A Trial between the Qur'an, Iblis, and the Algorithms of the Age

Case File: The Human Being Before Truth

The issue is not that the human being does not always know the truth, but that truth may stand before a person who possesses the means to examine it, yet chooses what accords with personal desire.

A person may demand indisputable evidence from an opponent, then believe a promise because it touches their desires, a narration (riwāya) because they inherited it from their community, a report because thousands of accounts repeat it, or a claim because an authority they trust has instructed them to believe it.

What, then, governs here: evidence or desire? Reason or affiliation? Truth or what the human being wants to be true?

Has anything changed in the mechanisms of enticement since Iblis confronted the human being with the promise of immortality and dominion that never decays, or have the algorithms of our age reproduced some of these mechanisms through means of far greater speed and reach?

These questions place the human being in the dock, not merely because a person may be deceived, but to test what they do when given the opportunity to verify, and when evidence conflicts with what they believe.

Court: The Court of Truth and Proof.

Defendant: The human being, not on account of belief or affiliation alone, but on account of the standard used to accept and reject claims.

First charge: A double standard of proof—demanding proof from others while exempting oneself, one's community, and one's preferred sources from that same standard.

Second charge: Yielding to enticement when a promise disguises itself as truth, desire as evidence, and deception as counsel.

Third charge: Turning repetition, fame, authority, and what has been inherited into substitutes for verification, and turning away from evidence when it reveals what one does not wish to believe.

The defendant's defense: Not everyone who errs is deceitful, not everyone who follows an opinion is a victim of deception, not every circulating report is false, and not every authority or technology is a means of deception. Requesting proof is a legitimate right, and doubt may be the beginning of knowledge rather than evidence of deviation.

The basis of judgment: The Noble Qur'an, read through the Qur'an, with its verses brought together and their meanings examined, and with distinctions drawn between text, inference, and hypothesis.

Case documents: The Torah and the Gospel as texts for comparison and examination; ancient and modern history as a record of events, narrations (riwāya), authority, and propaganda; and scientific research on algorithms and digital influence as tools for understanding the mechanisms of influence and their limits.

The Question Around Which the Trial Will Revolve

If a person demands evidence from an opponent, why might they believe what comes from their own community without examining it?

And if a person rejects illusion when they see it in others, why might they defend it when it serves their interests?

And if the Qur'an warns against following that of which one has no knowledge, does a person apply this standard to what they have inherited, what they hold sacred, what authority communicates to them, and what the screen presents to them?

The court will interrogate Iblis about his methods of enticement, confront al-Samiri's claim with what the Qur'an reveals about appearance and incapacity, examine communities' contestation over truth, and open the files on the instrumentalization of religion in history. It will then turn to the algorithms of our age: how belief takes shape, how repetition becomes familiarity, and how a person can become a transmitter of what they have not verified.

In the end, the question will not be: Who can persuade the human being?

Rather, the harder question is:

Does the human being have the courage to subject what they believe to the same standard they demand of their opponents?

The case is opened.

Nor is the maker of illusion the only defendant; the trial will also investigate those who promote it, those who justify it, and those who refuse to examine it once the evidence is within their reach.

For truth is tested not only by what we demand of others, but by what we accept applying to ourselves.

Opening the Hearing: Who Deserves to Stand in the Dock?

Judge

The hearing is opened to consider the case of the human being before truth.

O human being, you are the one who demands evidence from your opponent and asks those who disagree with you: Where is your proof? Who told you this? How do you substantiate your claim?

You are the one who will not accept a report when it contradicts your conviction, who searches for its flaws, investigates its source, and questions its transmitter.

But today the court asks you:

Do you use the same standard when you hear a report that accords with your desire?

Do you demand proof when someone promises you immortality, salvation, strength, money, or victory?

Do you test what you inherited from your forebears, what the holder of authority tells you, what the religious scholar decrees, and what the screen presents to you?

Do you seek truth, or do you seek what reassures you about what you have already decided to believe?

Prosecution

The issue is not that a person asks for proof; asking is a right, and seeking evidence is a necessity. The issue is demanding it from those one does not wish to believe, then exempting those one wishes to follow from scrutiny.

Since the court does not deliver its judgment on the basis of impressions, it has resolved to examine the evidence, beginning with the Qur'anic text, then comparing religious and historical evidence, and finally reaching contemporary tools of influence.

Part One: The Iblis File—When Enticement Becomes Persuasive Discourse

First Exhibit: The Promise That Targets Human Desire

In the account of Adam, enticement begins not with an overt threat, but with a promise that targets the human desire to endure and possess.

God Most High said:

﴿فَوَسْوَسَ إِلَيْهِ الشَّيْطَانُ قَالَ يَا آدَمُ هَلْ أَدُلُّكَ عَلَىٰ شَجَرَةِ الْخُلْدِ وَمُلْكٍ لَا يَبْلَىٰ﴾ (Then Satan whispered to him, saying, “O Adam, shall I guide you to the tree of immortality and dominion that never decays?”) [طه: ١٢٠]

Consider the nature of the offer: immortality and dominion that never decays.

This is a discourse that does not merely present information, but targets a deep desire within the human being. Iblis does not present Adam with a neutral truth; rather, he connects what he says to what Adam might wish for.

Then the Qur'an reveals another means:

﴿وَقَاسَمَهُمَا إِنِّي لَكُمَا لَمِنَ النَّاصِحِينَ﴾ (And he swore to them both, “I am indeed a sincere adviser to you both.”) [الأعراف: ٢١]

The oath, the appearance of sincere counsel, and the offer of a promise are all elements found in the account of enticement.

The court's observation: The text does not say that Adam demanded evidence from Iblis and then rejected it; we therefore cannot attribute to the account an incident that the Qur'an does not mention. But the text does establish that enticement may come in the form of a promise and counsel affirmed by an oath.

Here the question begins: Is it enough for a speaker to appear sincere in offering counsel for us to believe them? Does a promise become truth merely because it touches our desire?

Second Exhibit: From Desire to Belief

The problem lies not only in the existence of someone who deceives; the existence of deception alone does not explain why the human being responds to it.

The court therefore places a test before the reader:

If someone offers you a magnificent promise, do you examine whether it can be fulfilled, or become attached to what it promises you?

If he tells you that he wants what is best for you, do you test his actions, or settle for his words?

If he swears to you that he is truthful, does the oath become evidence of his truthfulness, or does his statement still require proof?

