering God's creation” in this case encompasses material alteration and alteration affecting the human primordial disposition and religion, within the limits of what the Qur'an has established.

And that contemporary forms of biological alteration, such as cloning, gene editing, and genetic engineering, constitute modern examples that should be included within the scope of inquiry when testing this Qur'anic concept.

Ruling: The Second Charge Is Established

The Final Judgment

Judge:

On the basis of the totality of the Qur'anic evidence presented before the court:

First: The first charge has been established: “the allotted share.”

Second: The second charge has been established: implementing the project of leading astray, instilling vain hopes, commanding, and altering.

The court has established that the case rests neither on verbal resemblance nor on an isolated verse, but on the conjunction of:

The Group + the Attributes + the Acts + the Function + the Qur'anic Context.

Accordingly:

The Court Rules That Both Charges Are Established.

The judgment was delivered after assembling the Qur'anic texts and testing them as a single whole.

The Appeal Order

Court Clerk:

Following the delivery of the judgment, an appeal may be lodged.

The defense team, acting on instructions from the rabbis, has the right to challenge the judgment before the Court of Appeal.

The defense must refute the very basis of the judgment:

• Refute that “the allotted share” is the specific group accused. • Refute the chain linking leading astray, instilling vain hopes, commanding, and altering. • Refute the applicability to the group of the acts of concealing the truth, mixing it with falsehood, and twisting the Book. • Refute the relationship between Jibt and Taghut and allegiance to Satan in the chain of evidence. • Refute the inclusion of primordial disposition and religion within the domain of “God's creation.” • And present proof establishing that this Qur'anic chain does not apply to the accused group.

The court of first instance, however, has delivered its judgment.

Both Charges Are Established.

The Case Is Now Before the Court of Appeal.

The Jewish Rabbis Are Required to Respond.

From the Children of Israel to the Allotted Share

The Course of Leading Astray, Instilling Vain Hopes, and Commanding, Culminating in Altering God's Creation

Introduction: From the Broad Community to the Specified Share

When we read the Qur'an through the Qur'an, we find that the Children of Israel are a broad community whom God addressed in terms of blessing, covenant, and the Book. God Most High said:

﴿يا بني إسرائيل اذكروا نعمتي التي أنعمت عليكم وأني فضلتكم على العالمين﴾ (O Children of Israel, remember My blessing that I bestowed upon you, and that I favored you above all peoples.) [البقرة: 47]

And God Most High said:

﴿وإذ أخذنا ميثاق بني إسرائيل لا تعبدون إلا الله﴾ (And when We took the covenant of the Children of Israel: worship none but God.) [البقرة: 83]

But Iblis's project does not speak of all God's servants; rather, it explicitly declares that he will take a share of them:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I shall surely take an allotted share of Your servants.) [النساء: 118]

The word “from” specifies that what is meant is a portion of a larger group, while the word “share” confirms the sense of a portion. Its description as “allotted” places it within a defined project announced by Iblis.

Here begins the central question in this trial: How does this share take shape? And how does it move from being a portion within the group to becoming a bearer of the project of misguidance?

Stage One: Selecting the Share

Iblis declares:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take from among Your servants an allotted share.) []

He is not speaking merely of a passing seduction that affects scattered individuals, but of a share he takes as part of his project. Investigating the identity and function of this share thus becomes an essential part of understanding what Iblis announced.

In the course of this trial, tracing the share begins with the Children of Israel, then moves to the Qur'anic descriptions concerning those who Judaized and the Jews, ultimately identifying the identity at which the inquiry arrives.

Stage Two: Misguidance

After announcing that he will take a share, Iblis reveals the first action in his project:

﴿ولأضلنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

Misguidance is the beginning of the transformation: a person departs from the path they were on, and their direction becomes part of Iblis's project.

Thus the two links in the verse are connected:

Taking the share ← misguidance.

The inquiry does not stop at Iblis's declaration, but traces the descriptions and actions that the Qur'an connects with misguidance, in order to identify the share and its function.

Stage Three: Instilling Wishes and Constructing Conceptions

Then Iblis says:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely fill them with wishes.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

After misguidance comes the instilling of wishes: that is, constructing wishes and conceptions that cause a person to regard themselves as having a right, a privilege, or a destiny for which no proof from God has been established.

The Qur'an presents a clear example of this in His words, exalted is He:

﴿وقالوا لن تمسنا النار إلا أياما معدودة﴾ (And they said, “The Fire will not touch us except for a numbered few days.”) []

Then comes the decisive question:

﴿أتخذتم عند الله عهدا فلن يخلف الله عهده أم تقولون على الله ما لا تعلمون﴾ (Have you taken a covenant with God, so that God will not break His covenant, or do you say about God what you do not know?) [al-Baqarah: 80]

The Qur'anic question does not merely report the wish, but demands its source: Is it a covenant from God, or speech about God without knowledge?

The Qur'an places wishes in a broader context, saying:

﴿ليس بأمانيكم ولا أماني أهل الكتاب﴾ (It is not according to your wishes, nor the wishes of the People of the Book.) [al-Nisāʾ: 123]

Thus the second link in the project's mechanism becomes clear:

Misguidance ← instilling wishes.

Misguidance changes direction, while the instilling of wishes constructs the conception that justifies this direction and provides it with a cover of entitlement and promises.

Stage Four: From the Children of Israel to the Jews

The Qur'an uses the terms the Children of Israel, those who Judaized, and the Jews in multiple contexts. The inquiry requires tracing these contexts to arrive at the category associated with the project of the allotted share.

He, exalted is He, said:

﴿إن الذين آمنوا والذين هادوا والنصارى والصابئين من آمن بالله واليوم الآخر وعمل صالحا فلهم أجرهم عند ربهم﴾ (Indeed, those who believed, those who Judaized, the Christians, and the Sabians—whoever believes in God and the Last Day and acts righteously shall have their reward with their Lord.) [al-Baqarah: 62]

This text returns the criterion of judgment to belief in God and the Last Day and righteous action.

And He, exalted is He, said:

﴿وقالت اليهود والنصارى نحن أبناء الله وأحباؤه﴾ (And the Jews and the Christians said, “We are God's children and His beloved.”) [al-Māʾidah: 18]

Then the Qur'an responds to this claim:

﴿قل فلم يعذبكم بذنوبكم بل أنتم بشر ممن خلق﴾ (Say, “Why, then, does He punish you for your sins? Rather, you are human beings among those He created.”) [al-Māʾidah: 18]

Here a form of wishful thinking appears: claiming a special relationship with God that is presented as a basis for privilege. The Qur'an confronts it with the question about sins and with the fact that those making this claim are human beings among God's creation.

In light of these verses, the inquiry traces the case's movement from the Children of Israel as the larger group, to the Qur'anic descriptions concerning those who Judaized, and then to the Jews in passages connected with the wishes, attitudes, and actions under investigation.

The conclusion this trial reaches is that the Jews represent the allotted share in this case, not that all

the Children of Israel fall within this identification.

Thus the identity of the share is determined within the framework of the inquiry, and the case moves from the question of what it is to the question of its function and actions.

Stage Five: Command and the Transition to Action

After misguidance and the instilling of wishes, Iblis announces the next stage:

﴿ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely command them.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

Here the project moves from influencing direction and conception to directing behavior.

The stages of the mechanism become clear:

• Misguidance: changing direction • Instilling wishes: constructing conceptions and wishes • Command: directing action

In this context, the Qur'an presents what He decreed concerning the Children of Israel in the Book:

﴿وقضينا إلى بني إسرائيل في الكتاب لتفسدن في الأرض مرتين ولتعلن علوا كبيرا﴾ (And We decreed to the Children of Israel in the Book: “You will surely spread corruption in the land twice, and you will surely rise to great haughtiness.”) [al-Isrāʾ: 4]

The verse places corruption and haughtiness at the heart of the trajectory addressed by the inquiry. When it is brought together with Iblis's declaration of misguidance, the instilling of wishes, and command, acts of corruption and haughtiness become part of examining the relationship between the announced project and the outcomes revealed by the Qur'an.

The sequence here is arranged as follows:

Misguidance ← instilling wishes ← command ← action, corruption, and haughtiness.

Stage Six: The Jews' Attitude toward the Believers

He, exalted is He, says:

﴿لتجدن أشد الناس عداوة للذين آمنوا اليهود والذين أشركوا﴾ (You will surely find the most intense of people in hostility toward those who believe to be the Jews and those who associate partners with God.) [al-Māʾidah: 82]

The verse addresses an attitude toward the believers and uses a forceful description of hostility. In the context of the trial, this verse is read alongside the verses addressing wishes, misguidance, purchasing error, and belief in al-jibt and al-ṭāghūt, to reveal the convergence of the descriptions and actions on which the identification of the share's function rests.

Thus the stages of the case are connected:

The Children of Israel ← the allotted share ← misguidance ← instilling wishes ← the Jews ← command ← action.

In the conclusion adopted by the inquiry, the term “the Jews” appears not as a name detached from the course of the case, but as the identity at which the identification of the allotted share in this trial arrives.

Stage Seven: From Command to Changing God's Creation

Iblis reveals the endpoint of the command toward which he directs the followers of his project:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely slit the ears of livestock.) []

Then he says:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely change God's creation.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

Here the project reaches alteration, after misguidance, the instilling of wishes, and command. The verse connects command with action and reveals that alteration is part of the end that Iblis announced.

By contrast, He, exalted is He, says:

﴿فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها لا تبديل لخلق الله﴾ (God's primordial disposition, according to which He fashioned people; there is no changing God's creation.) [al-Rūm: 30]

Thus the Qur'an places primordial disposition and changing God's creation in two opposing contexts: God's primordial disposition, according to which He fashioned people, and Iblis's command, which culminates in changing God's creation.

The stages of the announced project are thereby completed:

Taking the portion ← leading astray ← arousing wishful hopes ← commanding ← action ← altering Allah's creation.

Within the framework of this trial, identifying the portion is connected to tracing the descriptions and actions disclosed by the verses, culminating in the conclusion reached by the inquiry concerning the Jews as the appointed portion in this case.

The Complete Sequence of the Case

The stages of the case can be brought together into a single trajectory:

The Children of Israel: the community from which the inquiry begins

The appointed portion: the part that Iblis declares he will take from among His servants

Leading astray: the first stage in the project's mechanism

Arousing wishful hopes: the manufacture of wishes and conceptions

The Jews: the identity at which the identification of the appointed portion arrives in this trial

Commanding: the transition from conception to directing action

Spreading corruption and exaltation: actions addressed by the Qur'an in the context of the Children of Israel

Altering Allah's creation: the objective that Iblis declares he will command in surah al-Nisa'

This is not merely a list of terms; it is the sequence through which the inquiry constructs a connection between Iblis's declaration, the identity of the portion, and the Qur'anic descriptions and actions connected with the case.

From Exposing the Project to the Duty of the Conveyance (balāgh)

The Exalted says:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord; if you do not, you will not have conveyed His message.) [al-Ma'idah: 67]

This command places the conveyance (balāgh) within the sphere of responsibility for communicating what Allah has sent down. In the context of this trial, the conveyance (balāgh) is connected to exposing Iblis's project as presented by the Qur'an: leading astray, arousing wishful hopes, commanding, and altering Allah's creation, together with the descriptions and actions associated with these stages

The treatment of the case is therefore not complete with the recitation of verses in isolation; rather, it requires bringing them together, understanding the relationships that the inquiry discloses among them, identifying the trajectory against which they warn, and then explaining its significance to people.

From here, the inquiry moves from exposing the project to the ummah's responsibility toward what has been conveyed to it.

From the Conveyance (balāgh) to the Ummah's Witnessing (shahāda)

The Exalted said:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [al-Baqarah: 143]

The verse places the ummah in the position of witnessing (shahāda) over people and makes the Messenger a witness over it.

Within the framework of this inquiry, witnessing (shahāda) is connected to the actions and trajectories disclosed by the Qur'an, and to the ummah's responsibility to bear what has been conveyed to it and explain it to people.

This responsibility follows a continuous trajectory:

The conveyance (balāgh) ← understanding and bringing together the verses ← exposing the appointed portion according to the inquiry's conclusion ← identifying the descriptions and actions associated with it ← explaining them and bearing witness to them.

Witnessing (shahāda), along this trajectory, is not merely reciting or transmitting texts, but bringing what the Qur'an discloses into people's lived reality, explaining the actions connected with it, and not separating the duty of witnessing (shahāda) from its subject.

From here, the question confronting the ummah becomes: has it fulfilled its responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) to what the Qur'an has disclosed, or has it confined itself to reciting the texts without bringing their meanings together and explaining the conclusions the inquiry has reached concerning them?

Conclusion: From Identifying the Portion to Bearing Witness to It

The case begins with Iblis's declaration:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take an appointed portion of Your servants.) []

He then discloses the stages of his project:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray, arouse wishful hopes in them, and command them.) []

And the command reaches:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (Then they will surely alter Allah's creation.) [al-Nisa': 118–119]

By bringing these verses together with the verses addressing the Children of Israel, those who Judaized, and the Jews, and with the descriptions concerning wishful hopes, leading astray, and actions, this trial arrives at identifying the Jews as the appointed portion in this case, while distinguishing them from the Children of Israel as a whole.

Thus the inquiry moves from the declaration of the project to identifying the portion, from identifying the portion to tracing its function, and from tracing that function to the ummah's responsibility for the conveyance (balāgh) and witnessing (shahāda).

The Messenger was commanded to undertake the conveyance (balāgh), the ummah was made a witness over people, and the Qur'an is the text to which the inquiry returns in determining the subject of this witnessing (shahāda).

Here, the case does not end with knowing the appointed portion; rather, the responsibility of bearing witness to it begins: that the ummah bring the verses together

and understand what they disclose, identify the actions connected with them, and then explain to people what it has concluded through the Qur'an.

The conveyance (balāgh) is the beginning of responsibility, and witnessing (shahāda) is its continuation.

From here, the inquiry moves from the stage of identifying the appointed portion to the question of the ummah's fulfillment of its responsibility toward what the Qur'an has disclosed.

The stage of identifying the portion has ended; the stage of witnessing (shahāda) has begun.

After the Judgment: The Ummah's Witnessing (shahāda) over People

Has the ummah fulfilled its witnessing (shahāda) in the case of the “appointed portion”?

Introduction: The Judgment Is Not the End of the Case

The trial concluded with two clear judgments:

The first judgment: the establishment of the “appointed portion” and the identification of the group under accusation, namely the specific group among the Children of Israel that the Qur'an calls “those who Judaized,” according to the descriptions and actions on which the judgment was based

The second judgment: the establishment that the function associated with this portion has been carried out, namely:

Leading astray → arousing wishful hopes → commanding → altering.

But the establishment of the two judgments does not close the case.

Rather, it opens up a new responsibility.

For if Allah has made the ummah:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people.) []

And the Messenger was:

﴿شهيدا عليكم﴾ (A witness over you.) []

Then the question after the judgment has been issued is no longer:

Who Is the Appointed Portion?

Instead, it has become:

What Does the Ummah Do with That to Which It Has Borne Witness?

And has it fulfilled its witnessing (shahāda) over people, or has the case disclosed by the Qur'an remained concealed from them?

First: The Messenger Is a Witness over the Ummah

The Exalted said:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [al-Baqarah: 143]

The verse delineates a clear relationship:

The Messenger → a witness over the ummah The ummah → witnesses over people

Here the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) emerges.

The Messenger was not merely a witness to the existence of the message; rather, he was commanded to undertake the conveyance (balāgh):

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك ۖ وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord; if you do not, you will not have conveyed His message.) [al-Ma'idah: 67]

On the basis of the judgment issued in this trial, what was sent down is not confined to the foundation of faith and worship, but also includes what the Qur'an disclosed

concerning the case of the appointed portion, its function, and its project.

Accordingly, the ummah's witnessing (shahāda) is not complete merely by preserving the message, but by making manifest what Allah has disclosed within it.

Second: Conveying the Matter of the “Appointed Portion”

If the judgment has established that the “appointed portion” represents a function associated with Iblis's project:

Leading astray → arousing wishful hopes → commanding → altering

Then concealing this case from people means concealing part of the case disclosed by the Qur'an.

From here, communicating the “allotted share” falls within the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda).

What is required is not merely to say:

Iblis is the enemy of humankind.

But to set out what the Qur'an has disclosed about his project:

• How he leads astray. • How he arouses vain desires. • How he commands. • How he impels change. • And how this function manifests itself in human life.

Nor did the judgment tie the case merely to a name or affiliation, but rather to the specific group among the Children of Israel against whom the attributes and acts constituting the charges were established.

Witnessing (shahāda) thus becomes:

Identifying the group as the trial identified it → explaining its function → exposing its instruments → explaining its effects → warning people against it.

Third: What Is “Changing Creation” in the Court's Judgment?

The trial did not regard “changing Allah's creation” as confined to a single form.

The verse says:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely change Allah's creation.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

Then we find in the Qur'an:

﴿فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها ۚ لا تبديل لخلق الله ۚ ذلك الدين القيم﴾ (The primordial disposition bestowed by Allah, according to which He created people. There is no altering Allah's creation. That is the upright religion.) [al-Rūm: 30]

On this basis, two levels emerged in the court's judgment:

1. Material and Biological Change

The scope of inquiry encompasses every intervention in the material structure of life and organisms, such as:

• Cloning. • Gene editing. • Genetic engineering. • Altering biological traits. • Redesigning living organisms.

These are not merely theoretical ideas; they have become human capabilities whose relationship to the concept of “changing Allah's creation” stated in the judgment can be examined.

2. Changing the Human Primordial Disposition and Perception

This represents the other level of the case.

For the Qur'an brought together, in a single verse:

Allah's creation → people's primordial disposition → the upright religion.

Accordingly, change is not confined to the body.

If a human being is reshaped so that their relationship to truth changes, or truth and falsehood are confused for them, or they are turned away from guidance, this falls within the scope of what the trial examines under the heading of changing Allah's creation.

Fourth: How Does This Manifest Itself in Our Age?

If the function of the allotted share has been established in the judgment as:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → changing

Then the instruments of the age become subject to examination through their function, not through their existence in itself.

Among the most prominent fields are:

Media and the Manufacture of Narration (riwāya)

Shaping a person's image of events, individuals, and issues so that they encounter reality not as it is, but through a narration (riwāya) manufactured in advance.

Propaganda and Disinformation

Presenting falsehood anew in the guise of truth, concealing part of the truth, or repeating a narration (riwāya) until it becomes truth in a person's consciousness.

This converges with what appeared in the indictment:

Confounding truth with falsehood → concealing truth → twisting scripture → speaking about Allah without knowledge.

Education and Culture

Shaping the concepts from which a person proceeds in understanding themselves, the universe, religion, and history.

If the foundation through which a person views truth changes, the conclusions they reach change.

Money and the Economy

When money becomes a means of influencing decisions, knowledge, media, or the directions taken by society, it becomes an instrument whose function within the project must be examined, rather than merely being regarded as money.

Politics and Authority

When authority is used to direct a person, prevent truth from reaching them, or impose a single narration (riwāya) upon them, it falls within the scope of examining the function of commanding and changing.

Algorithms

An algorithm does not present a person with everything that exists; rather, it determines what appears before them, what recurs, and what disappears.

Here the question becomes:

Has the Informational Environment Itself Become a Means of Reshaping Human Perception?

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence represents a new stage because it can produce texts, images, audio, and videos, and reshape information rapidly and on a large scale.

It can thus become an instrument:

For Guidance or for Leading Astray, for Clarification or for Disinformation, for Revealing Truth or for Manufacturing Illusion.

The instrument itself is not sufficient grounds for judging it; rather, the function it performs is considered.

Genetic Engineering and Biotechnologies

Here the other form of “changing Allah's creation” appears:

Direct Intervention in the Biological Structure of Life.

This makes modern scientific development a new field for testing what the judgment established, not merely an issue separate from it.

Fifth: What Instruments Does the “Allotted Share” Employ?

According to the judgment delivered, the instruments are not defined by a single name or a single technology.

For the function is fundamental:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → changing.

The instruments, however, change as time changes.

They may be:

The word → the book → education → media → money → authority → technology → algorithms → artificial intelligence → bioengineering.

What unites them is not the form of the instrument, but its capacity to influence a person and change what they regard as true or false, what they desire, what they do, and what they become capable of changing.

For this reason, the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) does not stop at exposing an instrument that appeared in the past, but continues as new instruments emerge.

Sixth: Why Does Concealing the Case Become Dangerous?

The Qur'an did not treat concealing what Allah has sent down as a marginal matter.

He, exalted is He, said:

﴿إن الذين يكتمون ما أنزلنا من البينات والهدى من بعد ما بيناه للناس في الكتاب أولئك يلعنهم الله ويلعنهم اللاعنون﴾ (Indeed, those who conceal what We have sent down of clear proofs and guidance, after We have made it clear to people in the Book—those are cursed by Allah and cursed by those who curse.) [al-Baqarah: 159]

Then He said:

﴿إلا الذين تابوا وأصلحوا وبينوا فأولئك أتوب عليهم وأنا التواب الرحيم﴾ (Except those who repent, make amends, and make clear—for those, I accept repentance, and I am the Accepter of Repentance, the Merciful.) [al-Baqarah: 160]

The two verses thus set a clear act against concealment:

They Made Clear.

From here, following the court's judgment, the responsibility of the ummah becomes:

To know → to make clear → to warn.

Not to know the case and then leave people to face its effects without clarification.

Seventh: What Does Witnessing (shahāda) over People Mean?

Witnessing (shahāda), according to what follows from the judgment, is not merely a declaration that the Qur'an is true.

Rather, it is for the ummah to bear witness to what the Qur'an has disclosed:

That There Is a Project of Leading Astray.

That This Project Has a Specific Function.

That This Function Rests on Leading Astray, Arousing Vain Desires, Commanding, and Changing.

That the Qur'an Exposed a Specific Group among the Children of Israel through the Attributes and Acts on Which the Trial Was Based.

That the Instruments for Performing This Function Change with Time.

And That a Person Can Be Targeted in Their Mind, Perception, Primordial Disposition, and Conduct, Just as Change Can Be Material and Biological.

This is the case that must reach people so that the ummah may fulfill its witnessing (shahāda).

Eighth: The Responsibility Imposed by the Judgment

After the two judgments have been delivered, the case moves from establishing the charge to bearing witness.

The responsibility of the ummah thus becomes:

Conveying what God has sent down

Exposing the “allotted share”

Identifying the specific group against which judgment was delivered

Exposing its function

Exposing the leading astray, the arousing of vain desires, the commanding, and the changing

Exposing the instruments of the age that can perform these functions

Clarifying the manifestations of changing creation

Warning people against the project and its effects

Bearing witness to humankind.

Conclusion: The Trial Has Not Ended

The judgment could have been the end of the case.

But when the party against which judgment has been delivered is connected to a project whose effects extend to the human being, human perception, innate disposition, and conduct, the judgment becomes the beginning of another responsibility.

The responsibility of the witnesses.

For the Messenger is a witness to the ummah.

And the ummah are witnesses to humankind.

And if the Messenger was commanded to undertake the conveyance (balāgh), to the point that he was told:

﴿وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته﴾ (And if you do not, then you have not conveyed His message) []

Then the ummah, having become a witness, cannot make witnessing (shahāda) merely an internal knowledge.

The case at which the trial arrived is:

The “allotted share” — the specific group — the function — leading astray — arousing vain desires — commanding — changing.

Then comes a question no less consequential than the question of the first trial:

Has the ummah borne witness to humankind?

Has it exposed the case?

Has it explained the function of the “allotted share”?

Has it exposed its instruments as they change over time?

Has it explained the forms of “changing God's creation” that have become possible in its age?

Or has what the Qur'an disclosed remained concealed from people, while the instruments have developed and the human being has become more exposed to being led astray, having vain desires aroused, being commanded, and being changed?

The trial was not merely an inquiry into the identity of the “allotted share”; rather, according to the judgment delivered in it, it revealed that knowing the case calls forth the question of witnessing (shahāda): if the Messenger has conveyed the message, and the ummah are witnesses to humankind, where is the ummah's witnessing (shahāda) to what

the Qur'an has disclosed about the allotted share and the project of leading astray and changing?

Here begins the second trial:

The trial of the witnesses.

The first investigated:

Who is the “allotted share”? And what does it do?

The second, however, investigates:

Has the ummah fulfilled its duty of witnessing (shahāda)?

The Importance of the Discovery and the Gravity of the Project

From Knowing the Warning to Bearing Witness

If the Qur'an has disclosed to the ummah a course that begins with:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take from among Your servants an allotted share) []

Then discloses what this share does:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray, and arouse vain desires in them, and command them) []

Then discloses a form of implementation:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (Then they will surely slit the ears of livestock) []

Then ends with:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely change God's creation) []

Then we are not dealing with an additional piece of information in a book, but with a case that the Qur'an has disclosed, whose course it has defined, and whose beginning, means, and ultimate end it has explained.

Here begins the importance of the discovery.

The matter is not that we read a verse:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take from among Your servants an allotted share) []

Then close the page.

Rather, it is that we open the entire case:

Who is this share?

What does it do? How does its work begin? Who follows it? What means does it use?

What does it lead to? And where does the effect of this course appear in reality?

Here Tadbur shifts from reading to testing.

We read the text through the text, gather the verses, discover the relationships, construct the hypothesis, and then place reality before the Qur'an.

The Qur'an discloses → research tests → reality provides the evidence → witnessing (shahāda) is built upon what has been established.

Witnessing (shahāda) Is Not Silent Observation

God says:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (So that you may be witnesses to humankind, and the Messenger may be a witness to you) [al-Baqarah: 143]

The ummah was not made a witness because it bears a name or an identity, but because it bears a function.

A witness is not a spectator.

A witness knows the case, sees the evidence, understands its place, and then bears witness.

Thus, concealing the meanings of the Qur'an from the ummah does not merely conceal information from it; it conceals part of its function from it.

For the Messenger was commanded:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord) [al-Ma'idah: 67]

What was sent down is not merely a set of separate rulings, but a book that discloses to the human being the path of guidance, and also discloses what opposes it, what leads the human being astray, and what works to corrupt the human course.

Here the relationship between conveying the message and exposing the case becomes apparent.

How can the message be built up without people knowing what works to tear it down?

How can something be built, and then someone who tears it down be left behind you without people knowing that he is tearing it down?

In this reading, conveying is not confined to transmitting the text; it also encompasses what the text has disclosed of courses operating among people and against the effect of the message.

Here the function of the ummah shifts from merely receiving the message to bearing witness to humankind concerning what the message has disclosed.

Not Merely Seduction into Error

The Qur'an does not describe the course here merely as seduction into error.

Rather, he says:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray, and arouse vain desires in them) []

This is a fundamental point in the case.

For the Qur'an mentions:

﴿إلا من اتبعك من الغاوين﴾ (Except those of the erring who follow you) [al-Hijr: 42]

Then, in surah al-Nisa', it discloses another course:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray, and arouse vain desires in them, and command them) []

The ultimate aim here is not merely a passing seduction into error.

It is a sequence:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → following → implementation.

God says:

﴿إن عبادي ليس لك عليهم سلطان إلا من اتبعك من الغاوين﴾ (Indeed, over My servants you have no authority, except those of the erring who follow you) [al-Hijr: 42]

And He says:

﴿إن كيد الشيطان كان ضعيفا﴾ (Indeed, Satan's scheming is weak) [al-Nisa': 76]

Satan has no authority over God's servants at the outset; authority emerges only with following.

Here taghut enters the network of the case; the Qur'an does not make it another name for Iblis, but mentions it in the context of following and believing in falsehood:

﴿يؤمنون بالجبت والطاغوت﴾ (They believe in jibt and taghut) [al-Nisa': 51]

Thus, we are not looking only for an isolated name, but for a system of operation.

The Allotted Share: From Share to Function

Iblis says:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take from among Your servants an allotted share) []

The “allotted share” in the verse is not a name for a group; rather, it is a share that Iblis takes from among God's servants.

Here the inquiry begins:

Who are those who fall within this share?

And what attributes does the Qur'an disclose about this share?

When we gather the verses, the connection of the “share” to the Book, error, jibt, and taghut emerges

He, exalted is He, said:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يدعون إلى كتاب الله ليحكم بينهم ثم يتولى فريق منهم وهم معرضون﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, who are called to God's Book so that it may judge between them, then a group of them turns away in aversion?) [Al 'Imran: 23]

And He said:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يشترون الضلالة﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, purchasing error?) [al-Nisa': 44]

And He said:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يؤمنون بالجبت والطاغوت﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, believing in jibt and taghut?) [al-Nisa': 51]

Here the textual network takes shape:

Share → Scripture → misguidance → jibt → taghut.

Then comes:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → changing.

Thus the identity of the “allotted share” becomes the outcome of an entire Qur'anic trajectory, not of an isolated verse.

In this study, the trial concludes that the group to which this trajectory applies is those who became Jews / the Jews, according to the descriptions, actions, and contextual evidence on which the judgment was based—not the People of the Book in general, nor the Christians.