Conclusion: Desire may become a gateway for deception when what we want to believe takes precedence over the evidence we possess.

Chapter Two: The Case of al-Samiri — When Appearances Are Manufactured and Testing Is Neglected

Exhibit Three: The Calf Taken as an Object of Worship

God Most High said:

﴿فَأَخْرَجَ لَهُمْ عِجْلًا جَسَدًا لَّهُ خُوَارٌ فَقَالُوا هَٰذَا إِلَٰهُكُمْ وَإِلَٰهُ مُوسَىٰ فَنَسِيَ﴾ (Then he brought forth for them a calf, a body that lowed, and they said, “This is your god and the god of Moses, but he forgot.”) [طه: ٨٨]

Then came the Qur'anic question that exposes the contradiction between the claim and the capacity:

﴿أَفَلَا يَرَوْنَ أَلَّا يَرْجِعُ إِلَيْهِمْ قَوْلًا وَلَا يَمْلِكُ لَهُمْ ضَرًّا وَلَا نَفْعًا﴾ (Do they not see that it returns no word to them and has no power to harm or benefit them?) [طه: ٨٩]

Why was this calf taken as a god when it returned no word to them and had no power to harm or benefit them?

The court has no need to invent an explanation for the account; the text itself places the contradiction before us: an immense claim set against manifest incapacity.

Here, one form of defective judgment becomes clear: appearance, sound, spectacle, or the claim of an influential person becomes more compelling than testing the truth.

The Question Addressed to the Accused

Do you examine what a thing can actually do, or believe what you are told about it?

Do you ask for evidence of the capacity of the person you follow, or is it enough to see the people around him believing him?

Can something manifestly incapable become an object of trust if appearance precedes testing?

Chapter Three: The Case of the Qur'an — Is the Problem Seeking Evidence or Turning Away from It?

Exhibit Four: The Qur'an Does Not Criminalize Questioning; It Demands Proof

The defense may object, saying: A person cannot accept every claim without question. Seeking evidence is not a crime, but a necessity for knowing the truth.

The court accepts this objection.

God Most High said:

﴿قُلْ هَاتُوا بُرْهَانَكُمْ إِن كُنتُمْ صَادِقِينَ﴾ (Say, “Bring your proof, if you are truthful.”) [البقرة: ١١١]

And God Most High said:

﴿وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ وَالْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَٰئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْئُولًا﴾ (Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Hearing, sight, and the heart—all of these will be called to account.) [الإسراء: ٣٦]

The problem, then, is not that a person asks, “What is the evidence?” but that this question is applied selectively.

A person may demand ten pieces of evidence from an opponent, yet accept a report from a favored source without verifying it.

A person may reject an explanation because it does not accord with their belief, then accept another explanation merely because they inherited it.

A person may require others to substantiate their statements, while considering an idea's fame, antiquity, or numerous adherents sufficient to establish it.

Here, the matter shifts from a difference of opinion to a defect in the criterion of knowledge.

Exhibit Five: When a Person Does Not Want to Reconsider What They Believe

God Most High said:

﴿أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ أَمْ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبٍ أَقْفَالُهَا﴾ (Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [محمد: ٢٤]

And God Most High said:

﴿وَإِن تُطِعْ أَكْثَرَ مَن فِي الْأَرْضِ يُضِلُّوكَ عَن سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ إِن يَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ وَإِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ﴾ (If you obey most of those on earth, they will lead you astray from the path of God. They follow nothing but conjecture, and they do nothing but surmise.) [الأنعام: ١١٦]

These two verses place two tests before us:

First: Does a person reflect upon what they read, or close the door to reconsideration?

Second: Does a person make the number of adherents evidence of truth?

A large number of believers does not in itself establish the validity of a belief, just as a small number of believers does not establish its falsity. The evidence itself must be examined.

A person cannot object that an opponent lacks proof, then make received beliefs, the public, or authority a substitute for proof in matters they believe in.

Chapter Four: The Torah and the Gospel — From Message to Authority: Election, Rabbinic Interpretation, and the Deification of Christ

Case File: Did people follow what God's messages brought, or did they follow what religious authorities decided in the name of those messages?

Exhibit Six: The Torah and the Claim of Election

An examination of how the idea of the election of the Children of Israel became a claim to privilege over all other peoples, and of the extent to which this conception accords with the Qur'an, which links responsibility to deeds and does not make affiliation alone evidence of truth.

Exhibit Seven: The Rabbis and the Talmud

An examination of the role of religious exegesis (tafsīr) in shaping beliefs, and of how human interpretations can become rulings attributed to God, testing each claim against the text on which it rests rather than passing a single judgment on the Talmud as a whole.

Exhibit Eight: Jesus and the Doctrine of Deification

A comparison of what the Qur'an says about Jesus as God's servant and messenger with the Gospel texts on which the discussion of his divinity rests, followed by an examination of the doctrine's historical development and the role of councils and ecclesiastical authority in formulating and establishing it.

Exhibit Nine: The Common Test

Bringing the evidence together in a single question: If Moses and Jesus brought two messages from God, how do we test what was subsequently attributed to their messages? Is it enough for rabbis, monks, or the Church to adopt a particular interpretation for it to become binding, or must the text and the proof be examined?

Chapter Summary

The court does not equate the Qur'an with the Torah and the Gospel, nor does it make religious authority a reference point for judging the Qur'an. Rather, it adjudicates claims of election, interpretation, and deification by reference to its Qur'anic frame of reference, and examines the history of the formation of beliefs without conflating the original text with its subsequent exegesis (tafsīr).

The Core of the Case: The message is one thing, and what authority attributes to it is another; following authority does not absolve a person of the responsibility to examine what they believe.

The Torah and the Gospel: When the Message Becomes an Ethnic Privilege and the Messenger Becomes a God

Case File: How did God's messages, at the hands of religious authorities, become doctrines and privileges that the divine text does not substantiate, and how did people then follow those authorities without subjecting what they said to proof?

The court does not place the Qur'an, the Torah, and the Gospel on the same level, nor does it make rabbis, monks, or the Church a reference point for judging the Qur'an. Rather, it makes the Qur'an its reference point and opens texts, beliefs, and history to examination of the interpretations and transformations that the messages have undergone.

The issue is not whether Jews and Christians believe what they believe, but whether the doctrines they follow accord with God's messages, and whether their adherents have examined the evidence for them or merely accepted what their religious authorities have determined.

The court sets before itself two lines of inquiry:

In the case of the Children of Israel: how did the claim of chosenness become a privilege espoused by certain religious interpretations, one that may be used to justify superiority over all other peoples?

In the case of Christ: how did Jesus move from the status of messenger and human being in Qur'anic discourse to that of divinity in ecclesiastical doctrine, and did Jesus claim in the Gospel texts that he was God?

In both cases, the court returns to a single question: what did the message say, what did religious authority add to it, and why did people follow the addition?

Exhibit Six: The Case of the Children of Israel — When Chosenness Becomes Racial Privilege

The Qur'an says:

﴿يَا بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ اذْكُرُوا نِعْمَتِيَ الَّتِي أَنْعَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَأَنِّي فَضَّلْتُكُمْ عَلَى الْعَالَمِينَ﴾ (O Children of Israel, remember My favor which I bestowed upon you, and that I favored you above all peoples.) [البقرة: ٤٧]

Yet the Qur'an does not make descent from the Children of Israel a source of immunity from accountability, nor does it make affiliation alone evidence of the correctness of one's position or the righteousness of one's deeds.

And it says:

﴿وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ نَحْنُ أَبْنَاءُ اللَّهِ وَأَحِبَّاؤُهُ﴾ (The Jews and the Christians said, “We are God's children and His beloved.”) [المائدة: ١٨]

It then confronts this claim with the question:

﴿قُلْ فَلِمَ يُعَذِّبُكُم بِذُنُوبِكُم﴾ (Say, “Why, then, does He punish you for your sins?”) [المائدة: ١٨]

Examining the Exhibit

The court places before the reader the distinction between two things: a text's mention of a favor or preference in a particular context, and its transformation into a claim of permanent privilege that places a particular group above all other human beings merely by virtue of its affiliation.

If the claim of chosenness becomes a racial privilege, or a conception that a particular group is closer to God in a manner that exempts it from the criterion of truth and deeds, the court asks: where is the proof of this absolute privilege? Does the divine text establish it, or have human interpretations added it to the text?

A group's declaration that it is chosen is not enough to make its claim true. Nor is a person's affiliation with a religious group enough to make that person's position true.

Exhibit Seven: The Rabbis — From Exegesis (tafsīr) of the Text to the Manufacture of Privilege

The Qur'an says:

﴿اتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ أَرْبَابًا مِّن دُونِ اللَّهِ﴾ (They took their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God.) [التوبة: ٣١]

And it says:

﴿فَوَيْلٌ لِّلَّذِينَ يَكْتُبُونَ الْكِتَابَ بِأَيْدِيهِمْ ثُمَّ يَقُولُونَ هَٰذَا مِنْ عِندِ اللَّهِ﴾ (So woe to those who write the Book with their own hands, then say, “This is from God.”) [البقرة: ٧٩]

And it says:

﴿وَإِنَّ مِنْهُمْ لَفَرِيقًا يَلْوُونَ أَلْسِنَتَهُم بِالْكِتَابِ لِتَحْسَبُوهُ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَمَا هُوَ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ﴾ (And among them is a group who twist their tongues with the Book so that you may think it is from the Book, though it is not from the Book.) [آل عمران: ٧٨]

These texts place a grave issue before the court: religious authority's transformation from an agency that interprets the text into one that attributes to God what is not from Him, or presents its human interpretation as a divine ruling.

Here the investigation opens the file on the Talmud, with its rabbinic traditions, debates, and interpretations, to examine whether certain interpretations have added meanings to the texts that exceed what they convey, and how those interpretations have been used to shape religious conceptions of the community and the other.

The court does not regard the mere existence of the Talmud as evidence of distortion; rather, it judges every claim and interpretation against the text to which it is attributed. If a human interpretation establishes a privilege unsupported by the text, and that privilege is then presented as a divine ruling, the question becomes: who established it, and on what evidence?

The Point at Issue in the Charge

If certain rabbis transformed the concept of chosenness into an absolute racial privilege, or used religious exegesis (tafsīr) to justify one group's superiority over the rest of humanity, this would not be merely a difference of interpretation; it would become a religious claim that must be tested in light of God's message and its criterion.

The conclusion the court puts forward is that transforming favor into absolute privilege, and affiliation into a criterion of superiority over others, conflicts with the divine message that holds the human being responsible for what they say and do.

From the perspective of the Qur'an, every interpretation that justifies falsehood in God's name or turns religion into an instrument of domination and corruption falls within the sphere of deviation from God's guidance, not within that of proof of the interpretation's validity.

Exhibit Eight: The Case of Jesus — Did Christ Say He Was God?

The court turns to the second issue, whose question is more explicit: did Jesus claim in the Gospel that he was God whom people must worship, or was the doctrine of his divinity formulated and developed through interpretations and ecclesiastical authority?

The Qur'an says:

﴿قَالَ إِنِّي عَبْدُ اللَّهِ آتَانِيَ الْكِتَابَ وَجَعَلَنِي نَبِيًّا﴾ (He said, “I am indeed God's servant. He has given me the Book and made me a prophet.”) [مريم: ٣٠]

And it says:

﴿لَّقَدْ كَفَرَ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ﴾ (Those who say, “God is the Messiah, son of Mary,” have indeed disbelieved.) [المائدة: ٧٢]

And it says:

﴿مَّا الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ إِلَّا رَسُولٌ﴾ (The Messiah, son of Mary, is only a messenger.) [المائدة: ٧٥]

Within the court's Qur'anic frame of reference, Jesus is God's servant and messenger, not God Himself.

But the court does not confine itself to presenting the Qur'anic ruling; it opens the Gospel texts on which Christians rely and asks a specific question: do we find in them a direct declaration by Jesus that he is God, asking people to worship him?

Examining the Gospel Texts

In the Gospel of John, Jesus says:

“That you alone are the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” [يوحنا ١٧: ٣]

Also in the Gospel of John:

“My Father is greater than I.” [يوحنا ١٤: ٢٨]

In the Gospel of Mark, when Jesus is asked about the first commandment, he begins his answer by saying:

“The first of all the commandments is: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.” [مرقس ١٢: ٢٩]

The court places these texts before the reader and asks the reader to read them in their contexts, rather than merely accepting what the religious institution determines about them.

These passages contain no direct declaration by Jesus in the words “I am God,” but they do not, on their own, constitute all the texts on which Christian theology relies. The arguments on which the other side relies must therefore also be examined, rather than claiming that these passages alone settle every question of interpretation.