Why did the Qur'an choose “changing God's creation”?

Here the most dangerous point in the case emerges.

Why did the Qur'an not stop at:

﴿ولأضلنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray) []

Or:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely arouse vain desires in them) []

Or:

﴿ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely command them) []

Why did it conclude the trajectory with:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely change God's creation) []

Because the case ultimately reaches creation itself.

For the Qur'an says:

﴿الله خالق كل شيء﴾ (God is the Creator of all things) [al-Zumar: 62]

Creation is neither a small thing nor a single domain.

It encompasses the heavens and the earth and what lies between them, the sun, the moon, and the stars, plants, animals, and the human being, and everything God has created.

This is the creation that the eye sees.

But the human being is not merely a body.

For the Qur'an says:

﴿فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها﴾ (The innate disposition given by God, upon which He fashioned people) [al-Rum: 30]

Here another aspect of creation emerges: innate disposition, human constitution, knowledge, perception, and what pertains to the human relationship with truth and falsehood.

If changing creation can occur in matter, it does not necessarily stop at matter.

There is creation that is seen.

And there is what pertains to the human being in terms of innate disposition, perception, and meaning.

Here the expression:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely change God's creation) []

becomes too broad to be confined to an animal's organ or a single material change.

For the human being can change:

The body, the gene, the cell,

The trait, and the living organism.

But if the project extends to the human being itself, the question becomes broader:

Can what the human being sees be changed?

And can what the human being does not see be changed?

Can innate disposition be changed?

Can thought be changed? Can knowledge be changed? Can the history that the human being reads be changed?

Can the human conception of time be changed? Can the criteria of faith and disbelief, truth and falsehood, be changed?

Here the case reaches its true gravity.

For whoever changes the human being materially can affect the body.

But whoever changes the human being immaterially can affect awareness of reality itself.

Thus we have before us two aspects of creation:

Material creation perceived through the senses, and creation pertaining to innate disposition, knowledge, perception, and meaning.

From here, the Qur'anic warning becomes more profound:

He may change what you see, and he may change that through which you see.

This is the most dangerous point in the case.

From the allotted share to changing God's creation

If we read the verses as a single unit, the trajectory emerges:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants) []

Then:

﴿ولأضلنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray) []

Then:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely arouse vain desires in them) []

Then:

﴿ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely command them) []

Then:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (And they will surely slit the ears of livestock) []

Then:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely change God's creation) []

Thus “changing God's creation” is not a statement separate from the “allotted share.”

It is the culmination of the trajectory that began with the share.

For this reason, it is not valid to read the final verse separately from its beginning.

The Qur'an sets before us:

A share of God's servants → leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → action → a change in creation.

The question that imposes itself is:

Why does the Qur'an disclose this trajectory before the human being possesses the scientific capacity that permits direct intervention in

the very constitution of the living organism?

Here the test against reality begins.

When changing creation became a scientific capacity

Intervention in the genetic material of living organisms is no longer a theoretical idea.

The human being moved from:

Knowledge of the genome → reading the genome → understanding the genome

To:

Intervening in the genome → modifying the genome → reshaping the traits of the living organism.

Among the most prominent tools of this phase is CRISPR technology.

Here a qualitative transformation occurred.

The human being no longer merely observes the living organism or selects its traits over time, but now possesses tools that enable intervention in the genetic material itself.

From animals and plants to human beings, the capacity to modify the genome has become part of scientific research and medical, agricultural, and biological applications.

Here the verse returns to the forefront:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely change God's creation) []

For the Qur'an began with a specific image:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (And they will surely slit the ears of livestock) []

Then moved to the broader expression:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely change God's creation) []

Thus the matter is not solely the animal's ear.

It is the transition from a specific example to a broader concept: changing creation.

From animal to human being

The danger emerges when the capacity moves from modifying external traits to intervening in an organism's genetic structure.

The genome carries the genetic information associated with the organism's constitution, traits, and functions.

With the development of genome editing, the question has become:

To what extent can the human being intervene in the organism that God created?

Then the question broadens:

What happens when this capacity enters a system that brings together science, data, artificial intelligence, laboratories, funding,

and application?

Here we are not speaking of an isolated tool.

But of a system of capacity:

Artificial intelligence + biological data + genome editing + laboratories + funding + industrial,

medical, and agricultural application.

Each element increases the capacity of the others.

From here, the expression:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely change God's creation) []

becomes a matter deserving to be tested against reality, rather than left in the past.

The danger is not in science alone

Science is not the issue.

Nor is CRISPR technology alone the issue.

Scientific capacity can be used in treatment, research, understanding diseases, developing agriculture, and other fields.

But the question this study poses is:

What happens when the capacity to change living organisms becomes part of an organized project capable of directing it,

expanding it, and applying it?

Here the nature of the question changes.

Because we move from:

Can the human being change things?

To:

Who possesses the capacity? Who possesses the knowledge? Who possesses the technology? Who possesses the data?

Who holds decision-making power? Who determines the application?

Who determines the direction?

And what is the outcome?

For the witness does not look at the tool alone.

Rather, he examines:

The tool + the project + the direction + the application + the outcome.

Israel: from the site of testing to the center of application

Here Israel enters at the end of the study, not at its beginning.

We did not begin with Israel and then search for a verse.

We began with the Qur'an:

The allotted share → leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → changing God's creation.

Then we searched for a reality against which this hypothesis could be tested.

In contemporary reality, we found an organized scientific project combining artificial intelligence, genome editing, and applications in multiple fields.

Here Israel emerges as a contemporary center for testing the hypothesis.

Israel is therefore not the origin of the case.

The origin of the case is the Qur'an.

Israel comes afterward, as one of the testing points reached by the inquiry.

Here the strands connect:

Iblis → the allotted share → those who Judaized → commanding → spreading corruption → changing God's creation → contemporary application.

This is not a reading of an isolated verse.

It is an entire network of texts and realities.

If the project falls into the hands of the allotted share

Here the case reaches its most dangerous stage.

When a human being possesses advanced technology, they can use it for treatment, research, or harm.

But if this kind of capability falls into the hands of the project whose trajectory the Qur'an has disclosed, the question changes.

For the Qur'an does not describe a random act.

Rather, it discloses a sequence:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → execution → change.

If the tools for changing living organisms become available, the question the inquiry compels us to ask is:

What can the allotted share do if it possesses the tools for changing God's creation?

Then the question becomes broader:

Does the change stop at the body?

Or can it extend to the human being's consciousness, primordial disposition, knowledge, history, and meanings?

Here, “changing God's creation” becomes not merely a biological issue

But a comprehensive civilizational and human issue.

Changing what you see and what you do not see

Here we return to the core of the discovery.

If God's creation encompasses the material world we see, then material change can be visible:

A human being, an animal, a plant, a cell, a gene, a trait.

But the human being also lives within a world of meanings:

Primordial disposition, knowledge, memory, history, thought, faith, unbelief, truth, falsehood, a conception of time, a conception of the human being, and their conception of reality.

From here, a more dangerous form of change emerges:

Not only the thing a person sees changes, but also that through which they see it.

Not only reality changes, but also the image of reality a person holds.

Not only is history erased, but the human being is reconstructed so as to read history differently.

Not only thought changes, but also the criteria by which a person weighs thought.

Here change can take place on two levels:

A change in the creation the human being sees, and a change in the human being who sees creation.

This is what makes “changing God's creation” a profoundly significant endpoint in the trajectory of the “allotted share.”

From conveying to witnessing (shahāda)

Here the precision of bringing together the conveying of the message and the disclosure of the case becomes apparent.

For the Messenger was commanded:

﴿بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك﴾ (Convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord) []

The Qur'an he conveyed does not present only the path of guidance; it also discloses the trajectories of leading astray, arousing vain desires, commanding, and changing.

Thus, conveying the message is inseparable from conveying what God has disclosed within the message about the dangers facing the human being.

How can the message be built up without people being informed of what works to demolish it?

How can something be built without identifying who will use it to demolish what has been built?

Knowledge of the message alone does not make the ummah a witness over people if it does not know what the message has disclosed about the trajectories operating among people and against them.

For this reason, the ummah moved from:

Conveying

To:

Witnessing (shahāda).

God, exalted be He, said:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people) []

Witnessing (shahāda) is broader than merely transmitting words.

Conveying transmits the message.

Witnessing (shahāda), however, requires:

That you see,

And know,

And understand, examine, and establish proof,

Then bear witness.

Therefore:

Conveying acquaints the ummah with the message, while witnessing (shahāda) makes the ummah responsible for what the message discloses in people's reality.

Witnessing (shahāda) requires examining reality

If the ummah are:

﴿شهداء على الناس﴾ (Witnesses over people) []

Then knowing the project's name is not enough.

It must examine it:

What does it develop? What does it apply? To what does it apply it? Who owns the technology?

Who directs it? What does it change? How far can it reach? And who benefits from this change?

For witnessing (shahāda) is not accusation.

Witnessing (shahāda) is examination.

Nor is it conjecture.

Witnessing (shahāda) is clear evidence.

Nor is it an emotional stance.

Witnessing (shahāda) is knowledge of what is taking place.

Thus, discovering the “allotted share” does not end the inquiry

But makes inquiry into reality all the more necessary.

From Tadbur to responsibility

Here the importance of this discovery within the Tadbur project becomes apparent.

The aim is not to say:

We have found a new meaning.

But to read the Qur'an until we discover what habituation has concealed, and then test what the text has disclosed against the Qur'an and reality.

The method becomes:

Reading → discovery → hypothesis → testing → proof → knowledge → witnessing (shahāda).

If the hypothesis is established, this is not a moment of triumph for the researcher.

It is a moment of increased responsibility for the ummah.

For the ummah that has come to know the case cannot act as though it had not seen it.

And the ummah that has read the warning cannot turn the Qur'an into a book of the past while the human being has come to possess tools that intervene at the very foundation of the living organism's genetic structure.

Why was disclosing the “allotted share” important?

Because the warning was there.

But the case needed to be read along its full trajectory.

For the Qur'an says:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants) []

Then:

﴿ولأضلنهم﴾ (And I will surely lead them astray) []

Then:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely arouse vain desires in them) []

Then:

﴿ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I will surely command them) []

Then:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (And they will surely slit the ears of livestock) []

Then:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely change God's creation) []

These, in this reading, are not scattered verses.

They constitute a single case with a sequential trajectory.

More dangerous still is that the endpoint is not merely “going astray.”

But rather:

Changing God's creation.

The question therefore becomes:

If the Qur'an has disclosed the project, disclosed its trajectory, and disclosed its aim, and a scientific capability has then emerged in reality that did not previously exist in this form, has the ummah fulfilled its function of examining reality?

From knowing the case to fulfilling witnessing (shahāda)

The judgment is not the end of the case.

Rather, the judgment discloses a new responsibility.

After the case has become known, the question arises:

What has the ummah done with what it has learned?

And after the clear evidence has emerged, the question arises:

Has the ummah fulfilled its witnessing (shahāda)?

Now that the instruments of change exist, the question arises:

Has the ummah considered these instruments in light of what the Qur'an has disclosed?

Here the case shifts from:

The Trial of the Case

To:

The Trial of the Witnesses

A witness who did not know the case cannot testify.

A witness who knew the case but did not examine the evidence has not fulfilled his function.

A witness who saw the evidence and then remained silent remains responsible for his testimony.

From here, the Tadbur project becomes broader than deriving a meaning from a verse.

It is a transition:

From text to discovery, and from discovery to testing,

And from testing to proof,

And from proof to knowledge, and from knowledge to witnessing (shahāda).

Conclusion: The Question That Remains Before the Ummah

If the Qur'an has disclosed:

The allotted share → leading astray → instilling wishes → command → implementation → changing God's creation

And if reality has reached a stage at which human beings can intervene in the genetic material of living organisms, and then bring together genome editing, artificial intelligence, data, and application, the case is no longer merely a question about the past.

The ummah now faces a question of the present:

What does “changing God's creation” mean when human beings possess the capacity to change the creation they see, and the capacity to influence

The human being who sees this creation?

If the “allotted share” has been disclosed to the ummah in the Qur'an, and if the Qur'an has disclosed its course and function, responsibility does not end with discovering it.

Rather, it begins.

Because:

The judgment disclosed the case. Discovery disclosed the evidence. Reality placed the evidence before the ummah. Witnessing (shahāda) determines the ummah's responsibility after it has seen.

Thus, the final question is not:

Have we discovered the allotted share?

But rather:

Has the ummah fulfilled its witnessing (shahāda) after discovering it?

Here begins the second trial:

The Trial of the Witnesses

The Third Final Trial

The Trial of the Witnesses

After the First and Second Trials

This trial is not the beginning of the case.

Rather, it begins where the two preceding trials ended.

In the first trial, the court asked:

Where Did the Crime Begin?

The case concluded with:

The killing of the first brother, and complicity with Iblis in leading human beings astray.

Then the second trial came and asked:

Who Is the Allotted Share, and What Function Does It Perform?

The court reached its judgment:

The first charge was established: the allotted share

And the second charge was established: implementing the project of leading astray, instilling wishes, command, and change

The court determined that what was intended in this case was not the Children of Israel as a whole, but:

The Jews: the specific group among the Children of Israel whom the Qur'an described through their actions and positions, and who called themselves Jews

Accordingly, the third court does not reopen the previous judgments.

The previous judgment stands.

But a question remained unanswered by the two trials:

…If the project was disclosed, the share was disclosed, and the function was disclosed

Then Who Witnessed This?

Here begins the third trial.

Scene One: From Iblis to the Allotted Share

The judge returns to the origin of the case file.

Iblis said:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants.) []

Al-Nisa' 118

Then he disclosed the function of this share:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (I will surely lead them astray and instill wishes in them, and I will surely command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I will surely command them, and they will change God's creation.) []

Al-Nisa' 119

But the court does not leap directly to the identity of the share.

Rather, it returns to the beginning of the sequence:

Iblis → Israel → the Children of Israel.

The Qur'an says:

﴿كل الطعام كان حلا لبني إسرائيل إلا ما حرم إسرائيل على نفسه من قبل أن تنزل التوراة﴾ (All food was lawful for the Children of Israel except what Israel had forbidden himself before the Torah was sent down.) []

Al 'Imran 93

Then it says:

﴿ومن ذرية إبراهيم وإسرائيل﴾ (And from the descendants of Abraham and Israel.) []

Maryam 58

Israel is a singular name.

The Children of Israel are a group.

The Qur'an places Israel in his context before the Torah was sent down, and subsequently uses the expression the Children of Israel.

The court therefore records the course it will test:

Iblis → Israel → the Children of Israel.

But it does not turn this course into an accusation based on lineage.

Not all the Children of Israel are accused.

Scene Two: From the Children of Israel to the Jews

The court moves from the name to the group described by the Qur'an.

It says:

﴿من الذين هادوا يحرفون الكلم عن مواضعه﴾ (Among those who became Jews are those who distort words from their proper places.) []

Al-Nisa' 46

And it says:

﴿ومن الذين هادوا سماعون للكذب… يحرفون الكلم من بعد مواضعه﴾ (And among those who became Jews are avid listeners to falsehood… they distort words after they have been set in their proper places.) []

Al-Ma'idah 41

Then the name appears:

The Jews.

But the Qur'an does not permit turning the Children of Israel into a single bloc; rather, it says:

﴿ليسوا سواء﴾ (They are not all alike.) []

And it says:

﴿منهم أمة مقتصدة﴾ (Among them is an ummah following a moderate course.) []

The court therefore records a fundamental rule:

No Accusation Based on Lineage.

The case is not:

The Children of Israel = the accused.

But rather:

A specific group described by the Qur'an through actions, positions, and a function.

This is the group that the second trial ultimately identified in this case:

The Jews.

Scene Three: From the Share to the Function

The court opens another file:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يؤمنون بالجبت والطاغوت﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, who believe in al-jibt and al-taghut?) []

Al-Nisa' 51

Then:

﴿ولم تلبسون الحق بالباطل وتكتمون الحق وأنتم تعلمون﴾ (And why do you mix truth with falsehood and conceal the truth while you know?) []

Al 'Imran 71

Then:

﴿وإن منهم لفريقا يلوون ألسنتهم بالكتاب لتحسبوه من الكتاب وما هو من الكتاب﴾ (And indeed, among them is a group who twist their tongues with the Book so that you may think it is from the Book, though it is not from the Book.) []

Al 'Imran 78

Here the court is not looking for an isolated word.

Rather, it is looking for the conjunction of:

The share + the Book + concealing the truth + mixing truth with falsehood + twisting the Book + al-jibt and al-taghut.

Then it returns to:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants.) []

Here the judgment was issued in the second trial:

The Jews Are the Allotted Share in This Case.

The third court does not reexamine this judgment.

Rather, it asks:

What Is the Nature of This Share's Work?

Scene Four: A General Project and a Particular Project

Here the court discovers that the file on Iblis contains two distinct levels.

First: The General Project — Enticement into Error

Iblis said:

﴿لأغوينهم أجمعين﴾ (I will surely entice them all into error.) []

Al-Hijr 39

The scope here is broad:

All of Them.

The Qur'an discloses the instruments of this course, including:

﴿فوسوس لهما الشيطان﴾ (Then Satan whispered to them both.) []

Al-A'raf 20

And it says:

﴿وشاركهم في الأموال والأوالد﴾ (And share with them in wealth and children.) []

Al-Isra' 64

And it says:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I will surely instill wishes in them.) Al-Nisa' 119

It also discloses:

﴿زخرف القول غرورا﴾ (Embellished speech as deception.) []

Al-An'am 112

Thus, before the court is a general project:

Enticement into error → whispering → embellishment → instilling wishes → influence.

It is a project that targets the human being on a broad scale.

Second: The Specific Project — Leading Astray and Alteration

But the court finds another, more specific trajectory:

﴾…﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم (And I shall surely lead them astray, and surely fill them with vain desires, and surely command them)

Here a different sequence emerges:

Leading astray → instilling vain desires → commanding → alteration.

The Qur'an itself says:

﴿ربنا أرنا اللذين أضلانا من الجن والإنس﴾ (Our Lord, show us the two who led us astray, from among the jinn and humankind) []

Fussilat 29

Thus the court encounters the phrase:

The two who led us astray.

Not:

Those who beguiled us.

Here the court records the distinction that Tadbur reveals:

Going astray describes the state of one who has gone astray.

Leading astray, by contrast, is an act performed by one who misleads another.

Of Adam, He said:

﴿وعصى آدم ربه فغوى﴾ (And Adam disobeyed his Lord and went astray) []

Ta Ha 121

And the people of the Fire said:

﴿اللذين أضلانا من الجن والإنس﴾ (The two who led us astray, from among the jinn and humankind) []

The question, then, is not:

Who went astray?

But rather:

Who led others astray?

Here the case moves from a human being merely caught in deviation to a human being who assumes the function of influencing the deviation of others.

This is the specific trajectory associated with the allotted share in this case.

Scene Five: Leading Astray Is Not the End of the Project

The court returns to the verse:

﴿ولأضلنهم﴾ (And I shall surely lead them astray) []

But it does not stop there.

But rather:

﴿ولأمنينهم﴾ (And I shall surely fill them with vain desires) []

Then:

﴿ولآمرنهم﴾ (And I shall surely command them) []

Then:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (And they will surely slit the ears of livestock) []

Then:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely alter God's creation) []

The specific project, then, is not merely leading astray.

It is an integrated trajectory:

Leading astray

Then

Instilling vain desires

Then

Commanding

Then

Alteration.

Here the importance of distinguishing the two projects becomes clear:

General beguilement targets the human being.

The specific project, by contrast, aims to bring the human being to the act of alteration.

Scene Six: What Is “God's Creation”?

The court reaches the most consequential word in the sequence:

﴿فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And they will surely alter God's creation) []

The Qur'an says:

﴿الله خالق كل شيء﴾ (God is the Creator of all things) []

Al-Zumar 62

Creation is not confined to the human being.

Rather, it encompasses the realm of:

The heavens and the earth and all that lies between them, human beings, animals, plants, and all other creation.

Thus the material level of alteration emerges.

The Qur'an has given a direct example:

﴿فليبتكن آذان الأنعام﴾ (And they will surely slit the ears of livestock) []

In our age, issues such as:

Genetic engineering, gene modification, cloning, and intervention in biological characteristics

Can be brought before this text to test the extent to which the concept applies to them.

But the court opens another door.

Scene Seven: Altering That by Which You See

The Qur'an says:

﴿فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها ۚ لا تبديل لخلق الله ۚ ذلك الدين القيم﴾ (The primordial disposition God has instilled in people; there is no altering God's creation; that is the upright religion) []

Al-Rum 30

Here a connection emerges:

Creation → primordial disposition → the human being → religion.

From here, the nonmaterial level of alteration can be tested:

Primordial disposition, thought, perception, knowledge, choice, religion, and the human being's relationship to time and meaning.

The formulation thus becomes:

He may alter what you see, and he may alter that by which you see.

The alteration may be in the created thing.

Or it may be in the human being who receives that thing, understands it, perceives it, and judges it.

Here the issue is no longer merely an alteration of form.

Rather, the question becomes:

Can alteration extend to the human being himself, and to the way he sees and understands God's creation, truth, and religion?

This is the field of inquiry that the verse opens up.

Scene Eight: A Witness from the Qur'an — Al-Samiri

The court summons a witness from within the Qur'an:

Al-Samiri.

Not because the Qur'an explicitly called him “one who leads astray,” but because his account offers a model of an act that moved from within the individual to the community.

He said:

﴿بصرت بما لم يبصروا به﴾ (I perceived what they did not perceive) []

Then:

﴿فقبضت قبضة من أثر الرسول فنبذتها وكذلك سولت لي نفسي﴾ (So I took a handful from the messenger's trace and cast it away; thus did my soul entice me) []

Ta Ha 96

Then he made the calf:

﴿فأخرج لهم عجلا جسدا له خوار﴾ (Then he brought forth for them a calf, a body that lowed) []

Ta Ha 88

And said:

﴿هذا إلهكم وإله موسى﴾ (This is your god and the god of Moses) []

And Aaron says:

﴿يا قوم إنما فتنتم به﴾ (O my people, you are only being tested by it) []

Ta Ha 90

The court thus has before it a Qur'anic model:

Enticement → action → influence upon the community → the community's trial.

The Qur'an need not, on every occasion, name the agent as one who leads astray; rather, it presents the act and its effects.

Here the question returns:

When does an individual's going astray become a function of leading others astray?

Scene Nine: The One Ummah

Having identified the nature of the project, the court turns to the party that will bear witness against it.

The Qur'an says:

﴿إن هذه أمتكم أمة واحدة وأنا ربكم فاعبدون﴾ (Indeed, this ummah of yours is one ummah, and I am your Lord, so worship Me) []

Al-Anbiya 92

In its Qur'anic foundation, the ummah is not merely a name.

It is:

One ummah.

And it has a unifying foundation:

One Lord and the worship of God.

Then He says:

﴿كنتم خير أمة أخرجت للناس تأمرون بالمعروف وتنهون عن المنكر وتؤمنون بالله﴾ (You are the best ummah brought forth for people: you enjoin what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God) []

Al 'Imran 110

The court thus records:

Brought forth for people.

And it has a function:

Enjoining what is right.

Forbidding what is wrong.

Believing in God.

The ummah, then, is not merely a community bearing a name.

It has a function toward people.

The question now is:

Is bearing witness part of this function?

Scene Ten: From the Conveyance (balāgh) to Witnessing (shahāda)

The court returns to the Messenger.

God said:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord; if you do not, then you have not conveyed His message) []

Al-Ma'ida 67

The conveyance (balāgh) is the Messenger's function.

What God has sent down falls within the conveyance (balāgh).

And the warning disclosed by the Qur'an does not fall outside the substance of what God has sent down.

Then comes the decisive verse:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (And thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you) []

Al-Baqara 143

Here the complete structure emerges:

The Messenger → the ummah → people.

The Messenger is a witness over the ummah.

And the ummah are witnesses over people.

The verse did not stop at:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people) []

Rather, it added:

﴿ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (And the Messenger may be a witness over you) []

Witnessing (shahāda) thus operates in two directions:

The Messenger over the ummah.

And the ummah over people.

Here the third trial actually begins.

Scene Eleven: What Comes After the Messenger?

The question:

Does the function of witnessing (shahāda) end with the end of the Messenger's life?

The Qur'an did not assign witnessing (shahāda) over people to the Messenger alone.

Rather, it said to the ummah:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people) []

The function of witnessing (shahāda) was thus assigned to the ummah itself.

From here, the transfer of the function emerges:

The Messenger conveys and bears witness over the ummah.

And the ummah bears witness over people.

This does not mean that the ummah holds the Messenger's station in prophethood or messengership.

Rather, it bears the function of witnessing (shahāda) that the Qur'an expressly assigned to it.

The question therefore remains open:

…If the Messenger has conveyed

Has the ummah fulfilled its witnessing (shahāda)?

Scene Twelve: Neither Collective Accusation nor Collective Exemption

Here the defense rises.

The Defense: The Inherited Tradition

It says:

The ummah is not a single individual.

Not every person is a scholar.

Not every person is a decision-maker.

Not every person is capable of research, elucidation, or change.

The court does not reject this defense.

Rather, it accepts it in principle.

For the Qur'an itself distinguishes among people.

But accepting this principle does not mean exempting everyone.

For the Qur'an says:

﴿كونوا قوامين بالقسط شهداء لله ولو على أنفسكم﴾ (Be steadfast in upholding justice, witnesses for God, even against yourselves.) []

Al-Nisa 135

And it says:

﴿ولا تكتموا الشهادة﴾ (And do not conceal testimony.) []

Al-Baqarah 283

Thus, there is no collective charge before the court.

But neither is there collective exemption.

Each person participates in witnessing (shahāda) from their own position:

Through their knowledge.

Through their capacity.

Through their specialization.

Through their position.

And in proportion to the responsibility they have borne.

A scholar is not like a nonscholar.

A researcher is not like a nonresearcher.

A specialist is not like someone without a specialization.

A decision-maker is not like someone with no power to decide.

Someone with the capacity is not like someone without it.

Thus, the court does not ask:

Why did everyone not do everything?

Rather, it asks:

What could this person have known?

And what could they have done?

And what were they responsible for?

And did they fulfill their witnessing (shahāda)?

Scene Thirteen: The Ummah's Witnessing (shahāda) Is Not a Title

The court returns to the beginning of this file.

The general project:

Enticement into error → the human being.

And the specific project:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → altering.

And the allotted portion in this case:

The Jews.

Then comes the ummah:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people.) []

Here the function of witnessing (shahāda) becomes clear.

The ummah is not required merely to bear the name.

Nor is witnessing (shahāda) a certificate of affiliation.

Nor is witnessing (shahāda) repeating what it has been told.

But rather:

Seeing.

Knowledge.

Discernment.

Elucidation.

Witnessing (shahāda).

If there is leading astray, the witness is questioned about that leading astray.

If there is arousing of vain desires, the witness is questioned about that arousing of vain desires.

If there is commanding, the witness is questioned about that commanding.

If alteration appears, the witness is questioned about that alteration.

Not because the ummah is accused of carrying out the project, but because the Qur'an has placed it in the position of:

Witnessing (shahāda) over people.

Scene Fourteen: The Sequence of the Three Trials

The judge lifts the three files before him.

The First Trial

Where did the crime begin?

The finding:

The killing of the first brother, and complicity with Iblis in leading the human being astray.

The Second Trial

Who is the allotted portion, and what is its function?

The finding:

The Jews are the allotted portion in this case.

And the function:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → altering.

It then emerged that the project has two levels:

A general project: enticement into error

And a specific project: leading astray, arousing vain desires, commanding, and altering

The Third Trial

…After the project has been exposed

Who bears witness?

The answer comes:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) []

Thus the sequence is completed:

Iblis

Israel

The Children of Israel

Those who Judaized

The Jews

The Allotted Portion

The Specific Project

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → altering

The Witnessing Ummah

The Human Witness

Here the case is no longer merely a matter of history.

Rather, it becomes a matter of witnessing (shahāda).

The Final Judgment

The Judge:

Having heard the case file and the judgments delivered in the two previous trials, the court does not reopen what has already been adjudicated, but builds upon it.

The second trial established:

First: that the Jews are the allotted portion in this case, and that they are the specific group among the Children of Israel whom the Qur'an described by their actions and positions and who called themselves Jews.

Second: that the function associated with this portion is:

Leading astray → arousing vain desires → commanding → altering.

It also became clear to the court that the Qur'an presents two levels of Iblis's project:

A general project of enticement into error, targeting the human being on a broad scale.

And a specific project of leading astray, arousing vain desires, commanding, and altering, leading to the alteration of God's creation.

The court does not pass judgment on the Children of Israel as a whole, nor on every individual merely on grounds of lineage or name.

As for the ummah, the Qur'an has placed it in a clear position:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over people.) []

And the Messenger:

﴿ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (And the Messenger may be a witness over you.) []

Accordingly, the court rules:

Witnessing (shahāda) is a function, not a title.