Nevertheless, the court’s question remains: if the divinity of Christ is the central doctrine that people are required to believe, where is the explicit textual evidence establishing that Jesus declared himself to be God?

The Historical Exhibit: Ecclesiastical Authority and the Definition of Doctrine

In 325 CE, the Council of Nicaea convened in the context of theological disputes concerning Christ’s relationship to the Father and adopted a creedal formulation pivotal to the history of Christianity. Discussions and doctrinal developments then continued, and later formulations took shape in connection with the Council of Constantinople in 381 CE.

The court uses this history to examine the role played by councils and ecclesiastical authority in formulating doctrine and defining the boundaries of acceptable belief.

But the convening of a council does not, by itself, establish that a doctrine is true or false; it establishes that its institutional formulation was bound up with a historical process of debate and decisions. The truth of the doctrine itself remains subject to textual and argumentative examination.

The Point of Accusation in the Christ Dossier

From the perspective of the Qur'an, turning Jesus into a god conflicts with his description as God’s servant and messenger.

The historical question, however, is: how did the doctrine that makes Christ a god or a divine hypostasis develop, and how did it become part of binding ecclesiastical teaching?

The question the investigation directs at adherence is: has each believer examined this issue personally through texts and arguments, or received the doctrine as an established truth that may not be challenged?

The court does not presume that every Christian has failed to reflect or seek evidence, but it does not grant doctrine immunity from examination merely because the Church affirms it.

If Jesus is a messenger sent by God, then turning him into a god is not a secondary detail; rather, it changes the nature of the message itself, requiring inquiry into the source of this belief and its evidence.

Exhibit Nine: The Shared Test — Moses, Jesus, and the Message Their Followers Go Beyond

Here the trial reaches the heart of the comparison.

The Qur'an affirms that Moses brought clear proofs to the Children of Israel, and presents the mission of Jesus as that of a messenger from God. But the existence of a divine message does not prevent interpretations, institutions, and beliefs from arising around it that go beyond what the text establishes.

The court does not equate the history of Judaism with the history of Christianity, nor does it claim that what occurred in one was repeated in the same manner in the other. But it places a single test before them:

In the dossier of the Children of Israel: have certain interpretations of chosenness become a collective privilege that goes beyond the criterion of truth and deeds?

In the dossier of the rabbis: have human additions or interpretations been presented as divine rulings that may not be reconsidered?

In the Christ dossier: has ecclesiastical doctrine concerning his divinity become a binding reference that followers receive without examining its textual evidence?

These are not merely three questions about the past. They are questions about how belief takes shape, and about the human right to distinguish between God’s message and what authority says in its name.

The Qur'an lays down a general rule in its words:

﴿وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ﴾ (And do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge.) [الإسراء: ٣٦]

It also says:

﴿قُلْ هَاتُوا بُرْهَانَكُمْ إِن كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ﴾ (Say, “Bring your proof, if you are truthful.”) [البقرة: ١١١]

This rule does not exempt a belief because it is inherited, nor does it grant religious authority immunity because it is ancient or widespread.

Summary of the Judgment in This Chapter

The trial establishes that the Qur'an rejects attributing to God what is not from Him, warns against taking rabbis and monks as lords, and rejects the deification of Christ.

The texts and history raise questions about how certain interpretations of chosenness took shape, and about the role of rabbinic traditions and ecclesiastical authority in defining doctrine. Attributing every interpretation or position to all Jews or Christians, however, requires specific evidence and must not be generalized without examination.

But the methodological conclusion is clear: it is not enough for religious authority to say that this is God’s ruling; rather, the text on which it relies, the meaning it derives from that text, and the evidence that justifies making it binding on people must be examined.

If a person demands proof from an opponent, then follows rabbis, monks, or the Church without testing their claims, the question no longer concerns others alone; it becomes a question of that person’s own responsibility before the truth.

Here the court pursues the case: how does adherence become a habit, and how does a person relinquish responsibility for examining what they believe?

Chapter Five: The History Dossier — When Authority, Fear, and Religious Narration (riwāya) Are Used to Manufacture Belief

Exhibit Eight: From Religious Chosenness to Claiming a Right to the Land

The court opens a dossier that extends beyond ancient history to the reality of Palestine, where religious narration (riwāya) intersects with the political project, and the divine promise is invoked to justify claiming the land, while the Palestinian people live with the consequences of occupation, settlement, and displacement.

The court places before itself a claim embraced by Jewish and Zionist religious and political currents: that the Jews are God’s chosen people, that the land of Palestine was granted to them by God, and that this promise gives them a special right to the land.

Here the questioning begins:

Is a group’s belief that God promised it a land sufficient for that belief to become a legal and political basis that overrides the rights of the inhabitants who live there?

Does religious or ethnic affiliation become a permanent title deed that nullifies another people’s rights in its homeland, or grants a state the right to control and displace that people?

Is the international community required to accept this claim merely because it rests on a religious reading of ancient texts, without examining its substance, its consequences, and the rights violated in its name?

Interrogating the Narration (riwāya)

The court does not treat religious belief itself as evidence of an absolute political right. There is a difference between the followers of a religion believing a narration (riwāya) about their history and that narration (riwāya) becoming a political claim imposed by force on another people.

Even if the claimant relies on a religious text, they must establish how they move from the text to the right they claim, and how this alleged right can nullify the rights of others.

Turning chosenness into racial superiority, or turning a religious promise into a license to seize land, does not become legitimate merely because a religious or political authority embraces it.

From the perspective of the Qur'an, grace does not become immunity from accountability, nor does membership in a religious community constitute proof of the validity of everything it claims. God Most High says:

﴿وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ نَحْنُ أَبْنَاءُ اللَّهِ وَأَحِبَّاؤُهُ قُلْ فَلِمَ يُعَذِّبُكُم بِذُنُوبِكُم﴾ (The Jews and the Christians said, “We are God's children and His beloved.” Say, “Why, then, does He punish you for your sins?”) [المائدة: ١٨]

The verse confronts the claim to proximity and privilege with the question of responsibility and accountability. A community's claim to a special standing is not enough to place it above the criterion of truth and justice.

And God Most High says:

﴿وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَآنُ قَوْمٍ عَلَىٰ أَلَّا تَعْدِلُوا اعْدِلُوا هُوَ أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَىٰ﴾ (Do not let hatred of a people lead you to act unjustly. Be just; that is nearer to piety.) [المائدة: ٨]

Here the criterion established by the court becomes clear: religion must not become a justification for injustice, nor may communal identity be used to nullify another person's right to justice, life, and land.

Exhibit Nine: Palestine — When the World Is Asked to Believe the Narration (riwāya) and Ignore Reality

The court moves from the claim to its consequences on the ground.

In Palestine, the conflict does not concern religious texts alone; it concerns a people living on their land, rights to self-determination, occupation, settlement, land confiscation, and the displacement of inhabitants.

A United Nations report issued in September 2025 documented continuing settlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. It noted that Israeli policies and practices associated with settlement and annexation violate Palestinian rights, and that the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion issued in July 2024, determined the illegality of Israel's continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

Here the court asks:

If a religious narration (riwāya) is used to justify control over land, does that narration (riwāya) extinguish the rights of those to whom the land belongs?

If civilians are killed, inhabitants displaced, or their property confiscated, is it enough for the perpetrator to invoke the slogan of divine promise for the act to become acceptable?

If governments and media outlets repeat a political narration (riwāya) until it becomes familiar in the public mind, does frequent repetition become proof?

The court is not putting Jews on trial because of their identity, nor does it attribute a single political position to all adherents of Judaism. It is trying a specific claim: the use of a religious reading to justify political privilege or control over another people's land.

A Jew who rejects injustice is not accused on account of their religion, just as a Palestinian does not lose their rights on account of their religion or identity. What is on trial is the act, the claim, and the evidence—not religious or ethnic identity.

Exhibit Ten: Nazi Propaganda — How Does a Lie Become a Collective Belief?

Modern history offers a documented example of authority's capacity to manufacture belief: Nazi propaganda.

The Nazi regime used the media, national symbols, and stereotypes to portray Jews and other groups as enemies, linked national belonging to acceptance of its ideology, and helped prepare society for persecution, war, and genocide.

The danger of propaganda lay not in the repetition of messages alone, but in a system that made falsehood familiar, incitement acceptable, and the exclusion of others appear to some people as a defense of the community and the homeland.

The court does not equate Nazism with Zionism, or different historical events with one another; each case has its own context and facts that must be examined. But it draws from the experience of Nazi propaganda a question suitable for testing any political authority:

How is the enemy manufactured in public consciousness? How is a repeated narration (riwāya) transformed into a truth that may not be reexamined? How are people induced to accept injustice against others in the name of protecting the community or fulfilling its historical destiny?

These questions are posed to any political project that uses fear, identity, or historical narration (riwāya) to justify violations of human rights.

Conclusion: Is a Claim Exempt from Proof Because It Has Donned the Garb of Religion?

The court reaches the heart of the case:

Not everything attributed to God proceeds from God, and not everything a community recounts about its history grants it an absolute right over the present and future of others.

Control over land does not become a right merely because those exercising it believe that God promised it to them. Nor does the crime of displacement or the killing of civilians become acceptable because of the identity of its perpetrators or the justifications they invoke.

Appealing to international law and human rights is not hostility toward a religion or a people; rather, it subjects actions to a criterion that grants no community immunity on account of its religion, ethnicity, or political power.

When the international community confronts a religious claim used to justify control or displacement, it is not required to believe the narration (riwāya) or to reject it merely because of its source; rather, it must examine what it claims, what evidence supports it, and what rights are violated by its consequences.

The methodological ruling in this case: neither alleged chosenness, nor religious promise, nor political propaganda, nor repetition of the narration (riwāya) grants anyone an unrestricted mandate to violate the rights of others.

If a person demands proof from an adversary, then believes the narration (riwāya) of authority without testing it, they have replaced evidence with allegiance, and truth with what they wish to believe.

Here the court returns to its central question: are we seeking what the evidence establishes, or are we seeking evidence to justify what we have already decided to believe?

Chapter Six: The Digital Age Case — When Temptation Enters a Person's Pocket

Exhibit Ten: Algorithms Do Not Display the Whole World; They Order What Appears to You

In the past, a person would hear an orator in a public square, read a newspaper, or receive news from someone they knew.

Today, they may open their phone to find a torrent of news, clips, images, and comments before them, while the system suggests additional content based on their previous behavior and interactions.

An algorithm is not a satanic mind, nor is every recommendation system designed to deceive the user. But it may order content according to objectives such as increasing engagement, viewing time, or the likelihood of clicking and sharing. If engagement is given considerable weight without sufficient safeguards for accuracy and quality, sensational or misleading content may gain additional circulation.

Scientific research examines the relationship between human biases and content-ranking systems, and investigates how platform design and social interaction affect the spread of misinformation. Findings vary according to the platform, the type of algorithm, and the context; therefore, the findings of a single study must not be generalized to all users or platforms.

The question the court places before the human being is not whether every algorithm is misleading, but whether content ranking has come to replace verification of the truth.

Exhibit Eleven: From Engagement to Repetition, Then Belief

Imagine this sequence:

١. You watch a clip that provokes your anger or accords with your beliefs.

٢. You engage with it by watching, commenting, or sharing.

٣. The recommendation system may regard this engagement as an indication of your interest.

٤. You are shown similar content or content related to your interests.

٥. Your chances of encountering the same account from multiple sources increase.

٦. You may interpret the repetition of the account as evidence of its truth, although repetition does not establish it.

This is one possible depiction of a feedback loop between user behavior and content ranking, not a deterministic description of every algorithm.

But the question remains:

Has the frequency with which information appears before you become a substitute for verifying it?

Has the number of views become evidence for you?

Do you believe a report because its source is genuinely reliable, or because you have seen it dozens of times?

Do you seek out the opposing account, or content yourself with what the system shows you?

Exhibit Twelve: The Report That Accords with Your Desires

A report may spread because people find it sensational, because it confirms their fears, or because it targets an adversary they hate.

Thousands of people may repost it without having independently verified it.

This does not mean that a report is false merely because it has spread, but it does mean that its spread is insufficient to establish its truth.

Here the individual's own responsibility becomes apparent: the platform may choose what it displays, but the user can pause before sharing, seek out the original source, examine the context, and distinguish between a claim and a document, between opinion and news, and between interpretation and an actual occurrence.

The deeper danger is that technology becomes a means of reinforcing what we want to believe rather than testing what we think is true.