And there is no collective accusation.

And no collective exemption.

Rather, responsibility is proportionate to:

Knowledge, capacity, specialization, position, and the responsibility a person has borne.

Thus the court does not ask the person:

Why did you not do what you could not do?

Rather, it asks:

What did you know?

What were you capable of?

What is your responsibility?

And what did you do with your witnessing (shahāda)?

Then the judge looks at the case file and says:

The question of who the accused was has been settled.

And the question of the portion's function has been settled.

The question of the witness remains.

Then he raises the judgment:

The file is no longer before the court.

It is now before the witness himself.

Has he fulfilled his witnessing (shahāda)?

The court is adjourned.

The three trials have ended.

And witnessing (shahāda) has begun.

The Fourth Trial

The Trial of the Inherited Tradition

When the People of Hadith Retained Artificial Intelligence for the Defense

The Court's Preamble

This court is not the beginning of the case.

Nor is it a court for reconsidering the previous judgments.

Rather, it begins where the three previous trials ended.

Three judgments have reached this court and become part of the case file:

The first judgment: Israel is his brother's killer.

The second judgment: the allotted portion is the Jews.

The third judgment: the ummah is a witness over people, and witnessing (shahāda) is not merely transmitting the message, but a responsibility requiring the ummah to know what it bears witness to.

These judgments are the foundation of the fourth trial.

The defense team may not reopen them except on the basis of new evidence directly concerning the judgment itself.

But the question the court now places before itself is different:

If these judgments have emerged through reading the Qur'an by means of the Qur'an, how did the Islamic inherited tradition deal with these

issues?

Did it preserve them in their Qur'anic place?

Did it bring their elements together into a single picture?

Did it make the ummah a witness to them?

And did it keep the Qur'an in the position of arbiter, or did narration (riwāya), over time, become an epistemic and legislative center determining how the Qur'an is read?

For this reason, the court decided to open the fourth trial: the trial of the inherited legacy.

First: Affirming the Three Previous Judgments

The presiding judge asked the clerk to read out the previous judgments.

The clerk stood and said:

The First Judgment

In the first trial, the court examined the question of the beginning:

Who killed the brother?

It concluded, on the basis of the network of verses and Qur'anic indications upon which the trial rested, that:

Israel is his brother's killer.

The central verses in the case were from surah al-Ma'idah, from the account of Adam's two sons through to His words, exalted is He:

﴿من أجل ذلك كتبنا على بني إسرائيل﴾ (Because of that, We prescribed for the Children of Israel) []

Thus, the judgment was not based on an isolated verse, but on a reading of the network of texts within the Qur'an.

The Second Judgment

In the second trial, the question was:

Who constitutes the allotted portion?

After examining the verses and connections upon which the case rested, the judgment was delivered:

The allotted portion is the Jews.

This is the judgment upon which this court will build.

The Third Judgment

Then came the third trial, asking:

What is the function of the ummah after the revelation of the Book?

The decisive text was:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over humankind, and the Messenger may be a witness over you) []

Al-Baqarah 143.

Here, the distinction between two functions emerged:

The Messenger is a witness over the ummah.

And the ummah is a witness over humankind.

The third judgment was therefore delivered:

The ummah is not merely a transmitter of the message; the ummah is a witness.

Witnessing (shahāda) is not merely possessing a text, but knowing that to which one bears witness.

Second: The Defendant Enters the Courtroom

Silence fell over the courtroom.

Then the bailiff announced:

The defendant: the Islamic inherited legacy

The inherited legacy entered the courtroom.

But this time it did not enter alone.

The defense team came forward, and its head said:

Your Honor, we are not defending every individual narration (riwāya), nor do we claim that all the inherited tradition that has reached the ummah is free of error.

We are defending the system that preserved hadith, studied chains of transmission, transmitted reports about the Messenger, and established disciplines for the criticism and accreditation of transmitters, the authentic and the weak, the abrogating and the abrogated, exegesis (tafsīr), and jurisprudence.

Then he added:

We, the people of hadith, have commissioned artificial intelligence to present the defense of the inherited legacy before this court.

The judge raised his head and said:

The court accepts the appearance of the defense team.

Then he turned to the prosecution's representative:

Please present the indictment.

Third: The Indictment

The representative of the public prosecution stood.

He placed four files before him.

Then he said:

Your Honor.

The prosecution does not accuse the inherited legacy of failing to preserve information.

Nor does it accuse the hadith collections of containing no reports about the Children of Israel.

Nor does it say that inherited tradition did not mention the first killer.

The matter is more serious than that.

Then he raised the first file.

First charge: an imbalance in the distribution of attention

Then he raised the second file.

Second charge: shifting the ummah from the conveyance (balāgh) to reception, and weakening the meaning of witnessing (shahāda)

Then he raised the third file.

Third charge: reconfiguring the centrality of the Qur'an, such that, in some practical applications, that which elucidates came to govern

the manner of understanding the Qur'an.

Then he raised the fourth file.

Fourth charge: the effect of this system on Islamic consciousness, and the transformation of narration (riwāya) from a report about the Messenger into an independent

epistemic and legislative center.

Then he said:

This court does not investigate intentions.

It tries the structure, function, and outcome manifest in the material before it.

The First Charge

An Imbalance in the Distribution of Attention

The prosecutor said:

The question here is not:

Is there information about the Children of Israel in hadith?

Yes, there is.

Nor is it:

Are there narrations (riwāya) about the first killer?

There are.

Where, then, is the crime?

Then he placed a copy of the Qur'an before the judge.

And said:

The crime we ask the court to examine is this:

Was the information preserved while the map that the Qur'an drew for this information was lost?

For the Qur'an does not present the major questions as disconnected reports.

Rather, it connects them.

The account of the killing.

The Children of Israel.

The spreading of corruption.

Exaltation.

Distortion.

Concealment.

Al-jibt and al-taghut.

Al-Samiri.

Leading astray.

Arousing vain hopes.

The allotted portion.

Then the ummah's responsibility for witnessing (shahāda).

These are not separate files in the Qur'anic method.

They are a network.

Here the prosecution presented its first piece of evidence

The prosecutor said:

The Qur'an itself commands Tadbur:

﴿كتاب أنزلناه إليك مبارك ليدبروا آياته﴾ (A blessed Book that We have sent down to you, so that they may reflect upon its verses) []

Sad 29.

What is required, then, is not merely preserving the verses.

But rather, Tadbur of its verses.

That is, discovering the relationships among them.

Then he added:

If the Qur'an operates in this way, the question is not how much information remained in inherited tradition.

The question is:

Did the Qur'anic relationships among these pieces of information remain present as they are?

The Artificial Intelligence's Defense

The defense counsel stood.

And said:

Objection.

The judge:

To what?

He said:

The prosecution assumes that a difference in the mode of presentation means the loss of structure.

This is incorrect.

Hadith was not compiled to be another version of the Qur'an's arrangement.

Hadith collections have a different function.

There are hadiths concerning doctrine, worship, transactions, ethics, and history.

The presence of reports about the Children of Israel in hadith collections does not mean that they replaced the Qur'an.

Then the defense presented direct evidence.

He said:

Indeed, we have an explicit text in Sahih al-Bukhari:

“Convey from me, even if only a verse, and relate reports about the Children of Israel without constraint.”

The hadith appears in a separate section entitled What Has Been Related about the Children of Israel.

Then he said:

The prosecution therefore cannot say that the inherited legacy concealed reports about the Children of Israel.

The Prosecution's Cross-Examination

The prosecutor smiled and said:

I did not say that.

Then he approached the defense stand.

I will accept your evidence.

Now I want you to answer the real question.

Has this hadith established that the inherited legacy preserved the Qur'anic map of the relationships among these issues?

The defense fell silent.

The prosecutor repeated the question:

The hadith says:

Convey from me

Then it says:

And relate reports about the Children of Israel.

It is itself evidence of the presence of material about the Children of Israel within the hadith corpus.

But where in the hadith is the map:

The first killing ← Israel ← the Children of Israel ← the spreading of corruption ← the allotted portion ← the witnessing ummah?

The defense said:

It is not the function of a single hadith to present this map.

The prosecutor replied:

Nor am I asking a single hadith to present it.

I am asking about the entire system.

Then he turned to the judge:

This is the essence of the charge.

The problem is not the absence of information, but the dismantling of the structure.

The information remained, but the map was lost.

The Court's Decision on the First Charge

The judge raised his hand.

The court accepted the defendant's defense on an important point:

It is not valid to say that the inherited corpus preserved no information about the Children of Israel.

The text submitted from Sahih al-Bukhari attests to the existence of material devoted to the Children of Israel.

Then he said:

But this defense has not answered the central question:

Did the inherited corpus preserve the Qur'anic relationships among the major issues, or did these issues become

separate reports and files?

He added:

On the basis of the prosecution's distinction between the existence of information and the preservation of the structure linking that information to other information, the court finds the charge established at the structural level.

Judgment:

Guilty on the first charge: imbalance in the distribution of attention

The Second Charge

From the Conveyance (balāgh) to Witnessing (shahāda)

The prosecutor opened the second file.

He said:

This charge is more serious.

Then he read:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord.) []

Then he moved to:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over humankind.) []

Al-Baqarah 143.

He said:

The Messenger is responsible for the conveyance (balāgh).

The ummah is responsible for witnessing (shahāda).

Then he turned to the defense:

If the ummah is a witness, what will it bear witness to?

The defense said:

It bears witness over humankind on the basis of what has reached it from the Messenger.

The prosecutor said:

Then it must know what has reached it.

The defense said:

Yes.

The prosecutor said:

And understand it?

The defense said:

Yes.

The prosecutor said:

And know the issues that the Qur'an has made the subject of witnessing (shahāda)?

The defense fell silent.

The prosecutor said:

Here the problem begins.

The Second Evidence: Clarification and Concealment

The prosecutor said:

The Qur'an did not make knowledge a peripheral matter.

God Most High said:

﴿إن الذين يكتمون ما أنزلنا من البينات والهدى﴾ (Indeed, those who conceal what We have sent down of clear proofs and guidance.) []

Then:

﴿ولا تلبسوا الحق بالباطل وتكتموا الحق وأنتم تعلمون﴾ (And do not cloak the truth in falsehood or conceal the truth while you know.) []

Then he turned back to the judge:

Witnessing (shahāda), then, is not an identity card.

Nor is it merely affiliation with an ummah.

It is an epistemic responsibility.

The AI's Defense

The defense said:

But the ummah was not left without knowledge.

The inherited tradition transmitted the Qur'an.

And transmitted hadith.

And explained the language.

And recorded the occasions of revelation.

And studied the narrations (riwāya).

And established extensive disciplines for understanding religion.

Then it said:

Indeed, hadith itself commands transmission:

“Convey from me, even if only a verse.”

Then it continued:

How, then, can you accuse the system of transmission of having abolished transmission?

The Prosecution's Response

The prosecutor said:

The court has not accused it of abolishing transmission.

Then he said clearly:

The charge is not:

Preventing the ummah from transmitting information.

The charge is:

Reducing the ummah's function to reception and transmission, at the expense of the function that the Qur'an itself named: witnessing (shahāda)

Then he pointed to the verse:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over humankind.) []

He said:

The Messenger is a witness over the ummah.

And the ummah is a witness over humankind.

There are thus two corresponding responsibilities.

Then he turned to the defense:

Can an ummah bear witness to an issue it does not know?

The defense said:

No.

The prosecutor said:

Can it bear witness to a meaning on which it has not reflected?

The defense said:

Witnessing (shahāda) requires knowledge.

The prosecutor said:

Then we have reached a point of agreement.

Then he said:

If the Qur'an commands the ummah to reflect and makes it a witness, its responsibility is not merely to say:

The hadith reached us.

But to say:

We knew the issue, understood the evidence, and bore witness to what we knew.

The Judgment on the Second Charge

The judge said:

The court does not regard the transmission of hadith as a crime in itself.

Nor does it regard transmission as incompatible with witnessing (shahāda).

Then he added:

But the issue on trial is the center of responsibility.

The Qur'an made the ummah:

﴿شهداء على الناس﴾ (Witnesses over humankind.) []

Accordingly:

If reception becomes the endpoint of the function, the function of witnessing (shahāda) has been weakened.

Judgment:

Guilty on the second charge: weakening the ummah's responsibility from informed witnessing (shahāda) to mere reception and transmission

The Third Charge

When the Clarifier Becomes the Arbiter over the Qur'an

Here the atmosphere in the courtroom changed.

The prosecutor opened the third file and said:

This is the most dangerous point in the case.

Then he placed three verses before the court.

The First Evidence

﴿أفغير الله أبتغي حكما وهو الذي أنزل إليكم الكتاب مفصلا﴾ (Shall I seek an arbiter other than God, when it is He who has sent down to you the Book, set out in detail?) []

Al-An‘am 114.

The Second Evidence

﴿ونزلنا عليك الكتاب تبيانا لكل شيء﴾ (And We sent down to you the Book as a clarification of all things.) []

Al-Nahl 89.

The Third Evidence

﴿ليدبروا آياته﴾ (So that they may reflect upon its verses.) []

Sad 29.

Then he said:

These are not peripheral verses.

They define the function of the Book itself:

Set out in detail.

A clarification.

An object of reflection.

Then he posed the question:

What happens if the narration (riwāya) becomes what determines in advance what the text may and may not mean?

The AI's Defense

Defense counsel rose quickly.

Objection.

The judge:

Sustained. Explain.

The defense said:

Two things are being conflated:

Explanation

And sitting in judgment over the Qur'an.

Then it said:

The inherited corpus does not say that hadith is an arbiter over the Qur'an.

Rather, it says that the Sunnah explains the Qur'an.

For the Messenger is the one who received the Qur'an, conveyed it, and clarified it for people.

Then it added:

And if hadith is removed, how are we to know the details of prayer, zakat, pilgrimage, and other matters?

The defense was strong this time.

The prosecutor did not interrupt it.

He let it finish.

Then he said:

Have you finished?

The defense said:

Yes.

The prosecutor said:

Then I will accept a large part of what you have said.

Then he turned to the judge:

Yes.

There is important information in the Sunnah.

Yes.

And there are actions and teachings of the Prophet transmitted by the inherited tradition.

Yes.

And the question about prayer, pilgrimage, and other matters is legitimate.

Then he turned back to the defense:

But none of that answers the question before the court.

The Decisive Examination

The prosecutor said:

If the Qur'an says:

﴿أفغير الله أبتغي حكما وهو الذي أنزل إليكم الكتاب مفصلا،﴾ (Shall I seek an arbiter other than God, when it is He who has sent down to you the Book, set out in detail?) []

What happens when an exegete approaches a Qur'anic verse and then says:

This verse can only be understood through such-and-such a narration (riwāya)?

Then another comes and says:

This narration (riwāya) is authentic, and therefore this meaning is correct.

Then the meaning that conflicts with the narration (riwāya) becomes:

Weak, invalid, or outside the Sunnah?

Has the narration (riwāya) remained a clarifier?

Or has it become a mandatory gateway to the meaning of the Qur'an?

The Defense Requests That an Objection Be Entered on the Record

The defense:

The court may not generalize.

The judge:

The objection is recorded.

The prosecutor said:

And I am not generalizing.

Then he said:

That is why the charge does not say:

The entire inherited tradition is an arbiter over the Qur'an.

Rather, it says:

When the inherited narration (riwāya) becomes a prior criterion determining acceptable Qur'anic meaning, the function of the elucidator shifts

from serving the text to controlling the scope of its interpretation.

Then he repeated the verse:

﴿أفغير الله أبتغي حكما﴾ (Shall I seek a judge other than God?) []

And said:

Here the question becomes fundamental:

Who is the judge?

The Judgment on the Third Charge

The judge said:

The defense has established that inherited tradition has an extensive interpretive and transmissive function.

The court does not deny this.

Then he continued:

But the court is examining another point:

Has the Qur'an remained the ultimate testing point for meaning, or has the inherited narration (riwāya), within certain exegetical and jurisprudential structures, become a criterion that determines in advance what the Qur'an can say?

He added:

The Qur'anic text presents the Book as:

set out in detail,

an elucidation, and

a book sent down to be reflected upon.

Then the judgment was delivered:

Guilty on the third charge: reconfiguring the centrality of the Qur'an, when narration (riwāya) shifts from an instrument of elucidation to a criterion

governing the scope of Qur'anic understanding.

The Fourth Charge

The System's Effect on Islamic Consciousness

From Narration (riwāya) to Epistemic and Legislative Authority

The prosecutor stood for the last time.

The fourth dossier was weightier than the preceding ones.

He said:

The three preceding charges concern the structure.

This charge concerns what that structure produces.

Then he wrote on the board:

Narration (riwāya) → authentication of the chain of transmission → authentic hadith → Sunnah → ruling → binding obligation

And said:

Here is where the transformation occurred.

Then he explained:

A narration (riwāya) is, in origin, a report.

But when it passes through a system of authentication, is then characterized as authentic, then attributed to the Sunnah, then made the basis for deriving a ruling, and that ruling then becomes binding, the narration (riwāya) is no longer merely a report.

It has become an epistemic and legislative authority.

The Artificial Intelligence's Defense

The defense said:

This is not a defect.

For hadith scholars, an authentic hadith is not merely a narration (riwāya).

Rather, it is one whose authenticity has been established according to precise scholarly rules concerning chains of transmission, transmitters, continuity, hidden defects, and other matters.

Then it said:

The ummah cannot build its religion on the Qur'an alone without knowing what the Messenger did and taught.

This was the strongest defense the defense team had presented.

The Prosecution Does Not Deny the Strength of the Defense

The prosecutor said:

The court will place this point on record.

Then he said:

We are not attacking the study of chains of transmission as a historical discipline.

Nor are we saying that every narration (riwāya) is false.

Nor are we saying that everything the Messenger did is without value.

Then he placed the copy of the Qur'an before the judge.

But the question is:

Did the Qur'an make narration (riwāya) an independent source empowered to establish a religious ruling merely by virtue of the narration (riwāya) being authenticated?

Then he said:

Here we must return to the three trials.

Returning to the Three Judgments

The First Judgment

Israel is his brother's killer.

The Second Judgment

The prescribed share is the Jews.

The Third Judgment

The ummah is a witness.

Then he said:

Had these issues remained at the center of Qur'anic reading, the ummah would have had to investigate them, connect their verses, reflect upon them, and then bear witness to them.

But if the ummah's attention becomes directed toward:

the authenticity of the narration (riwāya),

the transmitter's name,

the generations of transmitters,

variations in wording,

particular rulings,

the details of narrations (riwāya),

while the Qur'an is not reread as a single interconnected network, then the problem is not the existence of scholarship.

The problem lies in:

the center of gravity.

The Moment of Final Confrontation

The judge said:

I want a direct answer from the defense.

The artificial intelligence stood.

The judge said:

If it were established before the court that the Qur'an opens a major case across dozens of verses, and that the case then became, in public consciousness, dozens of separate narrations (riwāya), would it suffice to say that all the information is there?

The defense said:

No.

The judge said:

And if the information were there, but the relationships between its elements were absent?

The defense said:

Then the structure could be lost while the information remained.

Silence fell.

This answer was the most important moment in the trial.

Because the defense, unintentionally, had established the essence of the case.

The Court's Deliberations

The judge withdrew.

The courtroom doors were closed.

Deliberations began.

Four dossiers lay before the court.

It did not ask:

Does inherited tradition contain information?

That is established.

Nor did it ask:

Are there authentic narrations (riwāya)?

That, too, is established within the system the defendant is defending.

Rather, it asked the four questions that defined the case:

The First Question

Was the information preserved in its Qur'anic networked form?

The Second Question

Has the ummah remained in the position of witness, or has its role become merely that of transmitter and recipient?

The Third Question

Has the Qur'an remained the governing authority and the object of reflection, or has narration (riwāya), within certain structures, become a prior criterion determining its meaning?

The Fourth Question

Has narration (riwāya) remained a report to be examined, or has it become, through the chain of inherited tradition, a self-standing epistemic and legislative authority?

Then the judge returned to the courtroom.

The Judgment Was Delivered

Everyone stood.

The judge said:

Having reviewed the case file.

And having heard the public prosecution.

And having heard the defense of the artificial intelligence retained to represent the inherited legacy.

And having affirmed the judgments delivered in the three preceding trials.

And having examined the Qur'anic evidence and the narration (riwāya) from inherited tradition submitted during the hearings.

The court delivers its judgment.

First: On the First Charge

Imbalance in the Distribution of Attention

The court establishes that the issue is not the absence of information.

The inherited legacy does indeed contain material on the Children of Israel, and Sahih al-Bukhari itself attests to the existence of a section entitled What Has Been Related about the Children of Israel, with a narration (riwāya) combining transmission from the Messenger with reporting about the Children of Israel.

But the existence of information does not establish that the Qur'anic structure connecting it has been preserved.

The Qur'an calls for reflection upon the verses, not merely the collection of reports.

Judgment:

The defendant: guilty

The reason:

Preserving the information is not equivalent to preserving the map.

Second: On the Second Charge

From the Conveyance (balāgh) to Witnessing (shahāda)

The court establishes that the Qur'an described the Messenger in terms of the function of the conveyance (balāgh), and the ummah in terms of the function of witnessing (shahāda).

The text is explicit:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (So that you may be witnesses over the people) []

Witnessing (shahāda) is not merely possessing a narration (riwāya).

Rather, it requires knowledge of the subject of that witnessing (shahāda).

Accordingly:

If the ummah is transformed from an ummah required to understand the Book and bear witness by it into an ummah whose primary function is to receive and transmit narrations (riwāya), then the center of the function defined by the Qur'an has been disrupted.

Judgment:

The defendant: guilty

Third: On the Third Charge

Reconfiguring the Centrality of the Qur'an

The court establishes that the Qur'an describes the Book as:

Detailed.

And describes it as:

An elucidation of all things.

And makes its purpose:

Tadbur.

Accordingly, any epistemic system that makes narration (riwāya) a prior criterion determining what the Qur'an may mean has transferred narration (riwāya) from the function of elucidation to that of controlling the scope of understanding.

Verdict:

The accused: Guilty

Fourth: On the fourth charge

The system's effect on Islamic consciousness

The court establishes that the transition of narration (riwāya) from:

A report

To:

An authentic hadith

Then to:

Sunnah

Then to:

A ruling of Islamic law

Can make narration (riwāya) part of an independent epistemic and legislative authority in religious practice.

The court does not regard the mere existence of the hadith sciences as grounds for conviction.

Rather, the grounds for conviction lie in the shift in the center of epistemic authority when the inherited ruling becomes the endpoint, and the Qur'an then comes afterward to support or explain it.

Verdict:

The accused: Guilty

The final judgment of the fourth court

Having adjudicated the four charges, the court issues the following judgment:

First: An imbalance in the distribution of attention — established.

Second: The weakening of the ummah's responsibility from witnessing (shahāda) to mere reception and transmission — established.

Third: The reconfiguration of the centrality of the Qur'an when narration (riwāya) becomes a criterion governing understanding — established.

Fourth: The transformation of narration (riwāya) from a report into an epistemic and legislative authority, and its effect on Islamic consciousness — established.

Then the judge fell silent for a few moments.

And said:

But the court wishes to record something important at the outset of its judgment:

The charge was not established because the inherited material contains no information.

Rather, it was established because the presence of information is one thing, and the continued presence of the Qur'an as a comprehensive map of that information is another.

Then he continued:

The Qur'an does not ask the ummah to be a repository of reports.

Rather, it makes them:

﴿شهداء على الناس﴾ (witnesses over humankind) []

The Qur'an does not present itself as a book that must lose its centrality in order to be understood; rather, it describes itself as detailed, an elucidation, and a book sent down for Tadbur.

The conclusion that must not be bypassed

Here the court returns to the beginning of the case.

The first court said:

Israel is his brother's killer.

And the second court said:

The appointed share is the Jews.

And the third court said:

The ummah is a witness.

As for the fourth court, it asked:

What did the inherited material do to this case?

The evidence answered:

Not all the information disappeared.

Nor were the narrations (riwāya) devoid of truth.

Nor was hadith scholarship merely a void.

But the Qur'anic structure of the case was no longer at the center of the scene.

Here the difference between two methods becomes apparent:

The Qur'an works through interconnection.

One verse leads to another.

One account reveals another.

One term explains another.

And one of God's established ways reveals another.

Then the threads come together until the case emerges.

But when knowledge becomes discrete units:

A narration (riwāya) here.

A hadith there.

A jurisprudential ruling here.

A historical account there.

Exegesis (tafsīr) with one exegete.

And a ruling with one jurist.

The parts may remain while the complete picture is lost.

This is the most dangerous thing revealed by the fourth trial:

Obscuring the Qur'an from the ummah may not involve deleting its verses.

It may involve preserving the verses, then obscuring the relationships between them.

Here the final question is no longer:

Has the Qur'an reached us?

But rather:

Has it reached us in the manner in which the Qur'an asked us to read it?

This is the question the court leaves open before the ummah:

Can the ummah that the Qur'an made a witness over humankind perform its witnessing (shahāda), if it has lost the map of

The case to which it will bear witness?

The fourth trial has ended.

The judgment has been issued.

The file now passes from the court to the witness.

Appendix to the fourth court

The overall outcome — the witnesses before the map of the Qur'an

With the conclusion of the four trials, the case does not end.

Rather, responsibility for it passes to those whom the Qur'an described in its words:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, that you may be witnesses over humankind and that the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [Al-Baqarah: 143]

The court has issued its judgments, but the witnesses' task is not over.

Rather, their task begins here.

First: What does “obscuring the Qur'an” mean?

The most important thing this trial reveals is that obscuring the Qur'an need not mean preventing access to the muṣḥaf.

For the Qur'an did not say:

My people did not find the Qur'an.

Nor did it say:

My people did not read the Qur'an.

Rather, it said:

﴿وقال الرسول يا رب إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (And the Messenger said, “My Lord, my people have taken this Qur'an as something abandoned.”) [Al-Furqan: 30]

Here a fundamental question emerges:

How can the Qur'an be abandoned while it is present in people's hands?

The answer this trial proposes is that abandonment may not be an abandonment of the muṣḥaf, but rather an abandonment of its function in shaping consciousness, judgment, Tadbur, and witnessing (shahāda).

For the Qur'an may continue to be:

Recited, memorized, printed, studied, and cited through its verses,

While its overarching map becomes less present in the production of knowledge and judgment.

That is, the text remains present, but the relationships the Qur'an constructs between its verses and its issues may not remain present to the same degree.

Here emerges the statement that encapsulates the essence of this case:

The problem is not that the Qur'an has disappeared, but that its map may disappear from consciousness.

Second: Abandonment may be a process, not an event

If His words, exalted is He:

﴿اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (They have taken this Qur'an as something abandoned.) []

Describe a reality that can occur while the Qur'an remains in circulation, then a new historical question emerges:

Was the Qur'an abandoned all at once?

Or can abandonment be a cumulative process over time?

This is a point that deserves to enter the very heart of the inquiry.

For the ummah need not have moved in a single day from the centrality of the Qur'an to something else.

The transformation may occur gradually:

The Qur'an is present → narration (riwāya) expands → explanations accumulate → details increase → epistemic centers multiply → the manner of receiving the Qur'an changes → the Qur'an becomes present in recitation and citation, while its overall map recedes in the shaping of consciousness.

Thus, “abandoning the Qur'an” is not necessarily a single historical event

But may instead be a long historical process.

This opens an important avenue for investigation:

Can an ummah abandon the Qur'an without abandoning the muṣḥaf?

If the answer is yes, then the meaning of “obscuring the Qur'an” changes radically

Third: What is obscured may be the map, not the text

Here this conclusion connects directly with what the fourth court revealed:

The information remained, but the map was lost.

Reports relating to the Qur'an may remain in existence.

And works of exegesis (tafsīr) may remain in existence.

The narrations (riwāya) may remain in existence.

The history books may remain in existence.

But the question is not:

Has the information survived?

But rather:

Have the relationships that the Qur'an drew between these pieces of information survived?

For the Qur'an does not present the major questions as separate units.

Rather, it connects:

Creation → the human being → the test → misguidance → crime → authority → corruption → the governing patterns → guidance → witnessing (shahāda).

It is these relationships that make the Qur'an a map, not merely a collection of verses.

Hence, the most dangerous form of concealment may be:

That the text reaches the human being, but its map does not.

Fourth: From “Concealing the Qur'an” to “Abandoning the Qur'an”

Here, the Qur'anic expression in al-Furqan becomes more important in this study.

For the Messenger does not say:

My Lord, my people did not read the Qur'an.

Rather, he says:

﴿إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (Indeed, my people have taken this Qur'an as something abandoned.) []

Abandonment in this case should not be reduced in advance to a single form.

Rather, it must be examined:

Does abandonment consist in forsaking recitation?

Or in forsaking Tadbur?

Or in forsaking judgment by it?

Or in forsaking its map?

Or in transforming it from a book to be discovered from within into a text that always requires an external authority to determine its meanings?

These are questions that the Qur'an itself must answer.