A person who demands evidence from an adversary, then shares an unverified report because it accords with their own position, applies two different standards to the same issue.

This is the point at which the trial of the present age intersects with the Qur'an's question concerning knowledge, Tadbur, conjecture, and following.

Chapter Seven: Confronting the Defense — Is the Human Being Alone Responsible?

Defense Counsel

The accusation burdens human beings beyond what they can bear. People may be deceived because of insufficient information, group pressure, fear, or trust in sources they thought reliable. Algorithms may affect the ranking of what they see without their knowing how those algorithms work. How, then, can we hold human beings fully responsible?

Prosecution

We do not hold them responsible for every piece of information hidden from them, nor do we equate unintentional error with deliberate deception. Rather, we are examining the limits of their responsibility when they have a reasonable opportunity to verify something but disregard it because they do not want a result that conflicts with their desires.

Defense Counsel

What of the person who asks for proof and refuses to believe what they do not find convincing?

Prosecution

That is not grounds for condemnation. Asking for proof is a right; indeed, it is part of the search for truth. The grounds for condemnation arise when proof becomes a requirement imposed on others while one's own beliefs are granted a permanent exemption.

Defense Counsel

Is everyone who follows what has been handed down, or follows the majority, turning away from the truth?

Prosecution

No. Following a particular assertion does not in itself make that assertion false, just as opposing the majority does not make a person right. The criterion is evidence, not the identity of the follower or the number of followers.

Judge

The court records these distinctions and rules that condemnation concerns conduct established by evidence, not the mere fact that people differ in their beliefs.

Chapter Eight: The Qur'an Judges — What Is the Criterion of Truth?

After examining the exhibits, the court returns to its source of reference to establish the criterion of truth and reveal how deception begins, how desires and affiliations are exploited to manufacture belief, and how differences between groups become a barrier preventing a person from reexamining what they believe.

A person is not always misled because they lack information; they may be misled because they want to believe it, because they inherited it from their group, or because an authority they trust has persuaded them that questioning it constitutes a departure from the truth.

For this reason, the court places four Qur'anic principles before the human being, preceded by two testimonies that reveal the mechanisms of deception and the contest among groups over truth.

Exhibit Eleven: Iblis — How Does Deception Begin?

The Qur'an says, in the words of Iblis:

﴿وَقَالَ لَأَتَّخِذَنَّ مِنْ عِبَادِكَ نَصِيبًا مَّفْرُوضًا ۝ وَلَأُضِلَّنَّهُمْ وَلَأُمَنِّيَنَّهُمْ﴾ (And he said, “I will surely take an allotted share of Your servants, and I will surely lead them astray and fill them with wishes.”) [النساء: ١١٨–١١٩]

The verses reveal two explicit paths in Iblis's project: leading astray and arousing wishes.

Leading astray is turning a person away from the path of truth; arousing wishes is binding that person to enticing promises and hopes, until what they desire to attain exerts a stronger influence on them than examining the truth of what is presented to them.

In the account of Adam, Iblis says:

﴿هَلْ أَدُلُّكَ عَلَىٰ شَجَرَةِ الْخُلْدِ وَمُلْكٍ لَّا يَبْلَىٰ﴾ (Shall I guide you to the tree of immortality and a dominion that never decays?) [طه: ١٢٠]

Iblis did not present Adam with proof establishing the promise of immortality and dominion that never decays; rather, he appealed to his desire and offered him what might entice him to believe the promise.

Here the court questions the human being:

Do you believe what is presented to you because evidence has established its truth, or because you wish it were true?

Does this principle change when the promise comes from a political authority, a religious institution, or a media discourse that gives you a sense of superiority, privilege, or victory?

Deception may come in the form of a promise of immortality, or in the form of an inherited privilege, a promise of salvation, or a claim that a particular group possesses the truth to the exclusion of all other people. It may exploit a person's desire for power, security, or belonging, leading them to accept what accords with their desires without testing its evidence.

The court's finding: One of the most dangerous avenues of deception is for desire to become the criterion of belief, and for evidence to become subordinate to what a person wishes, rather than desire being subject to what the evidence establishes.

Exhibit Twelve: Conflict among Groups — Each Faction Claims to Possess the Truth

The Qur'an says:

﴿وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ لَيْسَتِ النَّصَارَىٰ عَلَىٰ شَيْءٍ وَقَالَتِ النَّصَارَىٰ لَيْسَتِ الْيَهُودُ عَلَىٰ شَيْءٍ وَهُمْ يَتْلُونَ الْكِتَابَ﴾ (The Jews say, “The Christians have no foundation,” and the Christians say, “The Jews have no foundation,” though they recite the Scripture.) [البقرة: ١١٣]

Then it says:

﴿كَذَٰلِكَ قَالَ الَّذِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ مِثْلَ قَوْلِهِمْ﴾ (Likewise, those who do not know have said the same as they say.) [البقرة: ١١٣]

The verse places a clear scene before the court: two groups each denying that the other possesses the truth, although both recite a scripture.

But the verse does not stop at this conflict; it adds that those who do not know have said the same as they say. Here the scope of the trial expands, because this pattern of exclusion is not confined to Jews and Christians; it can recur within any group that makes itself the standard of truth and denies it to others without proof.

Applying Tadbur to the sequence of the verse raises a question about those who came after the Jews and Christians and then repeated the same pattern of conflict. This test applies to Muslims when they divided into factions and sects, and each faction began denying that the other possessed the truth, treating affiliation with its own sect as evidence of the correctness of its belief.

The point is not that Islam as a message created this conflict, but that the followers of divine messages may turn affiliation into a standard of truth and repeat the conduct that the verse exposed among their predecessors.

Here the court questions the Muslim just as it questions anyone else:

If the Jews said that the Christians had no foundation, and the Christians said that the Jews had no foundation, and those who came after them then repeated this approach, is a person's affiliation with Islam sufficient to establish that they stand upon the truth?

And does a faction become right because it describes its opponents as misguided?

And does the judgment differ if a person repeats the statements of their own sect rather than those of another, without examining the evidence?

The recurrence of this pattern among groups reveals that affiliation can become a barrier to knowledge, and that a person may learn to judge others before learning to test their own belief.

The court's finding: A faction's denial that others possess the truth is not enough to establish that it possesses it. Nor is inheriting the name of a religious group enough to make a person knowledgeable about the truth. Truth is not established by affiliation, nor does it pass to a person merely through birth within a group or adherence to a sect.

Rule One: Do Not Follow That of Which You Have No Knowledge

God Most High says:

﴿وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ﴾ (Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge.) [الإسراء: ٣٦]

Not every piece of information that reaches you constitutes knowledge, not every confidence constitutes evidence, and not every circulating narration (riwāya) constitutes an established fact.

It is not enough for someone you trust to tell you something for it to become knowledge, nor for a religious or political institution to repeat it for it to become truth. You must examine its source, verify its evidence, and distinguish between fact, exegesis (tafsīr), and assertion.

This rule does not prevent a person from learning from others; rather, it prevents them from turning others' statements into unquestioned truths without knowledge.

Rule Two: Do Not Treat Numbers as Proof

God Most High says:

﴿وَإِن تُطِعْ أَكْثَرَ مَن فِي الْأَرْضِ يُضِلُّوكَ عَن سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ﴾ (If you obey most of those on earth, they will lead you astray from God's path.) [الأنعام: ١١٦]

Numbers establish prevalence, but they do not establish the validity of a claim.

Millions may repeat a single narration (riwāya), influential institutions may adopt it, and it may become an inherited belief over time; but none of this dispenses with the need for proof.

Just as the small number of people who believe a claim does not, by itself, establish its falsity, their large number does not, by itself, establish its validity.

The standard is not the number of those who believe, but what establishes the truth of what they believe.

Rule Three: Practice Tadbur and Do Not Close the Door to Reassessment

God Most High says:

﴿أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ أَمْ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبٍ أَقْفَالُهَا﴾ (Do they not reflect deeply upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [محمد: ٢٤]

Tadbur does not mean approaching the text with a predetermined conclusion, then selecting from it what supports that conclusion and ignoring what tests it.

Tadbur means gathering the relevant verses, reading them in their contexts, relating them to one another, testing the hypothesis against the texts as a whole, and distinguishing between what the Qur'an explicitly says and what you infer from its meanings.

Tadbur is not genuine if the conclusion is decided in advance and no evidence is allowed to prompt its reassessment.

Someone who asks the text only to confirm their belief is not testing the truth, but searching for what reassures them about what they already believe.

Rule Four: Demand Proof from Everyone

God Most High says:

﴿قُلْ هَاتُوا بُرْهَانَكُمْ إِن كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ﴾ (Say, “Bring your proof, if you are truthful.”) [البقرة: ١١١]

This rule does not change with the speaker, their identity, or their standing.

A religious figure is not exempt from providing proof because they are a religious figure, nor a politician because they hold authority, nor an influencer because they are famous, nor an expert because people trust their knowledge, nor a group because one belongs to it.

If a person demands evidence from their opponent, then accepts from their own group what they reject from their opponent, they have changed the standard of truth according to the speaker's identity, not the strength of the argument.

The court therefore places a single question before everyone:

Do you accept that your belief should be tested by the same standard with which you test the beliefs of others?

Summary of the Judgment: Do Not Make Your Desire, Your Group, or Your Authority a Substitute for Proof

The exhibits reveal that deception may begin with a promise that accords with a person's desire, that affiliation may become a barrier preventing them from reassessing their belief, and that conflict among groups does not establish that any one of them possesses the truth merely because it denies it to others.

The Qur'anic rules establish a clear standard: do not follow that of which you have no knowledge, do not treat numbers as evidence, do not close the door to Tadbur and reassessment, and do not grant any entity immunity from the demand for proof.

It is not enough for a person to say: I belong to the right group, or my religious authority decrees this, or my forebears believed it, or most people repeat it.

The question is not only: What do you believe? But also: Why do you believe it? What evidence supports it? And have you tested your belief as you test your opponent's belief?

Here the court rules: Truth is not established by desire, inheritance, authority, or numbers, but by what proof substantiates.

Chapter Nine: The Final Judgment — The Human Being before the Truth: From Condemning Deception to Trying Those Who Produce and Follow It

The Court of Truth and Proof

After examining the Qur'anic evidence, comparing religious texts and narrations (riwāya), interrogating historical examples, and considering the effects of authority, propaganda, and algorithms, the court returns to the question on which the case was founded:

Does the problem lie in the human being's lack of knowledge of the truth, or in the possibility of possessing evidence yet following what contradicts it?

The trial was neither a search for a single person on whom to lay blame nor an attempt to prove that the human being is a perpetual victim of deception. Rather, it was a test of the mechanisms that produce assent, of the criteria people use to accept what they believe and reject what contradicts it, and of the responsibility they bear when afforded an opportunity for examination and reassessment.

After deliberation, the court issues the following judgment.

First: On the Question of Temptation and Misguidance

The Qur'anic evidence establishes that misguidance does not always depend on explicitly denying the truth; it may begin with a desirable promise, a wish, an oath that suggests truthfulness, or advice that appears to serve the human being's interests.

God Most High said, in the words of Iblis:

﴿وَلَأُضِلَّنَّهُمْ وَلَأُمَنِّيَنَّهُمْ﴾ (I shall surely lead them astray, and I shall surely fill them with wishes.) [النساء: ١١٩]

In the account of Adam, temptation took the form of a promise of immortality and a dominion that would not decay:

﴿هَلْ أَدُلُّكَ عَلَىٰ شَجَرَةِ الْخُلْدِ وَمُلْكٍ لَا يَبْلَىٰ﴾ (Shall I direct you to the tree of immortality and a dominion that does not decay?) [طه: ١٢٠]

This evidence reveals that desire may become an avenue for misguidance, that what accords with a person's wishes is not necessarily true, and that the appearance of offering counsel is insufficient to establish the truthfulness of the counselor.

Accordingly, the court rules that the appeal of a promise, the strength of its influence, and the appearance of counsel do not take the place of evidence.

Second: On the Question of al-Samiri and the Appearance of Truth

In the account of al-Samiri, the Qur'an did not merely transmit his claim; it presented a statement about the calf's effect, then confronted it with what exposes its incapacity:

﴿فَأَخْرَجَ لَهُمْ عِجْلًا جَسَدًا لَهُ خُوَارٌ فَقَالُوا هَٰذَا إِلَٰهُكُمْ وَإِلَٰهُ مُوسَىٰ فَنَسِيَ﴾ (Then he brought forth for them a calf—a body that lowed—and they said, “This is your god and the god of Moses, but he forgot.”) [طه: ٨٨]

Then came the revealing question:

﴿أَفَلَا يَرَوْنَ أَلَّا يَرْجِعُ إِلَيْهِمْ قَوْلًا وَلَا يَمْلِكُ لَهُمْ ضَرًّا وَلَا نَفْعًا﴾ (Do they not see that it returns no word to them and has no power to harm or benefit them?) [طه: ٨٩]

The presence of an eye-catching appearance, an attention-arousing sound, or a claim surrounded by believers does not establish that its bearer possesses the capacity they attribute to it.