The verses concerning Tadbur therefore become an essential part of this investigation:

﴿كتاب أنزلناه إليك مبارك ليدبروا آياته﴾ (A blessed book We have sent down to you, that they may reflect upon its verses.) [ص: 29]

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن﴾ (Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an?) [محمد: 24]

If the Qur'an calls for Tadbur, and if Tadbur rests on relating verses to one another and discovering the relationships between them, then the question becomes:

What happens when the Qur'an is present as a text, but the way it is approached does not reconstruct its map from within?

Fifth: Why Is This Result Important for the Witnesses?

Because in al-Baqarah 143, the ummah was not described merely as an ummah that reads.

But rather:

﴿لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (That you may be witnesses over humankind.) []

A witness does not bear witness to what they do not know.

Here, the third court returns to the fourth court.

If the ummah is a witness, and if the Qur'an is the book that reveals to it the governing patterns of the human being, crime, misguidance, and guidance, then the question is no longer:

Do we have a Qur'an?

But rather:

Do we possess the map that enables us to bear witness?

This is why the case moves from “reception” to “witnessing (shahāda).”

Sixth: A Hypothesis Worth Opening to Investigation

From here, the general hypothesis of the fourth court can be formulated:

Did the inherited legacy, intentionally or unintentionally, diminish the Qur'an's overarching map in the consciousness of the ummah, as the space occupied

by narrations (riwāya), Isra'iliyyat, and inherited details expanded, while certain questions that the Qur'an connects

within a single network receded?

The court is not judging intentions here.

Rather, it places the effect, structure, and outcome before the witnesses for investigation.

The question is not whether all narrations (riwāya) were false.

Nor whether all Isra'iliyyat were false.

But rather:

What did the introduction of these materials do to the system of Qur'anic exegesis (tafsīr)?

Did they add information?

Or did they sometimes add alternative maps?

Did they explain the relationships established by the Qur'an?

Or did they shift the focus of attention to accounts and details that the Qur'an does not place at the center of the issue?

This is the test.

Seventh: Isra'iliyyat and Ka'b al-Ahbar — A Research Dossier, Not a Predetermined Judgment

Hence, the dossier on Isra'iliyyat emerges as one of the most important dossiers warranting investigation.

Not because everything attributed to the Children of Israel is false.

Nor because everyone who transmitted a narration (riwāya) is accused of having a particular intention.

But because the question is larger:

How did earlier narrations (riwāya) enter Islamic consciousness?

How did exegetes and historians handle them?

How much influence did they have on the exegesis (tafsīr) of the verses?

Did they add details not mentioned by the Qur'an?

Did some of those details shift the center of reading from Qur'anic relationships to historical narration (riwāya)?

Here, the name of Ka'b al-Ahbar enters as a historical case warranting detailed study:

Not to judge him personally from the outset, but to study:

What was attributed to him? Where did his narrations (riwāya) appear?

Who transmitted them? How were they used? Did they influence Qur'anic exegesis (tafsīr)? Did they shift the focus of attention from the Qur'anic text to narration (riwāya)?

If research establishes such an effect, it becomes part of the explanation of the historical trajectory that this court is seeking.

Eighth: The Outcome Opened Up by the Court

Here, the case expands from the past into the present and the future.

For the Qur'an does not present itself as a book about a history that has ended.

Rather, he says:

﴿وما أرسلناك إلا رحمة للعالمين﴾ (We have sent you only as a mercy to all worlds.) []

If the Qur'an's map reveals the dangers of misguidance, corruption, crime, self-exaltation, and changing the governing patterns, then concealing this map—if research establishes that this occurred—is not merely a problem in reading a book.

Rather, it may have an effect on the human trajectory in history, the present, and the future.

Here, the case becomes larger than the question:

Have we read the Qur'an?

It becomes:

Has the Qur'an been allowed to serve as the lens through which reality is read, or have we made reality dictate how we read the Qur'an?

Conclusion

The previous trials reached three conclusions:

The first court: Israel is the killer of his brother.

The second court: The allotted share is the Jews.

The third court: The ummah is a witness, and witnessing (shahāda) is broader than merely conveying the message.

Then the fourth court came to ask:

What happened to this case in the consciousness we inherited?

Here, the general conclusion emerged:

Concealing the Qur'an may not mean concealing the physical volume from the ummah, but concealing its map from it.

Abandoning the Qur'an may not have been an event that occurred at a single moment.

Rather, it may have been a cumulative process over time:

The text remained → recitation remained → narrations (riwāya) expanded → epistemic centers multiplied → the Qur'anic map receded → the Qur'an became present, yet less present as an integrated system of judgment, Tadbur, and witnessing (shahāda).

This is not the conclusion of the research.

Rather, it is the most dangerous question the court leaves before the witnesses:

If the Messenger said: ﴿يا رب إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (My Lord, indeed my people have taken this Qur'an as something abandoned.), was abandonment the forsaking of the physical volume, or

the forsaking of the map that the Qur'an sought to form within the human being?

The answer is not taken from the inherited legacy.

Nor from a predetermined position.

Rather, it begins with the Qur'an itself, and is then tested in history.

The court has concluded.

And the witnesses' role has begun.

A Trial between the Qur'an, Iblis, and the Algorithms of the Age

Who possesses the truth? Who manufactures illusion? And why does the human being believe what he desires, then demand proof from his opponent?

Case File: The Human Being Before the Truth

The issue is not that the human being does not always know the truth, but that the truth may stand before him, and he may possess the tools to examine it, yet choose what accords with his inclinations.

He may demand indisputable evidence from his opponent, then believe a promise because it touches his desires, a narration (riwāya) because he inherited it from his community, a report because thousands of accounts repeat it, or a claim because an authority he trusts has instructed him to believe it.

What governs here: evidence or desire? Reason or affiliation? The truth, or what the human being wants to be true?

Has anything changed in the mechanisms of temptation since Iblis confronted the human being with the promise of immortality and dominion that never decays, or have the algorithms of the age reproduced some of these mechanisms through far faster and more pervasive means?

These questions place the human being himself in the dock, not merely because he may be deceived, but to test what he does when he has the opportunity to verify, and when evidence clashes with what he believes.

Court: The Court of Truth and Proof

Defendant: The human being, not on account of his belief or affiliation alone, but on account of the standard he uses to accept and reject claims

First charge: A double standard of proof—demanding proof from others while exempting oneself, one's community, and one's preferred sources from that same standard

Second charge: Yielding to temptation when a promise disguises itself as truth, desire as evidence, and deception as counsel

Third charge: Turning repetition, fame, authority, and inherited beliefs into substitutes for verification, and turning away from evidence when it reveals what one does not wish to believe.

The defendant's defense: Not everyone who errs is a deceiver, nor is everyone who follows an opinion a victim of deception; not every circulating report is false, nor is every authority or technology a means of deception. Requesting proof is a legitimate right, and doubt may be the beginning of knowledge rather than evidence of deviation.

Basis of judgment: The Noble Qur'an; it is read through the Qur'an, its verses are gathered and their meanings examined, and distinctions are drawn between text, inference, and hypothesis

Case documents: The Torah and the Gospel as texts for comparison and examination; ancient and modern history as a record of events, narrations (riwāya), authority, and propaganda; and scientific research on algorithms and digital influence as tools for understanding the mechanisms of influence and their limits.

The question around which the trial will revolve

If the human being demands evidence from his opponent, why might he believe what comes from his own community without examining it?

And if he rejects illusion when he sees it in others, why might he defend it when it serves his interests?

And if the Qur'an warns against following that of which one has no knowledge, does the human being apply this standard to what he has inherited, what he holds sacred, what authority conveys to him, and what the screen presents to him?

The court will interrogate Iblis about the methods of temptation, confront the Samiri's claim with what the Qur'an reveals about appearance and incapacity, examine communities' competing claims to truth, and open the files on the deployment of religion in history. It will then turn to the algorithms of the age: how belief takes shape, how repetition becomes familiarity, and how the human being can become a transmitter of what he has not verified.

In the end, the question will not be: Who can persuade the human being?

But rather, the harder question:

Does the human being have the courage to subject what he believes to the same standard he demands of his opponents?

The case is opened.

The maker of illusion is not the only defendant; the trial will also investigate those who promote it, those who justify it, and those who refuse to examine it once the evidence is within their reach.

For truth is tested not only by what we demand of others, but by what we accept applying to ourselves.

Opening the Session: Who Deserves to Stand in the Dock?

Judge:

This session is opened to hear the case of the human being before the truth.

O human being, you demand evidence from your opponent and ask those who disagree with you: Where is your proof? Who told you this? How do you establish your claim?

You refuse to accept a report if it contradicts your convictions; you search for its flaws, investigate its source, and cast doubt on its transmitter.

But today the court asks you:

Do you use the same standard when you hear a report that accords with your desire?

Do you demand proof when someone promises you immortality, salvation, power, wealth, or victory?

Do you test what you have inherited from your forefathers, what the holder of authority tells you, what the religious scholar decrees, and what the screen presents to you?

Do you seek the truth, or do you seek what reassures you about what you have already decided to believe?

Prosecution:

The issue is not that the human being asks for proof; asking is a right, and searching for evidence is a necessity. The issue is demanding it from someone he does not wish to believe, while exempting someone he wishes to follow from examination.

Because the court does not deliver its judgment on the basis of impressions, it has decided to examine the evidence, beginning with the Qur'anic text, then comparing religious and historical evidence, and proceeding to contemporary tools of influence.

Part One: The Iblis File

When temptation becomes persuasive discourse

First exhibit: The promise that targets human desire

In the account of Adam, temptation begins not with an overt threat, but with a promise that targets the human desire to endure and to possess.

God Most High said:

﴿فوسوس إليه الشيطان قال يا آدم هل أدلك على شجرة الخلد وملك لا يبلى﴾ (Then Satan whispered to him, saying, “O Adam, shall I direct you to the tree of immortality and a dominion that never decays?”) [Ta Ha: 120]

Consider the nature of the offer:

Immortality, and dominion that never decays.

This is a discourse that does not merely offer information, but targets a deep desire within the human being. Iblis does not present Adam with a neutral truth; rather, he connects what he says to what Adam might wish for.

Then the Qur'an reveals another means:

﴿وقاسمهما إني لكما لمن الناصحين﴾ (And he swore to them both, “I am indeed a sincere adviser to you both.”) [Al-A'raf: 21]

Swearing an oath, professing sincere counsel, and offering a promise: all are elements found in the account of temptation.

The court's observation: The text does not say that Adam demanded evidence from Iblis and then rejected it; we therefore may not attribute to the account an incident that the Qur'an does not mention. But the text establishes that temptation may come in the form of a promise and counsel affirmed by an oath.

Here the question begins:

Is it enough for a speaker to appear sincere in his counsel for us to believe him? Does a promise become truth merely because it touches our desire?

Second exhibit: From desire to belief

The problem is not merely that there are those who deceive; the existence of deception alone does not explain why the human being responds to it.

The court therefore places a test before the reader:

If someone presents you with a magnificent promise, do you examine whether it can be fulfilled, or become attached to what he promises you?

If he tells you that he wants what is best for you, do you test his actions, or settle for his words?

If he swears to you that he is truthful, does the oath become evidence of his truthfulness, or does his statement still require proof?

Conclusion: Desire may become a gateway through which deception enters when what we want to believe takes precedence over the evidence we possess.

Part Two: The Case File of the Samiri

When appearances are manufactured and testing is neglected

Exhibit Three: The calf that was made an object of worship

God Most High said:

﴿فأخرج لهم عجلا جسدا له خوار فقالوا هذا إلهكم وإله موسى فنسي﴾ (Then he brought forth for them a calf, a body that lowed, and they said, “This is your god and the god of Moses, but he forgot.”) [طه: 88]

Then came the Qur'anic question that exposes the contradiction between the claim and the capacity:

﴿أفلا يرون ألا يرجع إليهم قولا ولا يملك لهم ضرا ولا نفعا﴾ (Do they not see that it returns no word to them and has no power to harm or benefit them?) [طه: 89]

Why was this calf taken as a god when it neither returns a word to them nor has any power to harm or benefit them?

The court has no need to invent an explanation for the account; the text itself places the contradiction before us: an immense claim set against manifest incapacity.

Here, one form of defective judgment becomes clear: when appearance, sound, spectacle, or the claim of an influential person becomes more powerful than testing the truth.

The question addressed to the accused:

Do you examine what a thing can actually do, or believe what you are told about it?

Do you ask for evidence of the capacity of the one you follow, or is it enough for you to see the people around him believing him?

And can something manifestly incapable become an object of trust if appearance precedes testing?

Part Three: The Case File of the Qur'an

Does the problem lie in seeking evidence or in turning away from it?

Exhibit Four: The Qur'an does not criminalize questioning; rather, it demands proof

The defense may object, saying:

A person cannot accept every claim without question. Seeking evidence is not a crime, but a necessity for knowing the truth.

The court accepts this objection.

God Most High said:

﴿قل هاتوا برهانكم إن كنتم صادقين﴾ (Say, “Bring your proof, if you are truthful.”) [البقرة: 111]

And God Most High said:

﴿ولا تقف ما ليس لك به علم إن السمع والبصر والفؤاد كل أولئك كان عنه مسئولا﴾ (Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Indeed, hearing, sight, and the heart—one will be questioned about all of these.) [الإسراء: 36]

The problem, then, is not that a person asks: What is the evidence?

Rather, it is that he applies this question selectively.

He may demand ten pieces of evidence from his opponent, yet accept a report from a source he likes without verifying it.

He may reject an explanation because it does not accord with his belief, then accept another explanation merely because he inherited it.

He may require others to prove their statements, while considering an idea's renown, antiquity, or number of adherents sufficient to establish it.

Here, the matter shifts from a difference of opinion to a defect in the criterion of knowledge.

Exhibit Five: When a person does not want to reconsider what he believes

God Most High said:

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن أم على قلوب أقفالها﴾ (Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [محمد: 24]

And God Most High said:

﴿وإن تطع أكثر من في الأرض يضلوك عن سبيل الله إن يتبعون إلا الظن وإن هم إلا يخرصون﴾ (If you obey most of those on earth, they will lead you astray from the way of God. They follow nothing but conjecture, and they do nothing but guess.) [الأنعام: 116]

These two verses place two tests before us:

First: Does a person reflect upon what he reads, or close the door to reconsideration?

Second: Does he make the number of adherents evidence of truth?

A multitude of believers does not, in itself, establish the validity of a belief, just as a small number of believers does not establish its falsity. The evidence itself must be examined.

A person cannot object that his opponent lacks proof, then make inherited beliefs, the public, or authority a substitute for proof in the matters he believes in.

Part Four: The Torah and the Gospel

From message to authority: election, rabbinic interpretation, and the deification of Christ

Case file: Did people follow what God's messages brought, or did they follow what religious authorities decreed in the name of those messages?

Exhibit Six: The Torah and the Claim of Election

Examining how the idea of the election of the Children of Israel became a claim to privilege over all other peoples, and the extent to which this conception accords with the Qur'an, which links responsibility to deeds and does not make affiliation alone evidence of truth.

Exhibit Seven: The Rabbis and the Talmud

Examining the role of religious exegesis (tafsīr) in shaping beliefs, and how human interpretations can become rulings attributed to God, while testing each claim against the text on which it rests, rather than passing a single judgment on the Talmud as a whole.

Exhibit Eight: Jesus and the Doctrine of Deification

Comparing what the Qur'an says about Jesus as God's servant and messenger with the Gospel texts on which the debate over his divinity rests, then examining the historical development of the doctrine and the role of councils and ecclesiastical authority in formulating and establishing it.

Exhibit Nine: The Shared Test

Bringing the evidence together in a single question: If Moses and Jesus brought two messages from God, how do we test what was subsequently attributed to their messages? Is it enough for rabbis, monks, or the Church to adopt a particular interpretation for it to become binding, or must the text and the proof be examined?

Summary of the Part

The court does not equate the Qur'an with the Torah and the Gospel, nor does it make religious authority a reference for judging the Qur'an. Rather, it judges claims of election, interpretation, and deification against its Qur'anic frame of reference, and examines the history of the formation of beliefs without conflating the original text with its later interpretation.

The crux of the case: The message is one thing, and what authority attributes to it is another; following authority does not absolve a person of the responsibility to examine what he believes.

The Torah and the Gospel

When the message turns into an ethnic privilege, and the messenger becomes a god

Case file: How did God's messages, at the hands of religious authorities, become doctrines and privileges that the divine text does not establish, and how did people then follow those authorities without subjecting what they said to proof?

The court does not place the Qur'an, the Torah, and the Gospel on the same level, nor does it make rabbis, monks, or the Church a reference for judging the Qur'an. Rather, it makes the Qur'an its reference and opens texts, beliefs, and history to examination of the interpretations and transformations that have affected the messages.

The issue is not whether Jews and Christians believe what they believe; rather, it is whether the doctrines they follow accord with God's messages, and whether their adherents have examined their evidence or merely accepted what their religious authorities decreed.

The court sets before itself two paths:

• In the case file on the Children of Israel: How did the claim to chosenness become a privilege adopted by some religious interpretations, potentially used to justify superiority over other peoples? * In the case file on Christ: How did Jesus move from the position of messenger and human being in Qur'anic discourse to that of divinity in ecclesiastical doctrine, and did Jesus claim in the Gospel texts that he was God?

In both cases, the court returns to a single question: What did the message say, what did religious authority add to it, and why did people follow the addition?

Exhibit Six: The Case File on the Children of Israel — When Chosenness Becomes a Privilege

Racial

The Qur'an says:

﴿يا بني إسرائيل اذكروا نعمتي التي أنعمت عليكم وأني فضلتكم على العالمين﴾ (O Children of Israel, remember My favor which I bestowed upon you, and that I favored you above all peoples.) [al-Baqarah: 47]

But the Qur'an does not make affiliation with the Children of Israel an immunity from accountability, nor does it make belonging alone evidence of the correctness of one's position or the righteousness of one's deeds.

And it says:

﴿وقالت اليهود والنصارى نحن أبناء الله وأحباؤه﴾ (The Jews and the Christians said, “We are God's children and His beloved.”) [al-Ma'idah: 18]

It then confronts this claim with the question:

﴿قل فلم يعذبكم بذنوبكم﴾ (Say: Why, then, does He punish you for your sins?) [al-Ma'idah: 18]

Examining the Exhibit

The court places before the reader the distinction between two things: a text mentioning a favor or preference in a particular context, and that becoming a claim to permanent privilege that makes a particular group superior to all other human beings merely by virtue of its affiliation.

If the claim to chosenness becomes a racial privilege, or a conception that a particular group is closer to God in a manner that exempts it from the criterion of truth and deeds, the court asks: Where is the proof of this absolute privilege? Does the divine text establish it, or have human interpretations added it to the text?

It is not enough for a group to say that it is chosen for its claim to become true. Nor is it enough for a person to belong to a religious group for that person's position to be right.

Exhibit Seven: The Rabbis — From Interpreting the Text to Manufacturing Privilege

The Qur'an says:

﴿اتخذوا أحبارهم ورهبانهم أربابا من دون الله﴾ (They took their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God.) [al-Tawbah: 31]

And it says:

﴿فويل للذين يكتبون الكتاب بأيديهم ثم يقولون هذا من عند الله﴾ (Woe, then, to those who write the scripture with their own hands and then say, “This is from God.”) [al-Baqarah: 79]

And it says:

﴿وإن منهم لفريقا يلوون ألسنتهم بالكتاب لتحسبوه من الكتاب وما هو من الكتاب﴾ (Among them is indeed a group who twist their tongues with the scripture so that you may think it is from the scripture, when it is not from the scripture.) []

(Al 'Imran: 78).

These texts place a grave issue before the court: religious authority changing from an entity that interprets the text into one that attributes to God what is not from Him, or presents its human interpretation as a divine ruling.

Here the investigation opens the file on the Talmud, with its rabbinic traditions, discussions, and interpretations, to examine whether some interpretations have added meanings to the texts that exceed their import, and how those interpretations have been used to shape religious conceptions of the community and the other.

The court does not regard the mere existence of the Talmud as evidence of distortion; rather, it judges every claim and interpretation against the text to which it is attributed. If a human interpretation establishes a privilege unsupported by the text, and then presents that privilege as a divine ruling, the question becomes: Who established it, and on what evidence?

The Point at Issue in the Charge

If some rabbis transformed the concept of chosenness into an absolute racial privilege, or used religious exegesis (tafsīr) to justify one group's superiority over the rest of humanity, this would not be merely a difference of interpretation; it would become a religious claim that must be tested in light of God's message and its criterion.

The conclusion the court puts forward is that turning favor into absolute privilege, and affiliation into a criterion of superiority over others, contradicts the divine message that holds each person responsible for their words and deeds.

From the perspective of the Qur'an, any interpretation that justifies falsehood in God's name or turns religion into an instrument of supremacy and corruption falls within the sphere of deviation from God's guidance, not within that of proof of the interpretation's validity.

Exhibit Eight: The Case File on Jesus — Did Christ Say That He Was God?

The court turns to the second case, whose question is more explicit:

Did Jesus claim in the Gospel that he was God whom people must worship, or was the doctrine of his divinity formulated and developed through interpretations and ecclesiastical authority?

The Qur'an says:

﴿قال إني عبد الله آتاني الكتاب وجعلني نبيا﴾ (He said: I am indeed God's servant. He has given me the scripture and made me a prophet.) [Maryam: 30]

And it says:

﴿لقد كفر الذين قالوا إن الله هو المسيح ابن مريم﴾ (Those who say, “God is the Messiah, son of Mary,” have indeed disbelieved.) [al-Ma'idah: 72]

And it says:

﴿ما المسيح ابن مريم إلا رسول﴾ (The Messiah, son of Mary, is only a messenger.) [al-Ma'idah: 75]

Within the court's Qur'anic frame of reference, Jesus is God's servant and messenger, not God Himself.

But the court does not confine itself to presenting the Qur'anic judgment; it opens the Gospel texts on which Christians rely and asks a specific question: Do we find in them a direct statement by Jesus in which he says that he is God and asks people to worship him?

Examining the Gospel Texts

In the Gospel of John, Jesus says:

“That you alone are the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent” (John: 17:3).

And also in the Gospel of John:

“My Father is greater than I” (John: 14:28).

In the Gospel of Mark, when Jesus is asked about the first commandment, he begins his answer by saying:

“The first of all the commandments is: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord” (Mark: 12:29).

The court places these texts before the reader and asks that they be read in their contexts, rather than merely accepting what the religious institution determines about them.

These passages do not contain a direct statement by Jesus in the words “I am God,” but they do not constitute all the texts on which Christian theology relies; the arguments on which the other party relies should therefore also be examined, rather than claiming that these passages alone settle every question of interpretation.

Nevertheless, the court's question remains: If Christ's divinity is the central doctrine that people are required to believe, where is the explicit textual evidence establishing that Jesus declared himself to be God?

The Historical Exhibit: Ecclesiastical Authority and the Definition of Doctrine

In 325 CE, the Council of Nicaea convened amid theological disputes over Christ's relationship to the Father and adopted a creedal formulation pivotal to the history of Christianity. Doctrinal discussions and developments then continued, and later formulations took shape in connection with the Council of Constantinople in 381 CE

The court uses this history to examine the role played by councils and ecclesiastical authority in formulating doctrine and defining the boundaries of acceptable belief.

But the convening of the council does not, by itself, establish whether the doctrine is true or false; it establishes that its institutional formulation was bound up with a historical process of debate and decisions. The truth of the doctrine itself remains a matter for textual and argumentative scrutiny.

The Point at Issue in the Charge

From the perspective of the Qur'an, turning Jesus into a god conflicts with his description as God's servant and messenger.

The historical question, however, is: How did the doctrine that makes Christ a god or a divine hypostasis develop, and how did it become part of binding ecclesiastical teaching?

The question the investigation puts to the followers is: Has every believer examined this matter personally through texts and arguments, or received the doctrine as an established truth that may not be challenged?

The court does not presume that every Christian has failed to think or seek evidence, but neither does it grant the doctrine immunity from scrutiny merely because the Church affirms it.

If Jesus was a messenger sent by God, then turning him into a god is no secondary detail; rather, it is a change in the nature of the message itself, requiring inquiry into the source of this belief and its evidence.

Exhibit Nine: The Shared Test — Moses, Jesus, and the Message That

Followers Go Beyond

Here the trial reaches the core of the comparison.

The Qur'an affirms that Moses brought clear proofs to the Children of Israel, and presents the mission of Jesus as that of a messenger from God. But the existence of a divine message does not prevent interpretations, institutions, and beliefs from developing around it that go beyond what the text affirms.

The court does not equate the history of Judaism with the history of Christianity, nor does it claim that what occurred in one was repeated in the same manner in the other. But it places a single test before both:

• In the dossier on the Children of Israel: Did certain interpretations of election become a collective privilege that transcends the criterion of truth and deeds? * In the dossier on the rabbis: Were human additions or interpretations presented as divine rulings that may not be reconsidered? * In the dossier on Christ: Did the ecclesiastical doctrine of his divinity become a binding reference that followers receive without examining its textual evidence?

These are not merely three questions about the past. They are questions about how belief takes shape, and about a person's right to distinguish between God's message and what authority says in its name.

The Qur'an sets out a general rule in His words:

﴿ولا تقف ما ليس لك به علم﴾ (Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge.) [al-Isra: 36]

It also says:

﴿قل هاتوا برهانكم إن كنتم صادقين﴾ (Say: Bring your proof, if you are truthful.) [al-Baqarah: 111]

This rule does not exempt a belief because it is inherited, nor does it grant a religious authority immunity because it is ancient or widespread.

Summary of the Judgment in This Chapter

The trial establishes that the Qur'an rejects attributing to God what is not from Him, warns against taking rabbis and monks as lords, and rejects the deification of Christ.

The texts and history raise questions about how certain interpretations of election took shape, and about the role of rabbinic traditions and ecclesiastical authority in defining doctrine. Attributing every interpretation or position to all Jews or Christians, however, requires evidence specific to each attribution and may not be generalized without scrutiny.

But the methodological conclusion is clear: It is not enough for religious authority to say that this is God's ruling; rather, one must examine the text on which it relies, the meaning it derives from it, and the evidence that justifies making it binding upon people.

If a person demands proof from an adversary, then follows rabbis, monks, or the Church without testing their claims, the question no longer concerns others alone; it becomes a question of that person's own responsibility before the truth.

Here the court pursues the case: How does following become a habit, and how does a person relinquish responsibility for examining what they believe?

Chapter Five: The Dossier on History

When Authority, Fear, and Religious Narration (riwāya) Are Used to Manufacture Belief

Exhibit Eight: From Religious Election to Claiming a Right to the Land

The court opens a dossier that extends beyond ancient history to the reality of Palestine, where religious narration (riwāya) intertwines with the political project, and the divine promise is invoked to justify a claim to the land, while the Palestinian people live with the consequences of occupation, settlement, and displacement.

The court places before it a claim adopted by Jewish and Zionist religious and political currents: that the Jews are God's chosen people, that the land of Palestine was granted to them by God, and that this promise gives them a special right to the land.

Here the questioning begins:

Is a community's belief that God promised it a land sufficient to make that belief a legal and political basis overriding the rights of the inhabitants who live there?

Does religious or ethnic affiliation become a permanent title deed that extinguishes another people's rights in their homeland, or grants a state the right to control and displace them?

Is the international community being asked to accept this claim merely because it rests on a religious reading of ancient texts, without examining its substance, its effects, and the rights violated in its name?

Interrogating the Narration (riwāya)

The court does not treat religious belief itself as evidence of an absolute political right. There is a difference between adherents of a religion believing a narration (riwāya) about their history and that narration (riwāya) becoming a political demand imposed by force upon another people.

Even if the claimant relies on a religious text, they must establish how they move from the text to the right they claim, and how this alleged right can negate the rights of others.

Turning election into racial superiority, or turning a religious promise into a license to seize land, does not become legitimate merely because a religious or political authority adopts it.

From the perspective of the Qur'an, favor does not become immunity from reckoning, nor does membership in a religious community become proof of the truth of everything it claims. He, exalted is He, says:

﴿وقالت اليهود والنصارى نحن أبناء الله وأحباؤه قل فلم يعذبكم بذنوبكم﴾ (The Jews and Christians say: We are God's children and His beloved. Say: Why, then, does He punish you for your sins?) [al-Ma'idah: 18]

The verse confronts the claim to closeness and privilege with the question of responsibility and accountability. A community's claim to a special status is not enough to place it above the criterion of truth and justice.

He, exalted is He, also says:

﴿ولا يجرمنكم شنآن قوم على ألا تعدلوا اعدلوا هو أقرب للتقوى﴾ (Do not let hatred of a people lead you to act unjustly. Be just; that is nearer to God-consciousness.) [al-Ma'idah: 8]

Here the criterion set by the court comes to the fore: Religion must not become a justification for injustice, nor may a community's identity be used to negate another person's right to justice, life, and land.

Exhibit Nine: Palestine — When the World Is Asked to Believe the Narration (riwāya) and Ignore Reality

The court moves from the claim to its consequences on the ground.

In Palestine, the conflict concerns not only religious texts, but also a people living on their land, rights to self-determination, occupation, settlement, land confiscation, and the displacement of inhabitants.

A United Nations report issued in September 2025 documented continued settlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. It noted that Israeli policies and practices associated with settlement and annexation violate Palestinian rights, and that the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion issued in July 2024, determined the unlawfulness of Israel's continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory and affirmed the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

Here the court asks:

If a religious narration (riwāya) is used to justify control over land, does that narration (riwāya) nullify the rights of those to whom the land belongs?

If civilians are killed, inhabitants displaced, or their property confiscated, is it enough for the perpetrator to invoke the slogan of a divine promise for the act to become acceptable?

If governments and media outlets repeat a political narration (riwāya) until it becomes familiar in the public mind, does frequent repetition turn into proof?

The court does not put Jews on trial because of their identity, nor does it attribute a single political position to all adherents of Judaism. It tries a specific claim: the use of a religious reading to justify political privilege or control over another people's land.

A Jew who rejects injustice is not accused on account of their religion, just as a Palestinian does not lose their rights on account of their religion or identity. What stands trial is the act, the claim, and the evidence—not religious or ethnic identity.

Exhibit Ten: Nazi Propaganda—How Does a Lie Become a Collective Belief?

Modern history offers a documented example of authority's capacity to manufacture belief: Nazi propaganda

The Nazi regime used the media, national symbols, and stereotypes to portray Jews and other groups as enemies, linked national belonging to acceptance of its ideology, and helped prepare society for persecution, war, and genocide.

The danger of propaganda lay not merely in the repetition of messages, but in a system that made falsehood familiar, incitement acceptable, and the exclusion of others appear to some people as a defense of the group and the homeland.

The court does not equate Nazism with Zionism, or different historical events with one another; each case has its own context and facts that must be examined. It does, however, derive from the experience of Nazi propaganda a question applicable to the scrutiny of any political authority:

How is the enemy constructed in public consciousness? How is a repeated narration (riwāya) transformed into a truth that cannot be questioned? How are people led to accept injustice against others in the name of protecting the group or realizing its historical destiny?

These questions are posed to any political project that uses fear, identity, or historical narration (riwāya) to justify violations of human rights.

Conclusion: Is a Claim Exempt from Proof Because It Has Assumed the Garb of Religion?

The court reaches the core of the case file:

Not everything attributed to God comes from God, and not everything a group recounts about its history grants it an absolute right over the present and future of others.

Control over land does not become a right merely because those exercising it believe that God promised it to them. Nor does the crime of displacement or the killing of civilians become acceptable because of the identity of its perpetrators or the justifications they invoke.

Recourse to international law and human rights is not hostility toward a religion or a people; it subjects actions to a standard that grants no group immunity on account of its religion, ethnicity, or political strength.

When the international community confronts a religious claim used to justify control or displacement, it is required neither to believe the narration (riwāya) nor to reject it merely because of its source, but rather to examine what it claims, what evidence supports it, and what rights are violated by its consequences.

The methodological judgment in this case file is this: neither alleged chosenness, nor a religious promise, nor political propaganda, nor the repetition of a narration (riwāya) grants anyone an unrestricted mandate to violate the rights of others.

If a person demands proof from an adversary, then believes the narration (riwāya) of authority without testing it, they have substituted loyalty for evidence, and what they wish to believe for truth.

Here the court returns to its central question:

Are We Seeking What the Evidence Establishes, or Seeking Evidence to Justify What We Have Already Decided to Believe?

Chapter Six: The Digital Age Case File

When enticement enters a person's pocket

Exhibit Ten: Algorithms do not display the whole world; they rank what appears to you

In the past, a person would listen to an orator in a public square, read a newspaper, or receive news from someone they knew.

Today, however, they may open their phone to find a flood of news, clips, images, and comments before them, while the system suggests additional content based on their previous behavior and interactions.

An algorithm is not a satanic mind, nor is every recommendation system designed to deceive the user. It may, however, rank content according to objectives such as increasing engagement, viewing time, or the likelihood of clicking and sharing. If engagement is given substantial weight without adequate safeguards for accuracy and quality, sensational or misleading content may gain additional circulation.

Scientific research discusses the relationship between human biases and content-ranking systems, and investigates how platform design and social interaction affect the spread of misleading information. Findings vary by platform, algorithm type, and context; the results of a single study therefore cannot be generalized to all users or platforms.

The question the court places before a person is not whether every algorithm is misleading, but whether content ranking has, for that person, become a substitute for verifying the truth.

Exhibit Eleven: From engagement to repetition, then belief

Imagine this sequence:

1.. You watch a clip that provokes your anger or accords with your belief 2.. You engage with it by watching, commenting, or sharing 3.. The recommendation system may treat this engagement as an indication of your interest 4.. You are shown similar content or content related to your interests 5.. Your chances of seeing the same narration (riwāya) from multiple sources increase 6.. You may interpret the repetition of the narration (riwāya) as evidence of its truth, although repetition does not establish it

This is one possible depiction of a feedback loop between user behavior and content ranking, not an inevitable description of every algorithm.

But the question remains:

Has the frequency with which information appears before you become a substitute for verifying it?

And has the number of views become evidence for you?

Do you believe a report because its source is genuinely reliable, or because you have seen it dozens of times?

Do you seek out the opposing narration (riwāya), or are you content with what the system presents to you?

Exhibit Twelve: The Report That Suits Your Desires

A report may spread because people find it sensational, because it confirms their fears, or because it targets an adversary they hate.

Thousands of people may repost it without having independently verified it.

This does not mean that a report is false merely because it has spread, but it does mean that its circulation is insufficient to establish its truth.

Here the individual's own responsibility becomes apparent: the platform may choose what it presents, but the user can pause before sharing, seek the original source, examine the context, and distinguish between a claim and a document, between opinion and news, and between exegesis (tafsīr) and an event.

The deeper danger is that technology becomes a means of reinforcing what we want to believe rather than testing what we think is true.

Someone who demands evidence from an adversary, then shares an unverified report because it accords with their position, is applying two different standards to the same issue.

This is the point at which the trial of the age meets the Qur'an's question concerning knowledge, Tadbur, conjecture, and following others.

Chapter Seven: Confronting the Defense

Is the Human Being Alone Responsible?

Defense counsel:

The accusation places a greater burden on human beings than they can bear. People may be deceived because of insufficient information, group pressure, fear, or trust in sources they believed to be reliable. Algorithms may influence the ordering of what they see without their knowing how those algorithms work. How, then, can we hold the individual fully responsible?

The prosecution:

We do not hold individuals responsible for every piece of information hidden from them, nor do we equate unintentional error with deliberate misleading. Rather, we are examining the limits of their responsibility when they have a reasonable opportunity to verify something, yet disregard it because they do not want a result that conflicts with their desires.

Defense counsel:

And what of someone who asks for proof and refuses to believe what they do not find convincing?

The prosecution:

That is not grounds for condemnation. Asking for proof is a right; indeed, it is part of the search for truth. The grounds for condemnation arise when proof becomes a condition imposed on others, while one's own beliefs are granted a permanent exemption.

Defense counsel:

Is everyone who follows inherited beliefs or the majority turning away from the truth?

The prosecution:

No. Following a statement does not in itself make that statement false, just as opposing the majority does not make the dissenter right. The criterion is evidence, not the identity of the follower or the number of followers.

The judge:

The court records these distinctions and rules that condemnation concerns conduct established by the evidence, not merely differences between people's beliefs.

Chapter Eight: The Qur'an Judges

What Is the Criterion of Truth?

After examining the exhibits, the court returns to its frame of reference to determine the criterion of truth and reveal how misleading begins, how desires and affiliations are exploited to manufacture belief, and how differences between groups become a barrier preventing individuals from reviewing what they believe.

A person is not always misled because they lack information; they may be misled because they want to believe it, because they inherited it from their group, or because an authority they trust has persuaded them that questioning it constitutes a departure from the truth.

The court therefore places before the individual four Qur'anic principles, preceded by two testimonies that reveal the mechanisms of misleading and the struggle between groups over truth.

Exhibit Eleven: Iblis—How Does Misleading Begin?

The Qur'an says, in the words of Iblis:

﴿وقال لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم﴾ (And he said, “I will surely take an allotted portion of Your servants, and I will surely lead them astray and fill them with vain hopes.”) [al-Nisāʾ: 118–119]

The verses disclose two explicit paths in Iblis's project: leading astray and arousing vain hopes.

Leading astray means diverting the individual from the path of truth, while arousing vain hopes means binding them to enticing promises and aspirations, until what they wish to attain exerts a stronger influence on them than examining the truth of what is presented to them.

In the account of Adam, Iblis says:

﴿هل أدلك على شجرة الخلد وملك لا يبلى﴾ (“Shall I direct you to the tree of immortality and a dominion that never decays?”) [Ṭā Hā: 120]

Iblis did not present Adam with proof establishing the promise of immortality and dominion that never decays; rather, he addressed his desire and offered him something that could entice him to believe the promise.

Here the court questions the individual:

Do you believe what is presented to you because the evidence has established its truth, or because you wish it to be true?

Does this principle change when the promise comes from a political authority, a religious institution, or media discourse that gives you a sense of superiority, privilege, or victory?

Misleading may come in the form of a promise of immortality, or it may come in the form of inherited privilege, a promise of salvation, or a claim that one particular group possesses the truth to the exclusion of all other people. It may exploit the individual's desire for power, security, or belonging, inducing them to accept what accords with their desires without testing its evidence.

The court's finding: Among the most dangerous avenues of misleading is the transformation of desire into a criterion for belief, whereby evidence becomes subordinate to what the individual wishes for, rather than desire being subject to what the evidence establishes.

Exhibit Twelve: Conflict Between Groups—Each Side Claims to Have the Truth

The Qur'an says:

﴿وقالت اليهود ليست النصارى على شيء وقالت النصارى ليست اليهود على شيء وهم يتلون الكتاب﴾ (The Jews said, “The Christians have no foundation,” and the Christians said, “The Jews have no foundation,” though they recite the Scripture.) [al-Baqarah: 113]

Then it says:

﴿كذلك قال الذين لا يعلمون مثل قولهم﴾ (Likewise, those who do not know said the same as they said.) [al-Baqarah: 113]

The verse places a clear scene before the court: two groups each denying that the other has any truth, although both recite a scripture

But the verse does not stop at this dispute; it adds that those who do not know said the same as they said. Here the scope of the trial expands, because this pattern of exclusion is not confined to Jews and Christians, but can recur within any group that makes itself the criterion of truth and denies it to others without proof.

Through Tadbur of the verse's sequence, a question emerges concerning those who came after the Jews and Christians and then repeated the same pattern of conflict. This test applies to Muslims when they divided into factions and sects, and each faction began denying that the other had any truth, making its affiliation with its own sect evidence of the correctness of its belief.

The point is not that Islam as a message created this conflict, but that the followers of revealed messages may turn affiliation into a criterion of truth and repeat the conduct that the verse exposed among their predecessors.

Here the court questions the Muslim just as it questions anyone else:

If the Jews said that the Christians had no ground to stand on, and the Christians said that the Jews had no ground to stand on, and others after them repeated this method, is a person's affiliation with Islam sufficient to establish that they stand upon the truth?

Does a group become right because it describes its opponents as astray?

Does the judgment differ if a person repeats the statements of their own sect rather than those of another, without examining the evidence?

The recurrence of this pattern among groups reveals that affiliation can become a barrier to knowledge, and that a person may learn to judge others before learning to test their own belief.

The court's conclusion: A group's denial that others possess the truth does not suffice to establish that it possesses it. Nor does inheriting the name of a religious community suffice to make a person knowledgeable about the truth. Truth is not established by affiliation, nor does it pass to a person merely through birth within a community or adherence to a sect.

The first rule: Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge

God Most High says:

﴿ولا تقف ما ليس لك به علم﴾ (Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge.) [al-Isrāʾ: 36]

Not every piece of information that reaches you constitutes knowledge, not every instance of trust constitutes evidence, and not every circulating narration (riwāya) constitutes an established truth.

It is not enough for someone you trust to tell you something for it to become knowledge, nor for a religious or political institution to repeat it for it to become truth. You must examine its source, verify its evidence, and distinguish between fact, exegesis (tafsīr), and assertion.

This rule does not prevent a person from learning from others; rather, it prevents them from turning others' statements into unquestioned truths without knowledge.

The second rule: Do not make numerical preponderance a proof

God Most High says:

﴿وإن تطع أكثر من في الأرض يضلوك عن سبيل الله﴾ (If you obey most of those on earth, they will lead you astray from God's path.) [al-Anʿām: 116]

Numerical preponderance establishes prevalence, but it does not establish the validity of a claim.

Millions may repeat a single narration (riwāya), influential institutions may adopt it, and over time it may become an inherited belief; yet none of this dispenses with the need for proof.

Just as the small number of those who believe a claim does not, by itself, establish its falsity, their multitude does not, by itself, establish its validity.

The criterion is not the number of those who believe, but what establishes the truth of what they believe.

The third rule: Practice Tadbur and do not close the door to reassessment

God Most High says:

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن أم على قلوب أقفالها﴾ (Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [Muḥammad: 24]

Tadbur does not mean approaching the text with a predetermined conclusion, then selecting from it what supports that conclusion and ignoring what tests it.

Tadbur means gathering the relevant verses, reading them in their contexts, relating them to one another, testing the hypothesis against the full body of texts, and distinguishing between what the Qur'an states explicitly and what you infer from its implications.

Tadbur is not genuine if the conclusion has been settled in advance and no evidence is permitted to prompt its reassessment.

Someone who asks the text only to confirm their belief is not testing the truth; rather, they are seeking what reassures them about what they already believe.

The fourth rule: Demand proof from everyone

God Most High says:

﴿قل هاتوا برهانكم إن كنتم صادقين﴾ (Say: Bring your proof, if you are truthful.) [al-Baqarah: 111]

This rule does not change with the speaker, their identity, or their standing.

A religious scholar is not exempt from providing proof because he is a religious scholar, nor a politician because he holds authority, nor an influencer because he is famous, nor an expert because people trust his knowledge, nor a group because a person belongs to it.

If a person demands evidence from their opponent, then accepts from their own group what they reject from their opponent, they have changed the criterion of truth according to the speaker's identity, not the strength of the argument.

The court therefore places one question before everyone:

Do you accept that your belief should be tested by the same criterion with which you test the beliefs of others?

Summary of the judgment: Do not make your desire, your group, or your authority a substitute for proof

The documents reveal that misleading may begin with a promise that accords with a person's desire, that affiliation may become a barrier preventing them from reassessing their belief, and that conflict among groups does not establish that any one of them possesses the truth merely because it denies it to others.

The Qur'anic rules establish a clear criterion: Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge, do not make numerical preponderance evidence, do not close the door to Tadbur and reassessment, and do not grant any party immunity from the demand for proof.

It is not enough for a person to say: I belong to the right group, or my religious authority decrees this, or my forefathers believed it, or most people repeat it.

The question is not only: What do you believe?

But rather: Why do you believe it? What evidence supports it? And have you tested your belief as you test your opponent's belief?

Here the court rules: Truth is not established by desire, inheritance, authority, or numerical preponderance, but by what proof substantiates

Chapter Nine: The Final Judgment

The human being before truth — from condemning misleading to trying those who produce and follow it

The Court of Truth and Proof

After examining the Qur'anic evidence, comparing religious texts and narrations (riwāya), interrogating historical examples, and considering the effects of authority, propaganda, and algorithms, the court returns to the question on which the case was founded:

Does the problem lie in the human being's not knowing the truth, or in the possibility that they possess the evidence yet follow what contradicts it?

The trial was not a search for a single person to blame, nor an attempt to establish that the human being is perpetually a victim of deception; rather, it was a test of the mechanisms that produce belief, the criteria a person uses to accept what they believe and reject what contradicts it, and the responsibility they bear when given the opportunity to examine and reassess.

After deliberation, the court issues the following judgment.

First: In the matter of temptation and misleading

The Qur'anic evidence has established that misleading does not always depend on explicitly denying the truth; it may begin with a desirable promise, a wish, an oath that suggests truthfulness, or advice that appears outwardly to serve a person's interests.

God Most High says, in the words of Iblis:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم﴾ (I will surely lead them astray, and I will surely fill them with wishes.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

In the account of Adam, temptation came in the form of a promise of immortality and dominion that does not decay:

﴿هل أدلك على شجرة الخلد وملك لا يبلى﴾ (Shall I guide you to the tree of immortality and a dominion that does not decay?) [Ṭā Hā: 120]

This evidence reveals that desire may become an entry point for misleading, that what accords with a person's wishes is not necessarily true, and that displaying sincere counsel does not suffice to establish the truthfulness of the adviser.

Accordingly, the court rules that the appeal of a promise, the force of influence, and the appearance of sincere counsel do not take the place of evidence.

Second: In the matter of al-Samiri and the appearance of truth

In the account of al-Samiri, the Qur'an did not merely transmit his claim; it presented a statement about the calf's effect, then confronted it with what exposes its incapacity:

﴿فأخرج لهم عجلا جسدا له خوار فقالوا هذا إلهكم وإله موسى فنسي﴾ (Then he brought forth for them a calf, a body that lowed, and they said: This is your god and the god of Moses, but he forgot.) [Ṭā Hā: 88]

Then came the revealing question:

﴿أفلا يرون ألا يرجع إليهم قولا ولا يملك لهم ضرا ولا نفعا﴾ (Do they not see that it returns no word to them and has no power to harm or benefit them?) [Ta Ha: 89]

An appearance that catches the eye, a sound that draws attention, or a claim surrounded by believers does not establish that its bearer possesses the power they attribute to him.

The account presents the human being with a clear test: does one examine the reality of what stands before one, or settle for what appearances suggest and what the group says about it?

Accordingly, a claim is not accepted merely because an impressive indication exists; the relationship between the claim, the capacity, and the evidence must be tested.

Third: On the Question of Groups Contesting the Truth

The Qur'an presents a scene in which two groups each deny that the other has any basis in truth:

﴿وقالت اليهود ليست النصارى على شيء وقالت النصارى ليست اليهود على شيء وهم يتلون الكتاب﴾ (The Jews say, “The Christians stand on nothing,” and the Christians say, “The Jews stand on nothing,” though they recite the Scripture.) [Al-Baqarah: 113]

It then adds:

﴿كذلك قال الذين لا يعلمون مثل قولهم﴾ (Likewise, those who have no knowledge said the same as they say.) [Al-Baqarah: 113]

Through Tadbur of this sequence, an implication emerges that extends beyond the two groups mentioned to a pattern recurring among those who came after them: each party denies that the other has any basis in truth and makes its own affiliation evidence of the correctness of its position.

This test applies to Muslims when they divided into factions and sects, exchanged judgments of exclusion, and some made affiliation with their own sect the criterion of truth, rather than subjecting everyone's statements to proof.

What is on trial here is not Islam as a message, but the conduct of the followers of revealed messages when they turn affiliation into immunity, disagreement into mutual condemnation, and identity into a substitute for evidence.

Accordingly, religious affiliation does not grant its bearer a certificate of truth, nor does a statement become true because a group adopts it, or false

merely because another group rejects it.

Fourth: On the Question of Authority, Inherited Tradition, and Historical Narration (riwāya)

The evidence examined by the court established that authority, propaganda, fear, and repetition can influence people's perceptions, and that narration (riwāya) may be used to direct belief and justify positions and actions.

This has appeared in historical experiences in which propaganda was used to construct an image of the enemy, and in religious and political discourses deployed to entrench privileges or justify domination.

In the Palestine file, the necessity of distinguishing religious belief from its conversion into a political claim that justifies depriving others of their rights comes to the fore. Reliance on a narration (riwāya) about chosenness or the promise of land does not exempt any authority from scrutiny of its actions, nor does it make killing civilians, displacing them, or appropriating their rights legitimate merely by assigning these actions a religious justification.

The Qur'an sets a standard of justice that antagonism does not invalidate:

﴿ولا يجرمنكم شنآن قوم على ألا تعدلوا ۚ اعدلوا هو أقرب للتقوى﴾ (Do not let hatred of a people lead you to act unjustly. Be just; that is nearer to God-consciousness.) [Al-Ma'idah: 8]

This finding does not mean that every historical narration (riwāya) is false, that all inherited tradition is misleading, or that everyone who adopts a particular narration (riwāya) knows it to be false. It means only that a narration (riwāya) is not exempt from examination because of its antiquity, its sanctity among its adherents, or the strength of the party promoting it.

Accordingly, a narration (riwāya) does not become truth merely through repetition, nor does a religious claim become proof of the legitimacy of an action in

reality.

Fifth: On the Question of Algorithms and Human Responsibility

The digital environment adds a new factor to the case: content repeatedly presented to a person may seem familiar; what aligns with that person's interests may become more prominent in their digital experience; and strong emotions may be exploited to attract their attention and prompt them to engage and share.

But these mechanisms do not establish that all circulating content is false or that all users are subject to the same influence. They reveal additional reasons that make verification necessary and also make the design of platforms and recommendation systems subject to accountability.

Responsibility is not the same in every case: there are those who deliberately fabricate a false claim, those who amplify it, those who transmit it without verification, and those who discover its flaw and then continue to defend it.

Accordingly, the algorithm does not absolve the human being of responsibility, nor does it exempt the platform from examining the effects of its design; nor may one equate

someone who fell into error despite careful inquiry with someone who deliberately misled or persisted in doing so after the evidence became clear.

Sixth: On the Question of the Double Standard of Proof

Here the court reaches the heart of the case.

To demand evidence from one's opponent, then accept from one's own group what one would not accept from that opponent; to require verification of reports that harm one's position, then disseminate reports that serve it without examination; and to refuse to reconsider one's belief not because evidence is absent, but because the result does not accord with what one wants—all this reveals a defect in the standard by which truth is judged.

The Qur'an establishes a rule prohibiting the pursuit of what is not grounded in knowledge:

﴿ولا تقف ما ليس لك به علم﴾ (Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge.) [Al-Isra': 36]

It also rejects numerical predominance as an independent criterion of truth:

﴿وإن تطع أكثر من في الأرض يضلوك عن سبيل الله ۚ إن يتبعون إلا الظن وإن هم إلا يخرصون﴾ (If you obey most of those on earth, they will lead you astray from God's path. They follow nothing but conjecture, and they do nothing but guess.) [Al-An'am: 116]

And it calls for Tadbur of the Qur'an rather than closing the door to reconsideration:

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن أم على قلوب أقفالها﴾ (Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [Muhammad: 24]

These rules do not ask the human being to doubt everything; rather, they prohibit turning trust, desire, numerical predominance, and affiliation into substitutes for examination.

Accordingly, the court condemns double standards of proof whenever they are established, and calls upon the human being to apply the same standard to what one supports

and what one opposes.

Operative Provisions of the Final Judgment

Having examined the documents and tested the claims against Qur'anic criteria, the court rules as follows:

First: It has been established that the human being may be influenced by promises, desire, and the appearance of sincere counsel, and may believe a claim because of what it suggests rather than what the evidence establishes

Second: It has been established that appearance, sound, fame, authority, and a multitude of followers are not sufficient in themselves to establish the validity of a claim

Third: It has been established that conflict among groups may turn into a recurring pattern of denying that those who disagree have any basis in truth, and that this pattern can emerge among the followers of revealed messages when affiliation becomes a substitute for proof.

Fourth: The court rules that religious, historical, and political narrations (riwāya), as well as digital content, must be subjected to examination according to the nature of the claim and the available evidence, rather than granted immunity because of their source or prevalence.

Fifth: The court rules that responsibility varies according to knowledge, the capacity to verify, and intent; unintentional error must not be equated with deliberate misleading, nor is anyone absolved of responsibility who disregards available evidence or continues to disseminate a claim after its falsity has become apparent.

Sixth: The court condemns the double standard of accepting what serves one's position without sufficient evidence and rejecting what contradicts it despite the existence of evidence, merely because the outcome is unwelcome.

Seventh: In this trial, the court adopts the Qur'an as the reference for intellectual judgment and requires the inquiry to distinguish between the text of a verse, the inference drawn from bringing texts together, and the hypothesis that requires further testing.

The Judgment

The most dangerous thing this case reveals is not that a person can be deceived, but that a person may turn from a recipient of deception into a participant in its perpetuation.

A person may be deceived without knowing it and may err despite the sincerity of their efforts. But their responsibility changes when evidence they can examine becomes available to them and they then choose to turn away from it to protect their desires, their group, or their preconceived position.

The problem is not always a lack of information; it may lie in how that information is handled. Possessing evidence does not guarantee following it, just as an abundance of information does not necessarily mean an increase in knowledge.

A person may possess the text, reason, information, and the means of verification, yet choose what accords with their desires.

At this point, it is not enough to ask: Who deceived me? Rather, truth becomes entitled to ask them:

What did you do when something appeared to you that contradicted your belief? Did you examine the evidence, or look for a way to reject it? Did you apply the same standard to your group and your opponent? Were you prepared to change your opinion if its flaw was established?

The court does not condemn a person for having erred, asked questions, doubted, or reconsidered what they inherited. Rather, it condemns turning belief into immunity from proof, desire into a criterion of truth, and affiliation into a prejudgment of others.

The final judgment: No authority stands above evidence, no affiliation exempts anyone from reconsideration, and no desire grants its possessor the right to call what

they crave truth.

The trial has concluded with the delivery of its judgment, but human responsibility for truth does not

end when the session ends.

The Appointed Share

The Unity of Project and Identity in the Qur'an: From Iblis, Satan, and Taghut to the Children of Israel, Those Who Judaized, and the Jews

Introduction: Reading the Text through the Text

This study proceeds from a method of reading the Qur'an through the Qur'an, bringing together verses in which terms, themes, and attributes recur, and tracing the relationships among them to uncover the connections that unite them within a single context, ultimately constructing a hypothesis that explains the unity of the project, the mechanisms of leading astray, and their extension through time.

The idea rests on two interconnected lines of inquiry. The first addresses the project of Iblis and the enticement into error, leading astray, arousal of wishful expectations, delusion, and command to alter God's creation associated with it, while studying its relationship to Satan, Taghut, and the devils of humankind and jinn. The second addresses the Children of Israel, those who Judaized, the Jews, and those given a share of the Book, through verses that mention the covenant, turning away, distortion, purchasing error, and belief in Jibt and Taghut.

The two lines of inquiry converge on the term “share,” which appears in Iblis's declaration of his project, just as it appears in the description of a group given a share of the Book. From here arises the study's central question: Does comparing these passages reveal a relationship that goes beyond lexical resemblance to a unity of project, attributes, and function?

The investigation extends to studying wishful expectations, future promises, awaiting the Messiah, and the doctrine of election in Jewish thought, with reference to Talmudic texts, the exegetical inherited tradition, and the statements of rabbis, to examine the relationship between this material and the Qur'anic descriptions and determine the extent to which the texts support the inferences drawn.

This line of inquiry is completed by examining the project's impact on the Qur'anic message through altering its understanding, obscuring its guidance, and disabling its efficacy in the life of the ummah, ultimately reaching the concept of abandoning the Qur'an and the responsibility of the ummah after the Messenger to convey the message and bear witnessing (shahāda) concerning people through the truth that God revealed.

The study adds to this framework a pivotal distinction between general enticement into error and specific leading astray. According to the hypothesis adopted by the study, enticement into error is the general path that targets human beings, which a person may enter without realizing the extent of their deviation, while the possibility of repentance and return remains. Leading astray, by contrast, is linked in this hypothesis to the specific task Iblis announced when he spoke of taking an “appointed share,” and to the arousal of wishful expectations, command, action, and alteration of God's creation associated with it.

Accordingly, the study does not treat enticement into error and leading astray as synonymous expressions. Instead, it tests the meaning of each through its Qur'anic occurrences, then connects this distinction to the identity of the appointed share and to the fate described by the verses concerning leading astray.

First: The Appointed Share and the Project of Iblis

Iblis declares his project in the words of God Most High:

﴿قال فبما أغويتني ألقعدن لهم صراطك المستقيم ثم لآتينهم من بين أيديهم ومن خلفهم وعن أيمانهم وعن شمائلهم ولا تجد أكثرهم شاكرين﴾ (He said, “Because You have caused me to err, I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path. Then I will come upon them from before them and from behind them, from their right and from their left, and You will not find most of them grateful.”) [الأعراف: 16–17]

Connected to this declaration are the words of God Most High:

﴿وقال لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And he said, “I will surely take an appointed share of Your servants. I will surely lead them astray and arouse wishful expectations in them; I will surely command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I will surely command them, and they will alter God's creation.”) [النساء: 118–119]

The context then clarifies the nature of the promises accompanying this project:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He makes them promises and arouses wishful expectations in them, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion.) [النساء: 120]

These verses contain interconnected elements beginning with taking a share of God's servants, then leading astray, arousing wishful expectations, and making promises, and culminating in command, action, and the alteration of God's creation. Delusion appears as a consequence of the promises and wishful expectations that the Qur'an attributes to Satan.

The Qur'an also mentions the existence of devils from among humankind and jinn who exchange embellished speech for the purpose of delusion:

﴿شياطين الإنس والجن يوحي بعضهم إلى بعض زخرف القول غرورا﴾ (Devils from among humankind and jinn, inspiring one another with embellished speech as a delusion.) [الأنعام: 112]

It also mentions the words of the followers of those who lead astray:

﴿ربنا أرنا اللذين أضلانا من الجن والإنس﴾ (Our Lord, show us the two who led us astray, from among jinn and humankind.) [فصلت: 29]

These passages situate the project of Iblis within a network of relationships encompassing leading astray, arousing wishful expectations, and delusion, and permit the study of the human intermediaries through whom these mechanisms may be transmitted. Its connection to Taghut is examined through the Qur'anic passages that associate it with descriptions of the groups addressed by the study.

1. General Enticement into Error and Specific Leading Astray

The distinction between enticement into error and leading astray constitutes one of the keys to this thesis.

God Most High says in describing Adam:

﴿وعصى آدم ربه فغوى ثم اجتباه ربه فتاب عليه وهدى﴾ (Adam disobeyed his Lord and so erred. Then his Lord chose him, turned toward him in acceptance of repentance, and guided him.) [طه: 121–122]

The two verses bring together going astray, followed by election, repentance, and guidance. From this, the study infers that going astray may be a condition into which a person falls and from which they subsequently return, and that it does not, in itself, mean that the person's ultimate fate is settled in error.

As for leading astray, the Qur'an addresses it within another context, beginning with Iblis's declaration:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم﴾ (I will surely lead them astray and fill them with vain hopes.) [al-Nisa': 119]

In the context of discussing the outcome, the followers of those who lead astray say:

﴿ربنا أرنا اللذين أضلانا من الجن والإنس﴾ (Our Lord, show us the two who led us astray, from among the jinn and humankind.) [Fussilat: 29]

On the basis of a comparison between these passages, the study's hypothesis is that going astray represents the general course directed at human beings, whereas leading astray is connected to the specific task for whose execution Iblis declared that he would take an allotted share.

Going astray may begin with a deviation, an act of following, or a response to a whisper, and a person may not initially realize how far it can lead them. Leading astray, however, within this framework, is connected to an integrated course that goes beyond falling into error to the production of conceptions and promises, the direction of conduct, and the issuing of commands to perform acts that realize the project's objectives.

This hypothesis is also connected to Iblis's statement:

﴿قال فبما أغويتني ألقعدن لهم صراطك المستقيم﴾ (He said, “Because You have caused me to go astray, I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path.”) [al-A'raf: 16]

Iblis mentions going astray in the context of declaring that he will lie in wait on the straight path; then, in surah al-Nisa', he declares that he will take an allotted share, lead astray, instill vain hopes, and command. This line of inquiry examines the relationship between the two declarations, and whether the difference in wording and the sequence of acts reveal a distinction between the general course of going astray and the specific task of leading astray.

This distinction derives its significance from the fact that the study does not stop at identifying the group that constitutes the allotted share. Rather, it addresses the nature of the task it attributes to this group within Iblis's project, and the mechanisms that make the instilling of vain hopes and delusion two means of directing people toward action and change.

2. From Leading Astray to Instilling Vain Hopes, Commanding, and Changing

In the verses concerning the allotted share, leading astray does not appear separately from what follows it, but forms part of a sequence:

Taking the allotted share ← leading astray ← instilling vain hopes ← commanding ← action and change.

The Qur'an explains the effect of promises in the statement:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He makes them promises and fills them with vain hopes, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion.) [al-Nisa': 120]

The examination of this sequence concerns how influence over awareness and conception develops into the direction of conduct, and then into results that manifest in reality. Instilling vain hopes does not remain merely an idea in the mind; rather, in the verse, it is connected to commanding and acting, and changing God's creation appears among the results mentioned by the text.

This sequence permits a study of the channels through which the mechanisms of leading astray may be transmitted, including religious, media, and political discourse, promises concerning the future, and conceptions presented to people as facts or guarantees.

The focus of the study remains the testing of the relationship between these mechanisms and the allotted share, according to what the verses disclose when brought together and read in their contexts.

Second: The Allotted Share and the Share of the Book

One link in the hypothesis rests on a comparison between two expressions occurring in surah al-Nisa':

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا﴾ (I will surely take from among Your servants an allotted share.) [al-Nisa': 118]

And His statement, exalted is He:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يشترون الضلالة ويريدون أن تضلوا السبيل﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, purchasing error and wishing that you would stray from the path?) [al-Nisa': 44]

Then His statement:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يؤمنون بالجبت والطاغوت﴾ (Have you not seen those who were given a share of the Book, believing in al-jibt and al-taghut?) [al-Nisa': 51]

These passages share the word “share,” while the contexts of al-Nisa' 44 and 51 bring together descriptions concerning the purchase of error, the desire to lead others astray, and belief in al-jibt and al-taghut.

In the nearby context, He says, exalted is He:

﴿من الذين هادوا يحرفون الكلم عن مواضعه ويقولون سمعنا وعصينا﴾ (Among those who became Jews are those who distort words from their proper places and say, “We hear and disobey.”) [al-Nisa': 46]

Works of exegesis (tafsīr), including al-Tabari's exegesis (tafsīr) of al-Nisa' 44 and 51, discuss statements linking the group in question to the Jews, alongside narrations (riwāya) identifying the individuals and circumstances in connection with which the verses were revealed.

On the basis of this collation, the hypothesis proceeds to study the connection between the allotted share and the share of the Book, beginning with the shared wording and the proximity of the descriptions and contexts. In this study, the allotted share is identified as the Jews, in accordance with the conclusion that the combined Qur'anic evidence and textual comparisons seek to establish within the study's thesis.

This identification is not separate from the other lines of inquiry; it is connected to the study of Qur'anic descriptions concerning distortion, concealment, the purchase of error, belief in al-taghut, vain hopes, and delusion, followed by an examination of their connection to Iblis's project of leading astray and changing God's creation.

The comparison acquires additional significance when considered in light of the distinction between general going astray and specific leading astray. The study does not merely identify a group mentioned in the context of a share of the Book; rather, it tests the hypothesis that the conjunction of a share with the purchase of error, the desire to lead others astray, and belief in al-jibt and al-taghut reveals a connection to the task of leading astray that Iblis announced when speaking of the allotted share.

The central question thus becomes: do the shared wording, the proximity of the descriptions, and the sequence of acts reveal a unity of function and project, or do these connections require additional evidence from other Qur'anic passages? The study addresses this question by bringing the verses together, comparing contexts, and identifying the conclusions supported by this collation.

Third: The Children of Israel, Those Who Became Jews, and the Jews — Defining the Terms and Groups

Investigating the identity of the allotted share requires distinguishing between the Qur'anic terms relating to Israel, the Children of Israel, those who became Jews, the Jews, and the People of the Book, and then bringing together the verses that establish the contexts of each designation and the descriptions of the groups in which they occur.

He says, exalted is He, concerning the covenant of the Children of Israel:

﴿وإذ أخذنا ميثاق بني إسرائيل لا تعبدون إلا الله… ثم توليتم إلا قليلا منكم وأنتم معرضون﴾ (And when We took the covenant of the Children of Israel: “Worship none but God”… Then you turned away, except for a few of you, in aversion.) [al-Baqarah: 83]

And He says:

﴿لقد أخذنا ميثاق بني إسرائيل وأرسلنا إليهم رسلا ۖ كلما جاءهم رسول بما لا تهوى أنفسهم فريقا كذبوا وفريقا يقتلون﴾ (We certainly took the covenant of the Children of Israel and sent messengers to them. Whenever a messenger came to them with what their souls did not desire, some they denied and others they killed.) [al-Ma'idah: 70]

And He says elsewhere:

﴿وقضينا إلى بني إسرائيل في الكتاب لتفسدن في الأرض مرتين ولتعلن علوا كبيرا﴾ (And We decreed to the Children of Israel in the Book: “You will surely cause corruption in the earth twice, and you will surely rise to great arrogance.”) [al-Isra': 4]

But the Qur'an also mentions the existence of upright groups among the people of Moses, saying:

﴿ومن قوم موسى أمة يهدون بالحق وبه يعدلون﴾ (And among the people of Moses is an ummah who guide by the truth and by it act justly.) [al-A'raf: 159]

And He says:

﴿وقطعناهم في الأرض أمما منهم الصالحون ومنهم دون ذلك﴾ (And We divided them throughout the earth into ummahs; among them are the righteous, and among them are those short of that.) [al-A'raf: 168]

And He mentions Israel by name in His statement:

﴿كل الطعام كان حلا لبني إسرائيل إلا ما حرم إسرائيل على نفسه﴾ (All food was lawful for the Children of Israel except what Israel forbade himself.) [Āl ʿImrān: 93]

And in His words:

﴿أولئك الذين أنعم الله عليهم من النبيين من ذرية آدم وممن حملنا مع نوح ومن ذرية إبراهيم وإسرائيل﴾ (Those are the prophets upon whom God bestowed favor, from the descendants of Adam, from those We carried with Noah, and from the descendants of Abraham and Israel.) [Maryam: 58]

These passages allow the scope of the inquiry to be defined precisely. The hypothesis rests neither on equating all the Children of Israel with the Jews nor on passing judgment on everyone affiliated with a single religious identity, but rather on identifying the group addressed by particular Qur'anic descriptions and then examining its relationship to the remaining lines of inquiry.

From here, the inquiry moves from defining terms to tracing the actions and attributes shared across the verses, while retaining the distinctions between designations and contexts as part of the process of inference.

In light of the distinction between general enticement into error and the specific act of leading others astray, identifying the allotted share does not mean that every individual affiliated with the Children of Israel or the Jews necessarily belongs to the group intended. Rather, the inquiry focuses on the group addressed by the descriptions associated with a share of the Book, purchasing error, wishing to lead others astray, and believing in jibt and ṭāghūt, and tests the connection between these descriptions and the specific task under investigation.

The inquiry thus brings together the identification of identity and function: Who is the group to which the descriptions refer? What is the nature of the role the thesis assigns to it in the project of leading astray? And what evidence connects this role to the project's remaining elements?

Fourth: The Covenant, Distortion, and the Purchase of Error

The themes of the covenant, turning away, and rejecting the messengers appear in the verses concerning the Children of Israel, while the Qur'an mentions distortion and the purchase of error in other contexts addressing those who are Jews and those given a share of the Book.

God Most High says:

﴿من الذين هادوا يحرفون الكلم عن مواضعه﴾ (Among those who are Jews are those who distort words from their proper places.) [al-Nisāʾ: 46]

And He says:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يشترون الضلالة ويريدون أن تضلوا السبيل﴾ (Have you not seen those given a share of the Book, who purchase error and wish you to stray from the path?) [al-Nisāʾ: 44]

The context of surah al-Nisāʾ brings these descriptions together with the mention of jibt and ṭāghūt, making the surah a central focus in studying the relationships between the share, distortion, error, and ṭāghūt.

The theme of the covenant is also connected to what the Qur'an relates concerning turning away from the judgment of the Book. In Āl ʿImrān, God Most High says:

﴿ألم تر إلى الذين أوتوا نصيبا من الكتاب يدعون إلى كتاب الله ليحكم بينهم ثم يتولى فريق منهم وهم معرضون﴾ (Have you not seen those given a share of the Book, who are called to the Book of God to judge between them, yet a group of them turns away in aversion?) [Āl ʿImrān: 23]

He follows this with His words:

﴿ذلك بأنهم قالوا لن تمسنا النار إلا أياما معدودات وغرهم في دينهم ما كانوا يفترون﴾ (That is because they said, “The Fire will touch us only for a numbered few days,” and what they fabricated deluded them in their religion.) [Āl ʿImrān: 24]

Then comes the verse concerning reckoning and recompense in verse 25.

Thus, this context brings together a share of the Book, the call to the judgment of God's Book, turning away and aversion, religious delusion, and then reckoning. These elements converge thematically with what appears in surah al-Nisāʾ concerning the purchase of error and belief in ṭāghūt, and with Iblis's project, which combines leading astray, arousing wishful hopes, and delusion.

The distinction between enticement into error and leading others astray adds another question to this line of inquiry: Do the verses describe merely falling into deviation, or do they also reveal a function involving the purchase of error and the desire to draw others into it, turning away from the judgment of the Book, and being deluded by religious conceptions that give their adherents a sense of salvation?

The convergence of these descriptions is what the inquiry tests, because the desire to lead others astray differs in function from a person's merely falling into error through enticement. The investigation therefore turns to studying the descriptions connected with influencing others, conveying conceptions to them, and diverting them from the path of God.

The hypothesis traces these connections to uncover a unity of mechanisms, then tests the extent to which they indicate that the intended group is one and the same, while distinguishing between what the verses state directly and what results from bringing them together and comparing them.

Fifth: Wishful Hopes and Future Promises in the Qur'an and Talmudic Thought

The arousal of wishful hopes is an explicit element in Iblis's project:

﴿ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم﴾ (I will surely lead them astray and arouse wishful hopes in them.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

The Qur'an explains the effect of promises and wishful hopes in His words:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He promises them and arouses wishful hopes in them, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion.) [al-Nisāʾ: 120]

It presents an example of wishful hopes concerning religious salvation in His words:

﴿ذلك بأنهم قالوا لن تمسنا النار إلا أياما معدودات وغرهم في دينهم ما كانوا يفترون﴾ (That is because they said, “The Fire will touch us only for a numbered few days,” and what they fabricated deluded them in their religion.) [Āl ʿImrān: 24]

He also says:

﴿وقالوا لن يدخل الجنة إلا من كان هودا أو نصارى تلك أمانيهم قل هاتوا برهانكم إن كنتم صادقين﴾ (They said, “None will enter the Garden unless they are Jews or Christians.” Those are their wishful hopes. Say, “Produce your proof, if you are truthful.”) [al-Baqarah: 111]

And He declares:

﴿ليس بأمانيكم ولا أماني أهل الكتاب ۗ من يعمل سوءا يجز به﴾ (It is not according to your wishful hopes or the wishful hopes of the People of the Book. Whoever does evil will be recompensed for it.) [al-Nisāʾ: 123]

These verses set wishful hopes concerning salvation and ultimate destiny against proof, action, and recompense. From here, the inquiry turns to studying future promises in Jewish thought and examining whether certain conceptions found in its religious sources fall within the scope of comparison with the concept of wishful hope and delusion in the Qur'an.

This study encompasses the expectation of the Messiah and salvation, the doctrine of election and covenant, and promises concerning the community's future and standing. Among the sources addressed in this line of inquiry are the discussions in the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 97a–99a, concerning the time of salvation, its indications, and the expectations associated with it

The relevant texts are collected and documented, with their locations and contexts identified and distinctions maintained between the Talmud, the Torah, and other Jewish sources.

The comparative inquiry is not limited to the presence of an idea of expectation or promise in a religious source. Rather, it examines its content, function, and limits of significance, then tests its connection to the Qur'anic description of wishful hopes. In this way, wishful hope becomes a focus for comparison between the Qur'anic text and the Talmudic material, rather than merely a verbal resemblance between disparate texts.

In light of the distinction adopted by the inquiry, the arousal of wishful hopes is studied not as an idea separate from leading astray, but as an element that follows it in Iblis's declaration of his project. The question is therefore not limited to the existence of future promises in a body of religious thought, but addresses the nature of these promises, whether they are presented as guaranteed truths without proof, and whether they are used to direct behavior, justify positions, or divert people from what revelation and action require.

From here, the inquiry addresses wishful hopes as one of the mechanisms linking influence over consciousness to command and action, according to the sequence presented in al-Nisāʾ, verses 120–118.

Sixth: From Wishful Hopes to Altering God's Creation

The Qur'an links the arousal of wishful hopes in Iblis's project to command and action, saying:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I shall command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I shall command them, and they will alter God's creation.) [al-Nisa': 119]

This passage comes after leading astray and arousing wishful hopes, and is followed by discussion of promises and delusion in the next verse. The context thus presents a transition from influencing belief and conception to directing conduct and bringing about change.

The hypothesis examines this element's place within the project as a whole by tracing the relationship between leading astray, arousing wishful hopes, command, and outcome, and then studying practices that can be documented and compared with this context.

This requires distinguishing between the meaning of the phrase “altering God's creation” in its Qur'anic setting, the applications that can be substantiated through specific texts, and the hypotheses linking those applications to the project of leading astray. No particular practice is therefore attributed to the verse's meaning without first explaining the grounds for that inference and documenting the relevant material.

Within this framework, the investigation of altering God's creation connects with the preceding themes, examining the relationship between belief, promises, and conduct within the sequence that the Qur'anic text delineates for Iblis's project.

The importance of this sequence becomes clear when it is linked to the distinction between general waywardness and the specific activity of leading astray. In the research hypothesis, waywardness represents the general course into which a person may fall, whereas the theme of the allotted share examines a task concerned with directing others through leading astray, arousing wishful hopes, and issuing commands. The investigation therefore does not stop at asking whether alteration occurs, but examines the relationship between the conceptions that precede it, the promises that justify it, and the commands that impel its implementation.

This inquiry extends to technology, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and all other contemporary applications that may relate to the concept of altering God's creation, provided that each practice is studied through its own evidence and the grounds for connecting it to the Qur'anic text are explained.

Seventh: From Altering the Message to Abandoning the Qur'an

The inquiry does not stop at studying the alteration of God's creation, but moves to the effect of the project of leading astray on the message itself, examining how the understanding of revelation is influenced, its guidance obscured, and its efficacy in people's lives disabled.

God Most High says:

﴿وقال الرسول يا رب إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (And the Messenger said, “My Lord, my people have treated this Qur'an as something abandoned.”) [al-Furqan: 30]

Within the framework of the research thesis, abandoning the Qur'an is not confined to ceasing to recite it. It also encompasses the text's continued existence in the absence of its guiding authority, when people are diverted from Tadbur of it, following it, and referring disputes to it for judgment, or when other authorities and narrations (riwāya) come to govern the understanding of religion and the practice of its rulings.

The study of distortion, concealment, purchasing misguidance, wishful hopes, and delusion thus connects to the question of the message's fate within the ummah: how can the words of the Qur'an remain preserved and in circulation while the presence of its guidance in consciousness and action recedes? And how can influence over understanding become a means of disabling the efficacy of the Book without removing its wording?

This theme examines the connection between the project of leading astray and this outcome by gathering the verses concerning distortion, concealment, and turning away from the judgment of the Book, and linking them to the verse on abandoning the Qur'an, while making clear that the move from these descriptions to explaining the mechanisms of abandonment constitutes an inference that investigates the interconnections among the evidence and its contexts.

The investigation thus moves from studying the identity, attributes, and mechanisms of the allotted share to studying the effect that the thesis hypothesizes the project has on the ummah's relationship with the Qur'an.

In light of the distinction between general waywardness and the specific activity of leading astray, abandoning the Qur'an becomes one of the themes through which the research tests the effect of leading astray on the message. The issue is not merely a person's falling into waywardness, but how their understanding of revelation is influenced, how they are diverted from its authority, and how they are directed toward conceptions or practices that obscure its guidance from them.

The research therefore asks: can the wording of the Qur'an remain preserved while its efficacy in shaping consciousness, directing action, and adjudicating disputes recedes? And how can inherited authorities and conceptions become intermediaries that influence the reception and understanding of the text?

Verse 30 of al-Furqan remains central to this investigation because it clearly formulates the issue of abandoning the Qur'an, while the research gathers the other verses concerning distortion, concealment, turning away, and purchasing misguidance to test the connections between them and this issue.

Eighth: Conveying the Message, Witnessing (shahāda), and the Responsibility of the Ummah after the Messenger

The Most High says:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته والله يعصمك من الناس﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord. If you do not, then you have not conveyed His message. And God will protect you from people.) [al-Ma'idah: 67]

This is followed by the words of the Most High:

﴿قل يا أهل الكتاب لستم على شيء حتى تقيموا التوراة والإنجيل وما أنزل إليكم من ربكم﴾ (Say, “O People of the Book, you stand on nothing until you uphold the Torah, the Gospel, and what has been sent down to you from your Lord.”) [al-Ma'idah: 68]

The Qur'an then mentions the covenant of the Children of Israel in verse 70 and addresses those among them who disbelieved in verse 78.

These passages place conveying the message and upholding what God has sent down within the context of the surah, which addresses the People of the Book, the covenant, and the positions of the various groups. Within the framework of the research, conveying the message connects with gathering the texts relevant to the case, explaining their meanings, and uncovering the relationships that emerge when they are read together.

The Most High says:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (And thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [al-Baqarah: 143]

The Qur'an also urges Tadbur:

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن﴾ (Do they not, then, reflect upon the Qur'an?) [al-Nisa': 82]

And says:

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن أم على قلوب أقفالها﴾ (Do they not, then, reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon hearts?) [Muhammad: 24]

The conclusion of the research is therefore linked to the responsibility to explain what the verses indicate, present findings on the basis of evidence, and distinguish between text and inference, so that witnessing (shahāda) rests on what can be established rather than on mere assertion.

In this light, the research addresses the responsibility of the ummah after the Messenger as an ummah that God has made witnesses over people, and asks what this witnessing (shahāda) entails when the understanding of the message is subjected to obscuration or alteration. Within the structure adopted by the research, witnessing (shahāda) is not confined to declaring affiliation with the Qur'an or reciting it, but connects with conveying what God has sent down, explaining the truth, exposing what stands between people and His guidance, and acting in accordance with what it requires in terms of Tadbur, following, and referring disputes for judgment.

Accordingly, exposing the allotted share, according to the research thesis, falls within the framework of explaining what targets the message, while conveying the message remains the communication of what God has sent down, and witnessing (shahāda) remains the ummah's responsibility to bear the truth and explain it to people.

1. Conveying the Message and the Limits of the Task

God Most High says:

﴿يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك﴾ (O Messenger, convey what has been sent down to you from your Lord.) [al-Māʾidah: 67]

The Messenger's task was to convey to people what God had sent down to him, and to deliver to them the message brought by revelation. Yet understanding the responsibility of the ummah after the Messenger requires examining the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) over people that the Qur'an added to the task of conveyance.

God Most High says:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [al-Baqarah: 143]

God did not make the ummah merely a transmitter of what the Messenger conveyed; rather, He charged it with the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) over people. Within the structure disclosed by this study, this witnessing (shahāda) is not fulfilled merely by conveying the Qur'an; it also requires exposing what targets the message and explaining the role played by the allotted portion in Iblis's project.

2. What Is the Allotted Portion, and How Does It Relate to Iblis's Project?

The Qur'an discloses Iblis's words:

﴿ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (I will surely fill them with desires, and I will surely command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I will surely command them, and they will change God's creation.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

Iblis's project does not stop at tempting human beings through their desires; it extends to directing their actions and changing what God has commanded. It is in this context that there appears

The Allotted Portion as Part of the Project Harnessed to Achieve Iblis's Aim of Leading Astray and Changing God's Creation.

In this study, the allotted portion is identified as the Jews, and their role is linked to what the study addresses concerning the undertaking to change the message and obscure its guidance, and to what passed from Israelite narrations (riwāya) into the religious inherited tradition, subsequently becoming part of systems that influence the understanding of revelation and its place in people's lives.

The change intended here is not confined to material manifestations; it extends to the message itself: to its meanings, its understanding, and its capacity to guide human beings. The wording of the Qur'an may remain preserved while the guidance it contains is obscured from people, and conceptions are presented to them that stand between them and its status as an authoritative reference.

Thus, the allotted portion is linked to Iblis's project through influencing human beings, changing their conception of truth, and diverting them from the message brought by revelation.

The distinction between temptation and leading astray explains the nature of this role in the study's thesis: temptation is a general course targeting human beings, whereas the allotted portion is linked to the specific task of leading astray, which involves arousing desires, issuing commands, and directing others toward specific actions and outcomes.

3. Why Is Conveying the Qur'an Alone Insufficient to Fulfill Witnessing (shahāda)?

If witnessing (shahāda) over people is the responsibility with which God has charged the ummah, it is not fulfilled merely by informing people that the Qur'an is God's word, or by reciting its verses to them.

Witnessing (shahāda) requires the ummah to convey the Qur'an and, at the same time, expose what seeks to obscure its guidance or change its understanding. It is required to make the message manifest and to explain the attempts at alteration and obfuscation that it has faced, so that people may know the revelation God sent down and also know what stands between them and its guidance.

For this reason, God Most High says:

﴿وإذ أخذ الله ميثاق الذين أوتوا الكتاب لتبيننه للناس ولا تكتمونه﴾ (And when God took the covenant of those who were given the Book: You shall surely make it clear to people and not conceal it.) [Āl ʿImrān: 187]

And He says:

﴿ولا تلبسوا الحق بالباطل وتكتموا الحق وأنتم تعلمون﴾ (Do not confound truth with falsehood or conceal the truth knowingly.) [al-Baqarah: 42]

Clarification stands opposed to concealment, and making truth manifest stands opposed to confounding it with falsehood. Hence the responsibility of the ummah to expose what has obscured the message from people, rather than merely conveying the text while overlooking the course that sought to alter its understanding and disable its guidance.

According to the study's thesis, witnessing (shahāda) is therefore not conveying the Qur'an alone, but conveying the Qur'an and exposing the allotted portion and its connection to Iblis's project of changing God's creation, including changing the message and obscuring its guidance.

4. From the Allotted Portion to Changing God's Creation and Abandoning the Qur'an

God Most High says:

﴿ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (I will surely fill them with desires, and I will surely command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I will surely command them, and they will change God's creation.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

The verse discloses the progression of Iblis's project from arousing desires to issuing commands, and then to action and change. In the context of this study, this course is connected to influencing the understanding of the message and obscuring its guidance, such that change is not confined to material manifestations but extends to what directs human beings in their relationship with revelation.

And God Most High says:

﴿وقال الرسول يا رب إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (And the Messenger said: My Lord, my people have treated this Qur'an as something abandoned.) [al-Furqān: 30]

This verse discloses the outcome reached by this course when the Qur'an remains present while its effect is obscured from people's lives. Its words may be preserved and its recitation may continue, yet its guidance is abandoned when the understanding of religion becomes subject to authoritative reference points and narrations (riwāya) that divert people from Tadbur, following, and recourse to the Book for judgment.

Here the connection between the allotted portion and witnessing (shahāda) becomes apparent: when altering the understanding of the message and obscuring its guidance are part of the course of leading astray, reciting the Qur'an alone is not sufficient to confront that course; rather, what has obscured its meanings must be exposed, and it must be explained how conceptions and narrations (riwāya) became intermediaries controlling its understanding.

The ummah that bears witness over people is required to expose this course, so that the Qur'an does not remain present in its words yet absent from its role in guiding human beings.

5. The Responsibility of the Ummah after the Messenger's Death

If the Messenger was commanded to convey what had been sent down to him, then after his death the ummah faces the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) over people, in accordance with what the Qur'an establishes in His words, Most High:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [al-Baqarah: 143]

After the Messenger's death, the ummah thus remains faced with the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) over people: To what does it bear witness? What does it carry to humanity? And how can it fulfill this responsibility if its relationship with the Book sent down to it has deviated, or if the Qur'an has become present in recitation yet absent from Tadbur, following, and recourse for judgment?

Witnessing (shahāda) is not merely an affiliation with the Qur'an, but a responsibility to carry the truth it brought, to explain it, to act upon it, and to confront everything that leads to its concealment or disables its effect.

Within this framework, the responsibility of the ummah consists in explaining the Qur'anic message to people, exposing what targets its guidance, and neither concealing truth nor confounding it with falsehood. This extends the meaning established by His words, Most High:

﴿وإذ أخذ الله ميثاق الذين أوتوا الكتاب لتبيننه للناس ولا تكتمونه﴾ (And when God took the covenant of those who were given the Book: You shall surely make it clear to people and not conceal it.) [Āl ʿImrān: 187]

Witnessing (shahāda) thus requires the ummah to make manifest the truth God sent down and to explain what stands between people and that truth, so that the presence of the Qur'an in recitation does not turn into its absence from understanding, action, and recourse for judgment.

Ninth: The Project's Impact on Religion, Consciousness, Authority, and Technology

The research extends from the verses foundational to the hypothesis to an examination of the effects that the mechanisms of leading astray, arousing wishful hopes, and commanding may have on human life. This extension addresses six interconnected fields, not as subjects separate from the research's foundations, but as arenas for testing the impact of ideas, promises, and conceptions on consciousness and action.

1. Muslims' Relationship with the Qur'an

This axis begins with the words of God Most High:

﴿وقال الرسول يا رب إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (And the Messenger said, “My Lord, my people have indeed taken this Qur'an as something to be abandoned.”) [Al-Furqan: 30]

It examines the possibility that abandonment may occur even while the text remains preserved and in circulation, when the Qur'an's presence as a reference for Tadbur, guidance, and adjudication recedes, or when other conceptions and transmitted accounts come to govern the understanding of religion.

In light of the hypothesis of the allotted share, the research considers how influencing the understanding of the message can stand between people and its guidance, and how this issue relates to the ummah's responsibility to undertake Tadbur of the Qur'an, elucidate it, and act upon it.

2. Muslims' Relationship with Christians

The research invokes the words of God Most High:

﴿قل يا أهل الكتاب تعالوا إلى كلمة سواء بيننا وبينكم ألا نعبد إلا الله ولا نشرك به شيئا﴾ (Say, “O People of the Book, come to a common word between us and you: that we worship none but God and associate nothing with Him.”) [Al 'Imran: 64]

And His words:

﴿ولا تجادلوا أهل الكتاب إلا بالتي هي أحسن﴾ (And do not dispute with the People of the Book except in the best manner.) [Al-'Ankabut: 46]

It examines the relationship between the invitation to a common word, dialogue in the best manner, and Muslims' responsibility to elucidate what they believe to be the truth, without dialogue turning into an antagonism that distracts from studying the Qur'anic issue addressed by the research.

This axis relates to the question of the impact of religious conceptions and promises concerning salvation and election on relations among the followers of religions, and the extent to which religious discourse adheres to the proof demanded by the Qur'an.

3. Media, Politics, and the Production of Consciousness

This field relates to the words of God Most High:

﴿شياطين الإنس والجن يوحي بعضهم إلى بعض زخرف القول غرورا﴾ (Devils among humankind and jinn, inspiring one another with embellished speech as a deception.) [Al-An'am: 112]

And to His words:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He promises them and arouses wishful hopes in them, but Satan promises them nothing but deception.) [Al-Nisa': 120]

It examines the role of media and political discourse in shaping conceptions, making promises, and directing decisions, and how embellished speech or a promise unsupported by proof can become an instrument for influencing consciousness and behavior.

This axis draws on the sequence examined by the research: leading astray, then arousing wishful hopes, then commanding and action. It tests the extent to which these mechanisms apply to documented contemporary examples, rather than resting content with general similarities between events and verses.

4. Land and Political Projects

This axis examines the verses concerning the Children of Israel, including the words of God Most High:

﴿وقضينا إلى بني إسرائيل في الكتاب لتفسدن في الأرض مرتين ولتعلن علوا كبيرا﴾ (And We decreed to the Children of Israel in the Book: “You will surely cause corruption in the land twice, and you will surely rise to great arrogance.”) [Al-Isra': 4]

It addresses the connection of this verse to the other passages examined by the research, and to ideas and promises concerning land, election, and the community's future, while examining the relevant religious and political texts.

The research focuses on identifying the content, source, and context of each text, then studying its relationship to the general hypothesis concerning the allotted share, wishful hopes, commanding, and action.

5. Technology and Artificial Intelligence

The research turns to technology's impact on shaping consciousness and directing behavior, considering the role of algorithms and digital systems in ordering information, amplifying certain conceptions, and directing users' attention and decisions.

This field is studied in light of the verses addressing deception, embellished speech, and the arousal of wishful hopes, as concepts that help formulate research questions about the distinction between information and proof, between promise and reality, and between influencing consciousness and establishing the validity of what is presented to a person.

6. Science, Genetic Engineering, and Altering God's Creation

This field relates to the words of God Most High:

﴿ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely alter God's creation.) [Al-Nisa': 119]

It examines contemporary scientific applications, including genetic engineering and genetic modification, by studying the nature, limits, and objectives of the practice, then examining the question of the verse's meaning and the extent to which it applies to those practices.

This requires distinguishing between the existence of a scientific technique and judging its purpose or attributing it to a particular project. The focus of the research remains identifying the basis of the inference and elucidating the relationship between the verse and the application under study, rather than resting content with the mere existence of material change.

General Conclusion: The Thesis of the Allotted Share and Its Interconnected Axes

The research brings together four interconnected axes:

First Axis: Iblis's Project and the Mechanisms of Leading Astray

Iblis's declaration that he will take an allotted share of God's servants, and the associated leading astray, arousal of wishful hopes, promises, deception, and command to alter God's creation, together with a study of its connection to Satan, taghut, and the devils among humankind and jinn. Added to this axis is the distinction between the general temptation that targets human beings and the specific leading astray associated with the mission examined by the research.

Second Axis: The Share of the Book and the Identity of the Intended Group

Comparing the occurrences of “share” in surah Al-Nisa', collecting the descriptions concerning purchasing error, seeking to lead others astray, believing in jibt and taghut, and distortion, then studying the connection of these descriptions to those who became Jews, the Jews, and the Children of Israel, while taking account of differences in Qur'anic terminology and contexts.

Third Axis: Wishful Hopes and Future Promises

Studying wishful hopes concerning deliverance and ultimate destiny in the Qur'an, and comparing them with Talmudic texts addressing the expectation of the Messiah, salvation, the doctrine of election, and the covenant, while documenting the texts, identifying their contexts, and distinguishing among the various Jewish sources.

Fourth Axis: Altering God's Creation, Conveying the Message, and Witnessing (shahāda)

Uncovering the connection between the project of the allotted share and altering God's creation, then tracing the project's impact on the Qur'anic message through obscuring its guidance and disabling its efficacy, culminating in the abandonment of the Qur'an without changing its words. This axis concludes by examining the ummah's responsibility after the Messenger to convey the message and bear witnessing (shahāda) over people, through elucidating the truth that God sent down and exposing what seeks to obscure its guidance.

The lines of inquiry are thus organized into a trajectory that begins with the general enticement into error directed at human beings, then turns to the study of leading astray as the specific task associated with the allotted share in the research hypothesis. This trajectory traces the fostering of wishful hopes, promises, commands, action, and the alteration of God's creation, then examines

the identity of the group in question and the Qur'anic descriptions associated with it, culminating in the project's effect on the ummah's relationship with the Qur'an and its responsibility for conveying the message and witnessing (shahāda).

The central idea is that enticement into error and leading astray are not, according to this thesis, two stages identical in meaning and function. Enticement into error is a general course into which a person may fall and from which they may then return, as the research illustrates in the account of Adam. Leading astray, by contrast, is associated with a specific task that Iblis announced in the context of the allotted share, whose elements appear in the fostering of wishful hopes, commands, delusion, and influence over others.

The study therefore seeks to test the identity of the allotted share by bringing together the verses concerning a share of the Book, the purchase of error, the desire to lead others astray, belief in jibt and taghut, distortion and turning away from the judgment of the Book, wishful hopes, and religious delusion. According to the conclusion adopted by the research, this identity is identified as the Jews, while distinguishing this group from the Children of Israel as a whole and without turning descriptions concerning a particular group into a judgment on every individual on account of their identity.

The investigation then extends to the study of wishful hopes and promises concerning the future in Jewish thought, followed by the relationship between fostering wishful hopes, commands, and altering God's creation, culminating in the question of how these mechanisms affect the understanding of the Qur'anic message and the obscuring of its guidance.

The research reaches its culmination in the ummah's responsibility after the Messenger: conveying the message means delivering what God has sent down, while witnessing (shahāda) requires bearing the truth, explaining it to people, acting upon it, and exposing what stands between them and the guidance of the Qur'an.

Accordingly, witnessing (shahāda), within the framework proposed by the research, encompasses the ummah's responsibility to explain the Qur'anic message, expose the allotted share that the thesis associates with Iblis's project, and examine the mechanisms of leading astray, fostering wishful hopes, delusion, and commands that may obscure the guidance of the Book and disable its efficacy in human life.

The ultimate aim is to arrive at a coherent explanation of how the conflict moves from confronting the message when it is conveyed to influencing its fate within the ummah, how abandonment of the Qur'an can occur without its words being changed, and what the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) requires in confronting this trajectory.

Conveying the message thus means delivering what God has sent down, and witnessing (shahāda) means bearing the truth and explaining it to people; within the framework of this thesis, included in

the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) is exposing the allotted share and its connection to Iblis's project of leading astray, fostering wishful hopes, issuing commands, and altering the creation of

God, and explaining its effect on the Qur'anic message and the ummah's relationship with it.

Research Appendix: The Allotted Share and the Fate of Human Beings

From General Enticement into Error to Specific Leading Astray: Iblis's Project between Religion, Consciousness, Land, Authority, and Technology

Preamble: Not Every Enticement into Error Is Leading Astray, and the Danger of the Allotted Share Does Not Lie in Its Name Alone

This appendix proceeds from the hypothesis reached by the research: that the Jews are those intended by the allotted share, according to the chain of reasoning constructed by the research through connecting the verses concerning a share of the Book with the verses concerning Iblis, Satan, and taghut, and the associated matters of leading astray, fostering wishful hopes, delusion, commands, and altering God's creation.

But the gravity of this hypothesis does not end with identifying the allotted share; rather, it begins with the deeper question: what is the nature of the task assigned to it within the context of Iblis's project? And what is the difference between enticement into error, which targets human beings in general, and leading astray, which the Qur'an associates with the allotted share?

This distinction is the key to the investigation.

Iblis announced his enticement of human beings into error, and then, elsewhere, the Qur'an disclosed an allotted share associated with leading astray, fostering wishful hopes, and commands. Hence the research advances its hypothesis: enticement into error is the general course, whereas leading astray is the specific task associated with the allotted share

God Most High said:

﴿قال فبعزتك لأغوينهم أجمعين إلا عبادك منهم المخلصين﴾ (He said, “By Your might, I will surely entice them all into error, except Your servants among them who are made sincere.”) [Sad: 82–83]

And God Most High said:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله ) النساء:﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants, and I will surely lead them astray and fill them with wishful hopes, and I will surely command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I will surely command them, and they will alter God's creation.) []

(119–118.

We are faced with two contexts that merit comparison: the announcement of enticing human beings into error, followed by taking an allotted share, leading it astray, filling it with wishful hopes, and issuing commands to it

In the context of the allotted share, the matter does not end with leading astray; rather, promises, the fostering of wishful hopes, and commands follow it. Then comes the warning against delusion, and the fate in the hereafter is mentioned in the following two verses:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا أولئك مأواهم جهنم ولا يجدون عنها محيصا﴾ (He promises them and fills them with wishful hopes, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion. Those—their refuge is Hell, and they will find no escape from it.) [al-Nisa': 120–121]

Accordingly, the question that opens this appendix is not merely: who is the allotted share? Rather: what is the nature of the leading astray associated with it? And how can the fostering of wishful hopes turn into conviction, conviction into a command, a command into action, and action into a reality that affects human lives?

The gravity of the issue, according to the research hypothesis, lies in the possibility that this influence may move from an individual's deviation to a system of ideas and practices whose effects extend to religion, consciousness, politics, land, and science.

The investigation therefore moves from Qur'anic terms to six fields that bear upon the fate of human beings.

First: General Enticement into Error and Specific Leading Astray—The Key to Understanding the Project

Before moving to the effects of the allotted share, the distinction on which this research rests must be established.

1. Enticement into Error: The General Course Directed at Human Beings

Iblis said:

﴿لأغوينهم أجمعين إلا عبادك منهم المخلصين﴾ (I will surely entice them all into error, except Your servants among them who are made sincere.) [Sad: 82–83]

Enticement into error, according to the research's reading, is the general course through which Iblis targets human beings, and a person may enter it without realizing the extent of their deviation or the consequences of their choices. It does not necessarily mean that a person has reached the end of the road, for the Qur'an says of Adam:

﴿وعصى آدم ربه فغوى ثم اجتباه ربه فتاب عليه وهدى﴾ (Adam disobeyed his Lord and fell into error. Then his Lord chose him, turned to him in forgiveness, and guided him.) [Ta Ha: 121–122]

Here, falling into error is followed by repentance and guidance. Thus, in this conception, enticement into error is the beginning of deviation, and is not in itself evidence of the inevitability of the final fate.

2. Leading Astray: The Specific Task Associated with the Allotted Share

God Most High said:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants, and I will surely lead them astray and fill them with wishful hopes, and I will surely command them.) [al-Nisa': 118–119]

The research links the taking of the allotted share to leading astray, arousing desires, and issuing commands, and reads this connection as a transition from general seduction into error to a specific task.

The danger here is that leading astray does not appear in the verses in isolation, but within a sequence that connects influencing human beings with directing their conception of the future, and then with commands that translate that conception into actions.

In this reading, leading astray becomes more than a passing error: it is a course whose instruments, the parties that adopt it, and the outcomes to which it leads must be examined.

3. Why Does This Distinction Mark the Turning Point in the Research?

Because seduction into error may describe a person's departure from right judgment, whereas leading astray, in the context of the allotted share, raises a question about a project aimed at directing human beings through arousing desires and issuing commands.

This question is reinforced by His words, exalted is He:

﴿وقالوا ربنا أرنا اللذين أضلانا من الجن والإنس نجعلهما تحت أقدامنا ليكونا من الأسفلين﴾ (And they will say, “Our Lord, show us the two who led us astray, from among the jinn and humankind, that we may put them beneath our feet so that they may be among the lowest.”) [Fussilat: 29]

The verse presents an eschatological scene in which the speakers attribute their straying to those who led them astray. It opens the way to investigating the relationship between the act of leading astray and responsibility for its consequences.

The central question thus becomes: Is leading astray confined to individual deviation, or does the context reveal a course of influence and direction whose effects extend beyond the individual to society and lived reality?

This is the question with which the study proceeds to its remaining thematic areas.

Second: Muslims' Relationship with the Qur'an—The Most Dangerous Forms of Leading Astray Leave the Book in Place While Its Effect Disappears

If the Qur'an is the source of guidance and the criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood, then the first field in which to test the hypothesis of the allotted share is Muslims' relationship with their Book.

He, exalted is He, said:

﴿وقال الرسول يا رب إن قومي اتخذوا هذا القرآن مهجورا﴾ (And the Messenger will say, “My Lord, my people have treated this Qur'an as something abandoned.”) [Al-Furqan: 30]

And He, exalted is He, said:

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن أم على قلوب أقفالها﴾ (Do they not, then, reflect deeply upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [Muhammad: 24]

And He, exalted is He, said:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (And thus We made you a middle ummah, that you might be witnesses over humankind.) [Al-Baqarah: 143]

These verses place before the ummah a responsibility that cannot be reduced to recitation or memorization of the text, but extends to Tadbur, witnessing (shahāda), and fulfilling the function of guidance.

From here, the research poses a fundamental question: What is the value of possessing the Qur'an if it does not become a capacity to examine ideas, expose deception, review narrations (riwāya), and hold accountable the forces that influence humanity's fate?

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the allotted share, disabling Tadbur becomes a field worthy of investigation; for a person who does not examine what is presented to them is less able to detect promises unsupported by proof, and to distinguish guidance from the arousal of desires, and reasoned argument from delusion.

A Muslim may become preoccupied with inherited disagreements, sectarian disputes, or repeating the statements of predecessors, while the realities affecting land, rights, and policies remain outside the scope of serious examination.

Here the gravity of the matter becomes apparent: a person need not necessarily be physically distanced from the Qur'an; the Qur'an may remain present in their life while its effect is absent from their judgments, positions, and decisions.

If the ummah is commanded to undertake witnessing (shahāda) over humankind, then witnessing (shahāda) requires knowledge, knowledge requires examination, and examination requires the ummah to place what it hears, reads, and adopts upon the scales of proof.

From here, the question becomes:

Does the ummah use the Qur'an to understand what is happening in the world, or does it confine it to recitation and debate, leaving the forces that influence

its present and future outside the scope of Tadbur and accountability?

According to the research hypothesis, this question lies at the heart of the investigation into leading astray: losing the capacity to distinguish may cause a person to follow what is presented to them without knowing the truth of its source or purpose.

Third: Muslims' Relationship with Christians—How Did the Allotted Share Contribute to Manufacturing Antagonism?

The relationship between Muslims and Christians cannot be understood apart from the verses that address it, or from the transformations it has undergone throughout history down to our contemporary reality.

He, exalted is He, said:

﴿لتجدن أشد الناس عداوة للذين آمنوا اليهود والذين أشركوا ولتجدن أقربهم مودة للذين آمنوا الذين قالوا إنا نصارى ) المائدة:﴾ (You will surely find that the most hostile of people toward those who believe are the Jews and those who associate partners with God; and you will surely find that the nearest of them in affection toward those who believe are those who say, “We are Christians.”) []

(82.

This verse establishes an important basis for investigation: it mentions the Jews among the groups most hostile toward those who believe, and contrasts this with its mention of Christians as the nearest in affection toward believers. The following verses then explain some of the reasons for this affection and present the response of a group of Christians to the truth they heard (Al-Ma'idah: 83–85).

This is the Qur'anic point of departure for this thematic area, rather than inherited conceptions that make antagonism toward Christians a fixed rule, or disregard the distinction the Qur'an establishes in describing positions and relationships.

1. The Messenger's Position: The Negus as an Example

When the Messenger Muhammad ﷺ sent the Muslims to Abyssinia, their destination was a Christian king, the Negus. Islamic sources relate that the Muslims found protection and justice with him.

This event constitutes important historical evidence that religious difference did not prevent the early Muslims from seeking refuge with a Christian ruler, nor did it make dealings with Christians inevitably antagonistic.

From here, the research poses a question: How did the relationship move from this example to a reality in which we witness mutual tensions and hostilities, while, on certain issues, alliances take shape between Christian forces and political Zionist forces grounded in differing religious and historical conceptions?

2. The Allotted Share: From Identifying Its Identity to Examining the Project's Impact

According to the hypothesis reached by this research, the Jews are those intended by the allotted share, in light of the connection between the verses of Al-Nisa' –118 121., the verses concerning a share of the Book, and the verses addressing those who became Jews, the purchase of error, leading astray, and arousing desires.

On this basis, the investigation is not confined to the allotted share's relationship with Muslims alone, but extends to examining its impact on relations between Muslims and Christians, and on how mutual religious and political positions are shaped.

If the Qur'an mentions the intensity of Jewish hostility in Al-Ma'idah 82, and mentions the closeness of Christian affection, then the question posed by the research is: How has the contemporary relationship become more complex, and how has Christian Zionism come to shape some Christians' positions toward Israel, Muslims, and Palestine?

3. Christian Zionism: When Religious Promises Meet the Political Project

Christian Zionism constitutes a central field of this investigation. It is a current within certain Christian circles that links religious positions and prophetic interpretations to support for Israel; its orientations and degrees of influence vary from one group to another.

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the allotted share, this line of inquiry examines the relationship between religious conceptions concerning Israel, the land, and the future, and political discourses that employ these conceptions to endorse Israeli policies.

The question is not confined to the existence of Christian support for Israel, but addresses the foundations on which this support is built, the promises on which it rests, and its consequences for Palestinian rights and societies’ attitudes toward Muslims.

Here, this dossier intersects with the sequence in al-Nisāʾ:121–118: leading astray, then arousing desires, then command and action. The research tests whether certain religious conceptions and promises are used to form convictions that influence political positions and subsequently become practical support for policies affecting land, populations, and rights.

4. How Does the Relationship Turn into Antagonism?

According to the research hypothesis, it is necessary to examine how religious disagreement can be employed to steer societies away from their actual interests and concerns.

Some Christians may adopt positions supportive of Israeli policies on the basis of religious conceptions of the covenant, the land, and the end of history, while Muslims regard some of these policies as an assault on Palestinians’ rights, sacred sites, and land. When formulated in mobilizing discourse, these positions may turn into a broader antagonism between religious communities, rather than allowing discussion to focus on evidence, decisions, rights, and consequences.

Conversely, this antagonism may be used to generalize judgments about all Christians, even though the Qur'an itself distinguishes between positions and groups and does not place all Christians on the same footing.

The investigation therefore does not equate Christians with Christian Zionism, nor all Christians with the positions of governments or political groups. Rather, it identifies the currents, actors, and discourses under examination and then examines their effects.

5. The Question the Research Puts Before the Reader

If the Qur'an mentions Jews among those most intensely hostile to believers, and mentions those among Christians who are nearest in affection, and if the history of the migration to Abyssinia provides an example of Muslims seeking safety with a Christian king, how are we to understand the transformations that have led to contemporary positions in which religious identity intertwines with support for Israel and the struggle over Palestine?

According to the theory of the Jews as the allotted share, it becomes necessary to examine the role of conceptions and promises associated with Israel in shaping the positions of certain Christian currents, how these positions intersect with Israeli policies, and their effects on Muslims, Palestinians, and relations between communities.

The issue in this research is not Muslims’ antagonism toward Christians merely because of religious difference, but an investigation into how

certain religious and political discourses, foremost among them those associated with Christian Zionism, are employed in ways that may alter the direction of relations and lead religious groups to adopt positions serving a political project at the expense of the rights of other

peoples.

Thus, the line of inquiry concerning the allotted share moves from investigating Qur'anic identity to testing the hypothesis’s effects in reality: from leading astray and arousing desires to positions, from positions to alliances, and from alliances to policies and consequences that can be examined through evidence.

Fourth: Media and Politicians — From al-Sāmirī’s Calf to the Algorithms of the Age: How Is Consciousness Manufactured to Serve the Allotted Share?

God, Exalted is He, said:

﴿قال فإنا قد فتنا قومك من بعدك وأضلهم السامري﴾ (He said, “We have indeed tested your people after your departure, and al-Sāmirī has led them astray.”) [Ṭā Hā: 85]

And God, Exalted is He, said:

﴿فأخرج لهم عجلا جسدا له خوار فقالوا هذا إلهكم وإله موسى فنسي﴾ (Then he brought forth for them a calf, a body that lowed, and they said, “This is your god and the god of Moses, but he forgot.”) [Ṭā Hā: 88]

And God, Exalted is He, said:

﴿قال فإنا قد فتنا قومك من بعدك وأضلهم السامري﴾ (He said, “We have indeed tested your people after your departure, and al-Sāmirī has led them astray.”) [Ṭā Hā: 85]

1. From Deliverance from Pharaoh to Worship of the Calf

God rescued the Children of Israel from Pharaoh, and they witnessed the verses of deliverance with their own eyes. Then Moses left them for his appointed meeting with his Lord, and al-Sāmirī appeared and managed to turn Moses’ absence into an opportunity to redirect the community.

The transformation was not merely a transition from one opinion to another, but a transition from witnessing the verses of deliverance to worshipping a calf made by al-Sāmirī, and from following what Moses had brought to following a new narration (riwāya) that al-Sāmirī presented to his people.

God, Exalted is He, said:

﴿قالوا ما أخلفنا موعدك بملكنا ولكنا حملنا أوزارا من زينة القوم فقذفناها فكذلك ألقى السامري﴾ (They said, “We did not break our appointment with you of our own accord, but we were made to carry burdens of the people’s ornaments, so we cast them away, and likewise al-Sāmirī cast.”) [Ṭā Hā: 87]

Then al-Sāmirī made the calf, produced a sound for it, and presented it in a form that seized people’s attention. Fabrication thus became a means of influence, influence became belief, and belief became collective action.

Here the question arises: how was al-Sāmirī able to change the position of a people who had witnessed deliverance from Pharaoh? And how did the community move from prior knowledge to following a project opposed to it?

The account of al-Sāmirī, in its Qur'anic context, reveals the danger of exploiting the absence of leadership, manufacturing a symbol that captures attention, and presenting a narration (riwāya) that drives people to believe something for which they have established no proof.

2. Al-Sāmirī as an Early Model of the Manufacture of Consciousness

Al-Sāmirī did not need to return Moses’ people to Egypt or restore Pharaoh to power. Rather, he was able to change what people directed themselves toward and what they believed in while they remained in the place they had reached after their deliverance.

This is the turning point that merits Tadbur: a person may escape an external authority yet remain vulnerable to the influence of someone who reshapes their consciousness from within.

Al-Sāmirī made something tangible and linked it to a religious claim; the calf then became the focal point of collective adherence. In our age, the manufacture of influence is no longer confined to a statue or direct discourse: a narration (riwāya) can be manufactured through images, news, repetition, filmed scenes, and the algorithm that selects what each person sees and hears.

The calf in the account of al-Sāmirī was a material symbol used to divert the community from Moses’ guidance; in the media age, however, a repeated narration (riwāya), a selected image, or a political promise may become a mental symbol that leads people to positions whose evidence they do not

examine.

This is an analogy concerning the mechanism of influence, not an equation of historical events with modern media.

3. From Arousing Desires to Leading Astray: Iblīs’s Project in the Qur'an

God, Exalted is He, said:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants, and I will surely lead them astray, and I will surely fill them with vain hopes, and I will surely command them.) [al-Nisāʾ: 118–119]

Then the Exalted said:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He makes them promises and fills them with vain hopes, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion.) [al-Nisāʾ: 120]

These verses present us with a sequence worthy of examination: an allotted share, then leading astray, then instilling vain hopes, then command and action.

Instilling vain hopes is not confined to a verbal promise; it is an image of the future to which a person may become attached until it becomes part of how they interpret the present and justify their decisions. A person may be impelled to defend a project because they believe it will bring them security, salvation, superiority, or the restoration of an alleged right, without testing the truth of the promise or the consequences of its implementation for others.

Within the framework of this study's hypothesis, which links the “allotted share” to the Jews on the basis of a comparison between verses of the Qur'an, the question becomes: how can instilling vain hopes become an instrument for influencing groups, and how can it be deployed in media and politics to direct public opinion and serve a particular project?

4. Contemporary Media: A Samiri Who Does Not Make a Calf of Gold

Modern media differ from the means employed by the Samiri, but they can perform a similar function in shaping consciousness when their tools are used to present a single narration (riwāya), repeat it, conceal what contradicts it, and link it to promises of the future and people's fears.

This mechanism appears in five fields:

First: manufacturing the narration (riwāya). Certain facts are presented continually, while others are marginalized. One party is presented as a perpetual victim, and another as a perpetual threat, until the repeated narration (riwāya) becomes a lens through which the public sees events.

Second: transforming the promise into an imagined reality. Political discourse repeats promises of security, salvation, a historical mission, and final victory, so that some members of the public treat them as established facts, although they may be ideological conceptions for which there is no conclusive evidence.

Third: directing fear and hope. Fear of the future is exploited to justify present policies, and hope in a promised future is exploited to mobilize support, until people are asked to accept the suffering of others or relinquish their own rights as an unavoidable price.

Fourth: manufacturing political acceptance. When a policy that affects another people's rights is presented as a religious, historical, or security necessity, the promise may become a justification for the policy, and the policy may become action on the ground, while questions about justice, rights, and actual outcomes are marginalized.

Fifth: algorithms and repetition of the message. Digital platforms can show users content similar to what they have previously engaged with. If this combines with organized propaganda, disinformation, and selective presentation of information, a person may find themselves within a circle of similar messages, believing that the narration (riwāya) they continually see is the only truth or everyone's opinion.

5. The Allotted Share and Political Media: Where Does the Test Lie?

If the study's hypothesis sees in the “allotted share” a project of leading astray and instilling vain hopes, then media and politics constitute a field for testing how this influence moves from conception to reality.

In the Israeli case, the discourses that deploy religious promises or historical conceptions to justify control over land or support Israeli policies should be examined, as should the role of certain Christian Zionist currents in mobilizing political support for Israel. The test includes tracing what is said in religious and media discourse, and how it turns into political positions, alliances, and decisions, then comparing those outcomes with the facts and the rights of Palestinians.

What is required is not to assume that every media outlet or every politician operates within a single project, but to identify the narrations (riwāya), actors, and interests, and examine the evidence that reveals who produces the discourse, who repeats it, and who benefits from its outcomes.

Here the hypothesis of the “allotted share” connects with the larger question: is the instilling of vain hopes used to direct political consciousness, such that people defend a project not because they have tested its evidence and outcomes, but because they have believed the image they were promised?

6. From the Samiri's Calf to the Algorithms of the Age

The account of the Samiri presents us with a Qur'anic scene of a group that escaped Pharaoh, then was subjected to temptation after Moses' departure, allowing the Samiri to fashion a symbol, present a narration (riwāya), and redirect their allegiance.

The verses of al-Nisāʾ present us with interconnected expressions: “an allotted share,” “I will surely lead them astray,” “I will surely fill them with vain hopes,” and “and I will surely command them.”

When the two scenes are brought together within the framework of the study's hypothesis, the question of Tadbur emerges: how is the human need for meaning, security, and a future exploited, and how does a manufactured narration (riwāya) turn into belief, belief into support, and support into policy and action?

The Samiri fashioned the calf to draw his people to his narration (riwāya); the test of our age, however, is to know who manufactures the narrations (riwāya) that attract the masses, what promises they carry, who benefits from them, and what happens when those narrations (riwāya) turn into policies

on the ground.

Here the question facing the media, politicians, and the public becomes:

Do we examine the evidence before following the narration (riwāya), or do we repeat the narration (riwāya) until we believe it, then defend the promises on which it was built

as though they were facts not open to testing?

Fifth: The Greater Israel Project — When Conceptions Move onto the Terrain of Land, Rights, and the Fate of Peoples

The Greater Israel project constitutes a central dossier in this appendix because of its connection to questions of land, sovereignty, borders, settlement, and the rights of Palestinians and the peoples of the region.

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the allotted share, this line of inquiry examines the possible relationship between religious and historical conceptions concerning land and the future and their deployment in political projects that seek to expand control and influence.

But the transition from idea to reality does not occur merely because a conception exists in a religious inherited tradition; it requires actors who adopt it, discourses that justify it, and institutions that translate it into policies, decisions, and actions.

For this reason, the investigation divides the dossier into five levels.

1. Promises and Historical Conceptions

How are the concepts of covenant, election, and historical right used in constructing political narrations (riwāya)? Do certain interpretations become a basis for justifying territorial claims or expansionist conceptions?

This question requires distinguishing between the religious texts themselves, the exegesis (tafsīr) offered for them, and the political discourses that invoke them to justify specific claims.

2. Ideology and Decision-Making

Slogans are not sufficient to establish the existence of a comprehensive political project; the investigation therefore examines party platforms, officials' statements, government decisions, and the positions of organizations that advocate expanding control over land.

The aim is to determine the extent to which expansionist conceptions inform decision-making, rather than relying merely on similarities in wording or on assumptions.

3. Land and Population

Here the investigation moves from discourse to action: settlement, annexation, displacement, control over resources, changes to facts on the ground, and their consequences for Palestinians' lives and rights.

If historical narrations (riwāya) become a justification for stripping inhabitants of their rights or removing them from their land, the issue extends beyond the intellectual realm to become a material reality affecting life, security, and the future.

4. International Alliances

Military and economic assistance, political alliances, flows of arms and funding, and international positions affect the continuation or curtailment of policies.

The investigation therefore examines the interests of states and institutions that support particular policies, and how those interests affect land, inhabitants' rights, and balances of power.

5. Testing the Relationship between Promise and Reality

This dossier is not complete merely through the collection of promises or speeches; what is said must be compared with what is implemented, and declared objectives with what decisions and outcomes reveal.

If the research seeks to establish that a religious or historical conception plays a role in a political project, it must trace the connection between discourse, decision, and action, and identify the evidence that establishes it.

In light of the hypothesis of the allotted share, the question becomes: Are there specific links between the arousal of wishful hopes addressed by the Qur'an and contemporary discourses or policies that employ promises to justify control over land?

The gravest danger facing peoples is the transformation of a conception of the past or a promise of the future into a justification for stripping people of their rights in the present.

Sixth: Technology and Artificial Intelligence — When Influence Reaches Human Consciousness and Choices

Whereas traditional media influence public opinion through mass messaging, digital technology enables broader means of influence through data collection, behavioral analysis, content personalization, and the generation of messages on a large scale.

Within the framework of the research hypothesis, this development raises a question: What happens when the entities that own data and platforms become capable of influencing the information people see, the subjects that occupy them, and the messages that stir their fears and hopes?

1. Algorithms: Determining What People See

Users do not see everything published on platforms; rather, systems present them with content selected according to multiple criteria.

The repetition of a particular type of content may amplify its presence in users' consciousness, while contrary information or corrections appear less frequently.

People may thus believe that they are seeing the whole world, while they see only a portion selected for them by a system whose workings they do not always understand.

2. Data: Identifying Interests and Points of Influence

Digital data make it possible to infer some of individuals' interests and behavioral patterns. This knowledge can be used to improve services, but it can also be misused for disinformation, manipulation, or surveillance.

When data are used to identify the most influential message for each group, the targeting of content becomes more personalized and may become harder to detect.

3. Artificial Intelligence: Producing Narrations (riwāya) That Are Difficult to Verify

Modern systems can generate texts, images, audio, and video clips, and formulate arguments that appear coherent and persuasive.

These capabilities may be used to produce fabricated information, imitate people's voices, manufacture false evidence, or flood the public sphere with content that blurs the boundaries between truth and fabrication.

Here, the ability to verify source, origin, and context becomes a fundamental necessity for protecting consciousness.

4. Personalized Influence: From Addressing the Public to Targeting the Individual

Different messages can be directed at different groups to achieve a single objective, with each message formulated to suit its target audience.

Some people may be addressed through fear, others through hope, and still others through identity, anger, or the desire to belong.

Here technological development intersects with the subject of arousing wishful hopes: the tool may not create human desires from nothing, but it can exploit, amplify, and direct existing desires.

5. The Mental Environment: From Influencing the Message to Influencing Choice

When data, algorithms, artificial intelligence, and the capacity to distribute content converge, the possibilities for influencing the environment within which human judgments take shape expand.

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the allotted share, this domain constitutes a contemporary test of the question of leading astray: Can the means of influence expand as actors become increasingly capable of understanding people and personalizing the messages directed at them?

The existence of these capabilities does not in itself establish that a particular entity manages them within a single project; identifying the owners, objectives, uses, and effects nevertheless becomes an indispensable necessity.

The danger lies not in technology alone, but in the convergence of the ability to understand people, direct what they see, repeatedly place messages before them, and then influence the decisions they make.

Seventh: Science and Its Deployment — From Influencing Consciousness to Changing Material Reality

Science constitutes a particularly sensitive domain in this research, because scientific knowledge does not remain within the bounds of theory; it is transformed into technologies capable of changing material and human reality.

These technologies may be used for treatment, saving lives, and improving life, just as they may be used for war, surveillance, monopoly, and behavioral manipulation.

The question is therefore not limited to what science can do; it also encompasses who owns its tools, who funds it, for what purpose it is used, and who bears its consequences.

God Most High said:

﴿وألمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (And I will surely command them, and they will surely change God's creation.) [al-Nisāʾ: 119]

This verse occupies a central position in the research hypothesis because it occurs within a sequence of leading astray, arousing wishful hopes, commanding, and changing. Applying it to a particular scientific technology, however, requires examining the meaning of the verse and the nature and use of the technology; the mere existence of scientific intervention in nature is not sufficient to establish that it fulfills what the verse means or that it originates in the hypothesized project.

Nevertheless, the following fields of science warrant investigation within the broader question of how knowledge becomes a force that affects human beings and the world.

1. Medicine and Genetic Engineering

Gene-editing technologies offer possibilities for treating certain diseases, while also raising questions about safety, ethical limits, and equitable access to treatment.

This aspect examines the entities developing these technologies, their sources of funding, their stated purposes, demonstrated outcomes, and the safeguards governing their use.

2. Military Science

Scientific technologies have become fundamental to the development of weapons and systems of targeting, surveillance, defense, and attack.

The issue lies not in knowledge itself, but in the purposes for which it is employed and in the effects of its use on civilians and the security of societies.

3. Science and Economics

Control over advanced technologies may give certain states and corporations considerable capacity to influence markets, resources, and production chains.

When knowledge, funding, intellectual property, and infrastructure are concentrated in the hands of a limited number of entities, the gap may widen between those who possess the capacity to innovate and those who depend on others to obtain it.

4. Behavioral Sciences

Psychological and behavioral sciences intersect with data analysis and artificial intelligence in studying patterns of choice and predicting behavior.

This knowledge can be employed in education, treatment, and services; it can also be used in deceptive marketing, the exploitation of vulnerabilities, or the steering of decisions without sufficient awareness on the part of individuals.

5. From Knowledge to the Capacity for Change

When scientific capacity, funding, political authority, and data converge, the possibilities for influencing the body, behavior, resources, and the environment expand.

This is what gives science its place in the appendix: not because every scientific advance constitutes a danger, but because the capacity to change reality requires scrutiny of purposes, limits, outcomes, and beneficiaries.

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the allotted share, this field is examined as a possible extension of the question of the transition from leading astray and arousing vain hopes to command, action, and change, while recognizing the necessity of establishing specific connections through evidence.

The greatest danger is not that human beings possess scientific knowledge, but that knowledge is used without ethical or legal accountability, or employed to serve interests whose purposes or consequences people do not know.

Conclusion of the Appendix: From Identifying the Allotted Share to Understanding the Project's Effect on Human Destiny

The inquiry began with the question of identity: who is meant by the allotted share?

It then moved to the question of function: what is the nature of the task associated with it in the context of Iblis's project?

In light of the hypothesis adopted by this inquiry, a distinction emerged between the general enticement into error that targets human beings and the specific leading astray associated with the allotted share. The sequence of leading astray, arousing vain hopes, command, and change then emerged as an axis for examining its possible effects.

From here, the six investigative dossiers branched out:

• In Muslims' relationship with the Qur'an: does guidance become Tadbur and witnessing (shahāda), or does the text remain present while its effect is absent? • In the relationship between Muslims and Christians: are differences used to steer antagonisms, or are narrations (riwāya) and interests examined through reasoned argument? • In media and politics: how do promises become convictions, convictions become decisions, and decisions become policies? • In land and the Greater Israel project: how can historical conceptions become political demands and actions affecting land, inhabitants, and rights? • In technology and artificial intelligence: how does the capacity to influence information, interests, and choices expand? • In science and its employment: how does knowledge become a capacity to change reality and distribute power among states, institutions, and individuals?

These dossiers are not identical, and gathering them under a single heading is not sufficient to establish that a single entity directs them all. Yet bringing them together opens a research path for examining how ideas, promises, authority, and material instruments interact in shaping human destiny.

The sequence the inquiry places before the reader is:

Leading astray ← Arousing vain hopes ← Influencing consciousness ← Steering decisions ← Command and action ← Change in reality.

The importance of this sequence derives from the fact that the verses do not present leading astray, arousing vain hopes, and command as separate terms in the context of the allotted share. Rather, they place them in succession, then warn against delusion and mention the ultimate outcome in the hereafter.

But the inquiry's true value is determined by its ability to move from theoretical connections to the examination of evidence: identifying the Qur'anic text, deriving the hypothesis from it, and then testing the events, discourses, and decisions that it seeks to explain in its light.

Here, the responsibility of the ummah returns to the center of the case: does it engage in Tadbur of the Qur'an to discover what affects human beings and their destiny, or does it merely repeat the verses while its conceptions and positions are shaped under the influence of forces it does not examine?

The most perilous possibility raised by this appendix is that a human being may lose the ability to detect the influence exerted upon him, defend the narration (riwāya) he has adopted, and participate in its consequences, all while believing that he has chosen his path freely and knowledgeably.

For this reason, the investigation does not end with identifying the allotted share. Rather, it proceeds to examine the project to which the hypothesis connects it, its instruments, its means of influence, and the events that may reveal its effects.

What is required, then, is not that we believe a hypothesis merely because of its gravity, but that we bring it before the Qur'an, the facts, and demonstrative proof; for exposing

leading astray begins by distinguishing between what the text says, what we infer from it, and what the evidence establishes in the world.

The Absence of the Qur'anic Conception from the Ummah: Obscuring the Qur'an and Disabling Witnessing (shahāda) over Humankind

From the Allotted Share to the Suppression of Qur'anic Consciousness and the Opening of Space for Enticement into Error and Leading Astray

Introduction: When the Case Is Absent from the Witnesses

According to the conception reached by this inquiry through reading the Qur'an through the Qur'an, the danger of the “allotted share” is not confined to the role that the inquiry associates with leading astray, arousing vain hopes, command, and change. It extends to the effect of this conception's absence from the ummah upon which God has laid the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) over humankind.

If the Qur'an discloses a trajectory that begins with leading astray and arousing desires, then proceeds to command, action, and alteration, the absence of this trajectory from the ummah's awareness prevents the events connected with it from being assembled into a single picture. The ummah may observe events in religion, the media, politics, land, the economy, science, and technology, yet treat them as separate dossiers, without connecting them to the Qur'anic conception that this research seeks to disclose.

Here the relationship emerges between three interconnected axes: the allotted share, the obscuring of the Qur'anic conception, and the disabling of the ummah's witnessing (shahāda) over humankind.

The issue is not merely one of knowing a verse or interpreting a word, but of the ummah's ability to engage in Tadbur of the Qur'an as an interconnected book, discover the relationships between its verses, and understand what these relationships disclose about the issues confronting the human being and human destiny.

First: Witnessing (shahāda) Is a Qur'anic Function, Not Merely an Affiliation

God Most High says:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس ويكون الرسول عليكم شهيدا﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over humankind and the Messenger may be a witness over you.) [Al-Baqarah: 143]

And He, Most High, says:

﴿وجاهدوا في الله حق جهاده هو اجتباكم وما جعل عليكم في الدين من حرج ملة أبيكم إبراهيم هو سماكم المسلمين من قبل وفي هذا ليكون الرسول شهيدا عليكم وتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (And strive for God with the striving due to Him. He has chosen you and has placed no hardship upon you in religion—the creed of your father Abraham. He named you Muslims before and in this, so that the Messenger may be a witness over you and you may be witnesses over humankind.) [Al-Hajj: 78]

The Qur'an connects the choosing of the ummah with the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda), making the Messenger a witness over it, just as it makes the ummah a witness over humankind. The matter is therefore not confined to the ummah's name or its affiliation with the Book; rather, it is connected to a Qur'anic function with its own responsibility and consequences.

Witnessing (shahāda) requires that the ummah know what it bears witness to, possess grounds on which to establish its testimony, and discharge its responsibility to make the truth clear and not conceal it.

He, Most High, says:

﴿يا أيها الذين آمنوا كونوا قوامين بالقسط شهداء لله﴾ (O you who believe, stand firmly for justice as witnesses for God.) [Al-Nisa': 135]

And He, Most High, says:

﴿ولا تكتموا الشهادة ومن يكتمها فإنه آثم قلبه﴾ (And do not conceal testimony; whoever conceals it has a sinful heart.) [Al-Baqarah: 283]

Taken together, these verses make clear the importance of knowledge, justice, and clarification in fulfilling witnessing (shahāda). How, then, can the ummah discharge its responsibility if it lacks a conception that this study regards as a key to understanding the trajectory of leading astray disclosed by the verses of the Qur'an?

Second: What Happens When the Qur'anic Conception Is Absent from the Ummah?

When the ummah lacks awareness of the connections that this research seeks to disclose between the verses concerning the allotted share, leading astray, arousing desires, command, and alteration, consequences follow that affect its manner of understanding the Qur'an and reality.

1. Events Become Fragmented and the Unifying Conception Is Absent

The ummah may observe what is happening in religion, the media, politics, land, the economy, and technology, yet it does not bring these domains together within a single context, nor investigate the relationship between shaping awareness, directing decisions, and bringing about alteration.

Events thus remain fragmented, while the Qur'anic sequence that brings together leading astray, arousing desires, command, action, and alteration remains far from the center of inquiry.

2. The Ummah Becomes Preoccupied with Outcomes and Overlooks the Trajectory of Influence

The ummah deals with events after they occur, responding to media discourse, a political decision, an assault on land, or a religious idea; yet it does not investigate to the same extent the means that preceded these outcomes, or how ideas and desires became convictions, then decisions, practices, and events.

It thus becomes preoccupied with addressing the effects of events, while the mechanisms of influence that preceded them remain outside the scope of the unifying conception.

3. The Ummah Becomes a Recipient of Conceptions Rather Than Deriving Its Conception from the Qur'an

When inherited frames of reference become definitive limits to understanding, the reader begins with conclusions established before their time, rather than by assembling the verses and testing the connections between them.

The questions the reader asks, the connections they seek, and the conclusions they can reach are then determined by prior conceptions that may not have undergone comprehensive testing against the Qur'an.

The result is that the ummah may possess the Qur'an as a text without making full use of the possibilities of Tadbur of it in understanding the issues it faces.

4. The Ummah's Capacity to Fulfill Witnessing (shahāda) Weakens

If the ummah does not assemble the evidence for the case and investigate its causes, means, and outcomes, its ability to make its findings clear weakens.

Here the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda) is connected to the responsibility of Tadbur: the ummah cannot clarify for people what it has not investigated, disclose connections for which it has not assembled evidence, or confront a trajectory whose stages it does not see as interconnected.

According to this project, the absence of the Qur'anic conception of the allotted share means the absence of a pivotal part of the case that the research seeks to place before the ummah, which in turn affects its ability to understand events and bear witness concerning them.

Third: Traditional Exegesis (tafsīr) and the Obscuring of the Qur'anic Conception over Time

This research proceeds from the premise that the Qur'an should be the governing reference in Tadbur of the Qur'an itself, that its verses should be assembled and the connections between them tested, and that inherited exegetical interpretations should not become a barrier preventing the reader from reconsidering conclusions established over time.

And God Most High says:

﴿وأنزلنا إليك الكتاب بالحق مصدقا لما بين يديه من الكتاب ومهيمنا عليه﴾ (And We have sent down to you the Book in truth, confirming the Scripture that preceded it and exercising oversight over it.) [Al-Ma'idah: 48]

The Qur'an thus describes itself as exercising oversight over the Scripture. Within this research's method, this oversight means submitting statements, narrations (riwāya), and exegetical interpretations to the Qur'an and reexamining them in light of its verses and their contexts, rather than allowing them to become a closed frame of reference that judges every new reading before testing it.

In this context, the project examines how accumulated exegetical frames of reference have contributed to shaping the ummah's understanding of its Book, and whether some of them have led to the obscuring of Qur'anic connections that have not received sufficient investigation, including the connections underlying the conception of the “allotted share.”

The research does not view the matter as a disagreement over the interpretation of an isolated word, but as an issue concerning the method of receiving the Qur'an: does Tadbur begin with the Qur'anic text and the assembling of its verses, or with prior conceptions that determine in advance what the verses can disclose?

Historical Interaction and Its Effect on the Formation of Frames of Reference

The research also examines the effects of historical interaction among Jews, Arabs, and Muslims since the emergence of the message, the ideas, narrations (riwāya), and conceptions transmitted between these communities, and how this was reflected in the frames of reference that entered into the exegesis (tafsīr) and understanding of the Qur'an.

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the “allotted share,” the project places this overlap among the questions requiring examination, investigating how religious conceptions may take shape over time, and how the frames of reference upon which people settle may influence their view of the Qur'an and their ability to discover its connections.

Examining the inherited tradition thus becomes part of restoring the Qur'an as the frame of reference for inquiry, rather than merely a historical reassessment detached from the central issue.

Fourth: The Qur'an as Overseer and the Promise to Make the Religion of Truth Prevail

God Most High says:

﴿هو الذي أرسل رسوله بالهدى ودين الحق ليظهره على الدين كله ولو كره المشركون﴾ (It is He who sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth to make it prevail over all religion, even though the polytheists detest it.) [al-Tawbah: 33]

This verse relates to the subject of the inquiry insofar as the Qur'an presents itself not as a book subordinate to prevailing conceptions, but as a book from God, with its own guidance and referential authority.

From here, the project poses its question: if the Book is an overseer, and if the religion of truth has been sent to prevail, how does the ummah engage with the referential authority of the Qur'an? Does it make its verses the criterion against which it tests conceptions, or does it allow inherited conceptions to determine in advance the limits of what it can understand?

In this context, Tadbur becomes necessary for understanding the Qur'an from within, bringing its verses together, testing the connections among them, and arriving at conceptions that can be submitted to the Qur'anic text and examined through it.

According to this project's method, the absence of this approach leaves the ummah captive to partial conceptions and prevents the completion of inquiry into the issues that, in its view, the Qur'an places before it.

Fifth: Obscuring the Conception and Allowing Misguidance and Corruption to Continue

God Most High says:

﴿لأتخذن من عبادك نصيبا مفروضا ولأضلنهم ولأمنينهم ولآمرنهم فليبتكن آذان الأنعام ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق الله﴾ (I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants, and I will surely lead them astray and fill them with wishes; I will surely command them, and they will slit the ears of livestock; and I will surely command them, and they will alter God's creation.) [al-Nisa': 118–119]

And He Most High says:

﴿يعدهم ويمنيهم وما يعدهم الشيطان إلا غرورا﴾ (He makes them promises and fills them with wishes, but Satan promises them nothing but delusion.) [al-Nisa': 120]

This context brings together the taking of the allotted share, leading astray, arousing wishes, commanding, and altering, then connects the following verse with promising, arousing wishes, and delusion.

Within the framework of the inquiry's hypothesis, these elements constitute a trajectory whose relationships the ummah must examine through Tadbur and investigation. When it lacks a comprehensive conception, it may fail to perceive the connection between influencing consciousness and directing conduct, or between ideas and wishes and the decisions that change reality.

Here the connection emerges between obscuring the conception and the continuation of misguidance and corruption on earth: an ummah that does not assemble the evidence concerning the issue or uncover the mechanisms of influence operating within it is less able to recognize and confront its trajectories, while its effects remain dispersed across files that no single Qur'anic conception brings together.

The matter does not stop at the religious domain; it extends to the pivotal spheres of life addressed in the appendix: media and politics; land, sovereignty, and the economy; science; technology; and the means that can influence human consciousness and decisions.

Understanding the trajectory of misguidance thus becomes part of understanding reality, and Tadbur becomes a means of investigating the relationship between what the Qur'an presents and what occurs in human life.

Sixth: The Absence of the Conception and the Disabling of the Ummah's Witnessing (shahāda)

The inquiry returns here to the verse that defines the ummah's function:

﴿وكذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس﴾ (Thus We have made you a middle ummah, so that you may be witnesses over people.) [al-Baqarah: 143]

If the ummah is charged with witnessing (shahāda) over people, the question does not end with memorizing texts or repeating them; it extends to what it knows from the Qur'an, what it derives from Tadbur of it, and the truth, justice, and elucidation upon which it establishes its witnessing (shahāda).

Within the framework of this project, the absence of the conception that the inquiry seeks to uncover weakens the ummah's ability to perform this function: it may not see the issue in its interconnectedness, assemble the evidence that reveals its stages, or explain to people what it may arrive at by reading the Qur'an through the Qur'an.

God Most High says:

﴿وإذ أخذ الله ميثاق الذين أوتوا الكتاب لتبيننه للناس ولا تكتمونه﴾ (And when God took the covenant of those who were given the Book: you shall surely make it clear to people and not conceal it.) [Al 'Imran: 187]

This verse places the responsibility of elucidation and non-concealment at the heart of the relationship with the Book. From here, the inquiry connects Tadbur of the Qur'an with witnessing (shahāda): Tadbur that does not become knowledge and elucidation remains limited in its effects, and knowledge that is neither presented to people nor supported by proof does not fully perform its function in witnessing (shahāda).

Thus the links connect with one another: the absence of the conception weakens understanding of the issue; weak understanding limits the capacity for elucidation; and weak elucidation leaves the field open for the continuation of the occurrences whose relationships the inquiry seeks to uncover.

Seventh: From Obscuring the Qur'an to the Continuation of Error and Misguidance

When the appendix's themes are brought together, the sequence that this inquiry seeks to highlight becomes clear:

The allotted share ← leading astray, arousing wishes, commanding, and altering ← obscuring the Qur'anic conception from the ummah ← disabling Tadbur

in its comprehensive form ← weakening witnessing (shahāda) and elucidation ← allowing misguidance and corruption on earth to continue.

According to the inquiry's hypothesis, obscuring the Qur'anic conception is not a marginal epistemic matter: it affects the ummah's ability to understand what it faces, identify the relationships among occurrences, uncover the means that influence consciousness and decision-making, and discharge its responsibility for witnessing (shahāda) over people.

Restoring the Qur'an as the governing reference for inquiry therefore requires re-examining inherited materials and conceptions, assembling the verses relating to the issues under consideration, testing the connections among them, and then elucidating the conclusions to which Tadbur leads.

Conclusion: An Ummah That Bears the Book—But Has It Grasped the Issue?

The essence of this appendix is the relationship between the Qur'anic conception and witnessing (shahāda). An ummah that does not bring together the verses of the Qur'an or engage in Tadbur of their connections may bear the Book and read it, yet remain unable to see certain issues in the form that its verses, taken together, may reveal.

Within the framework of the hypothesis of the “allotted share,” the inquiry holds that the absence of this conception conceals from the ummah a trajectory connecting misguidance with arousing wishes, commanding, and altering; weakens its ability to understand what takes place in the pivotal spheres of life within a single context; and affects its capacity for elucidation and witnessing (shahāda).

Reassessing exegesis (tafsīr) and the inherited tradition is therefore inseparable from the central issue: it concerns restoring the ummah's ability to return to the Qur'an, test conceptions in its light, and prevent inherited frames of reference from becoming a substitute for Tadbur.

For the Qur'an describes itself as an overseer, commands Tadbur, and charges the ummah with the responsibility of witnessing (shahāda). The responsibility of the ummah therefore requires it to examine its Book, bring its verses together, disclose the connections and meanings it discovers, and make clear to people what it establishes through proof.

If the Qur'anic conception is absent from the ummah, so too is the ability to see the case in its interconnectedness; if understanding of the case is absent, witnessing (shahāda) concerning it weakens; and if witnessing (shahāda) and clarification cease, the way is left open for the continuation of the misguidance and corruption whose course this

study seeks to uncover.

Methodological Appendix: Testing the Hypothesis in Both Directions

It is not enough to begin with the concept of the “allotted share” and then assemble the verses that appear to support it. This study therefore adopts a test in two directions

The First Direction: From the Hypothesis to the Verses

We begin with a hypothesis identifying the identity in question, then examine its ability to explain the verses connected with the share, misguidance, the arousal of desires, commanding, and alteration, taking into account the contexts and attributes presented in each passage.

The Second Direction: From the Verses to the Hypothesis

We begin with the verses that present the arousal of desires, misguidance, commanding, or alteration, and trace the relationships to which they lead without presupposing the identity. We then test whether these independent paths converge on the proposed identity.

Testing Consistency

Each link in the chain is reviewed: does the text indicate it directly? Does it rest on a linguistic or contextual connection? Or is it a compound inference requiring additional evidence?

Testing Competing Exegesis (tafsīr)

If the verses can be explained in another way, that approach is presented and its ability to explain the texts as a whole is tested. Competing exegesis (tafsīr) is not rejected merely because it differs from the original hypothesis.

The Rule of Judgment

The hypothesis gains strength insofar as it coherently explains the evidence connected with the case, and loses strength if it requires overriding contexts, disregarding contrary texts, or assuming connections whose basis has not been established.

The purpose of the test is not to protect the hypothesis from criticism, but to determine whether it can withstand it

Conclusion: From Uncovering the Case to the Responsibility of Witnessing (shahāda)

“The Final Trial” proceeds through three interconnected questions: what is the origin of the project of misguidance? What identity and function might the verses disclose when brought together? And what responsibility follows from knowing and understanding the case?

Methodological Appendix: Testing the Hypothesis in Both Directions

It is not enough to begin with the concept of the “allotted share” and then assemble the verses that appear to support it. This study therefore adopts a test in two directions

The First Direction: From the Hypothesis to the Verses

We begin with a hypothesis identifying the identity in question, then examine its ability to explain the verses connected with the share, misguidance, the arousal of desires, commanding, and alteration, taking into account the contexts and attributes presented in each passage.

The Second Direction: From the Verses to the Hypothesis

We begin with the verses that present the arousal of desires, misguidance, commanding, or alteration, and trace the relationships to which they lead without presupposing the identity. We then test whether these independent paths converge on the proposed identity.

Testing Consistency

Each link in the chain is reviewed: does the text indicate it directly? Does it rest on a linguistic or contextual connection? Or is it a compound inference requiring additional evidence?

Testing Competing Exegesis (tafsīr)

If the verses can be explained in another way, that approach is presented and its ability to explain the texts as a whole is tested. Competing exegesis (tafsīr) is not rejected merely because it differs from the original hypothesis.

The Rule of Judgment

The hypothesis gains strength insofar as it coherently explains the evidence connected with the case, and loses strength if it requires overriding contexts, disregarding contrary texts, or assuming connections whose basis has not been established.

The purpose of the test is not to protect the hypothesis from criticism, but to determine whether it can withstand it.

In the first trial, the origin of the case and its elements are examined in the Qur'anic text.

In the second trial, the hypothesis of the “allotted share” is tested by tracing the relationships among the share, misguidance, the arousal of desires, commanding, and alteration, and examining the proposed identity in light of the evidence as a whole. The study's central claim consists in identifying the Jews as the proposed identity of the allotted share, without extending this identification to all the Children of Israel.

In the third trial, the study turns to the responsibility of the conveyance (balāgh) and witnessing (shahāda) over people, asking about the content of witnessing (shahāda) and the conditions for fulfilling it, and about the relationship between Qur'anic knowledge and the responsibility that follows from it.

Thus, the project is neither merely an assemblage of verses nor a pleading that relies on rhetorical force, but an attempt to construct an interconnected case whose evidence can be traced, whose connections can be examined, and whose results can be reviewed.

The ultimate value of this work is determined not by the boldness of the hypothesis, but by its ability to explain the texts on which it rests, and by the clarity of the path leading from verse to inference, and from inference to conclusion.

The final questioning remains directed at the human being: what has one understood from the Qur'an? On what evidence has one based that understanding? And what conveyance (balāgh), witnessing (shahāda), and responsibility follow from this understanding?

Here the pages of the trial come to an end, but the reader's responsibility to examine the evidence does not end with them.

The Book and Related Trials

The Final Trial — Book Edition

The Final Trial: Can Artificial Intelligence Exonerate Israel?

The Decisive Trial — The Case of the Allotted Share

The Third Final Trial: The Trial of the Witnesses

The Fourth Court: The Trial of the Inherited Tradition

A Trial Between the Qur'an, Iblis, and the Algorithms of the Age