The account places a clear test before the human being: does one examine the reality of what stands before one, or settle for what its appearance suggests and what the group says about it?

Accordingly, a claim is not accepted merely because an impressive indication exists; rather, the relationship between the claim, the capacity, and the evidence must be tested.

Third: On the Question of Groups Contesting the Truth

The Qur'an presented a scene in which two groups each deny that the other has any basis in truth:

﴿وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ لَيْسَتِ النَّصَارَىٰ عَلَىٰ شَيْءٍ وَقَالَتِ النَّصَارَىٰ لَيْسَتِ الْيَهُودُ عَلَىٰ شَيْءٍ وَهُمْ يَتْلُونَ الْكِتَابَ﴾ (The Jews said, “The Christians have no basis,” and the Christians said, “The Jews have no basis,” while they recite the Scripture.) [البقرة: ١١٣]

It then adds:

﴿كَذَٰلِكَ قَالَ الَّذِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ مِثْلَ قَوْلِهِمْ﴾ (Likewise, those who do not know said the same as they did.) [البقرة: ١١٣]

Examining this sequence brings into view an implication that extends beyond the two groups mentioned to a pattern recurring among those who came after them: each party denies that the other has any basis in truth and makes its own affiliation evidence of the correctness of its position.

This test applies to Muslims when they divided into factions and sects, exchanged judgments of exclusion, and some made affiliation with their own sect a criterion of truth, rather than subjecting everyone's statements to proof.

What is on trial here is not Islam as a message, but the conduct of the followers of religious messages when they turn affiliation into immunity, disagreement into mutual condemnation, and identity into a substitute for evidence.

Accordingly, religious affiliation does not grant its bearer a certificate of truth, nor does a statement become correct because a group adopts it, or false merely because another group rejects it.

Fourth: On the Question of Authority, What Is Inherited, and Historical Narration (riwāya)

The evidence examined by the court established that authority, propaganda, fear, and repetition can influence people's perceptions, and that narration (riwāya) may be used to direct belief and justify positions and actions.

This has appeared in historical experiences in which propaganda was used to manufacture an image of the enemy, and in religious and political discourses employed to entrench privileges or justify domination.

In the Palestine dossier, the necessity of distinguishing religious belief from its transformation into a political claim that justifies depriving others of their rights comes to the fore. Reliance on a narration (riwāya) about chosenness or the promise of land does not exempt any authority from scrutiny of its actions, nor does it turn the killing or displacement of civilians, or the appropriation of their rights, into legitimate acts merely by grounding them in a religious justification.

The Qur'an sets a criterion of justice that antagonism does not suspend:

﴿وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَآنُ قَوْمٍ عَلَىٰ أَلَّا تَعْدِلُوا ۚ اعْدِلُوا هُوَ أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَىٰ﴾ (Do not let hatred of a people lead you to act unjustly. Be just; that is nearer to reverence for God.) [المائدة: ٨]

This finding does not mean that every historical narration (riwāya) is false, that everything inherited is misleading, or that everyone who adopts a particular narration (riwāya) knows it to be false. It means only that a narration (riwāya) is not exempt from examination because of its antiquity, its sacredness to its followers, or the strength of the body promoting it.

Accordingly, a narration (riwāya) does not become truth merely through repetition, nor does a religious claim become proof of the legitimacy of an act in practice.

Fifth: On the Question of Algorithms and Human Responsibility

The digital environment adds a new factor to the case: content repeatedly presented to a person may seem familiar, what aligns with one's interests may gain a greater presence in one's digital experience, and strong emotions may be exploited to attract one's attention and prompt engagement and sharing.

Yet these mechanisms do not establish that all circulating content is false, or that all users are subject to the same influence. They reveal additional reasons that make verification necessary and make the design of platforms and recommendation systems a subject of accountability as well.

Responsibility is not the same in every case: there are those who deliberately fabricate a false claim, those who amplify it, those who transmit it without verification, and those who discover its flaw yet continue to defend it.

Accordingly, the algorithm does not absolve the human being of responsibility, nor does it exempt the platform from examining the effects of its design; and one who falls into error despite diligent inquiry must not be equated with one who deliberately misleads or persists in doing so after the evidence has come to light.

Sixth: On the Question of the Double Standard of Proof

Here the court reaches the heart of the case.

For a person to demand evidence from an opponent, yet accept from their own group what they would not accept from that opponent; to require verification of reports that undermine their position, yet circulate reports that serve it without scrutiny; and to refuse to reconsider a belief not because evidence is lacking, but because the outcome does not accord with what they want—all this reveals a defect in the criterion by which truth is judged.

The Qur'an has established a rule that prohibits following what is not grounded in knowledge:

﴿وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ﴾ (Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge.) [الإسراء: ٣٦]

It has also rejected numerical preponderance as an independent criterion of truth:

﴿وَإِنْ تُطِعْ أَكْثَرَ مَنْ فِي الْأَرْضِ يُضِلُّوكَ عَنْ سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ ۚ إِنْ يَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ وَإِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ﴾ (If you obey most of those on earth, they will lead you astray from the way of God. They follow nothing but conjecture, and do nothing but guess.) [الأنعام: ١١٦]

It has called for reflection on the Qur'an rather than closing the door to reconsideration:

﴿أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ أَمْ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبٍ أَقْفَالُهَا﴾ (Do they not reflect on the Qur'an, or are there locks upon their hearts?) [محمد: ٢٤]

These rules do not ask a person to doubt everything; rather, they prohibit turning trust, desire, numerical preponderance, and affiliation into substitutes for scrutiny.

Accordingly, the court condemns double standards of proof wherever they are established, and requires each person to apply the same criterion to what supports their position and what opposes it.

Operative Provisions of the Final Judgment

Having examined the documents and confronted the claims with Qur'anic criteria, the court rules as follows:

First: It has been established that a person may be influenced by promises, desire, and the appearance of sincere counsel, and may believe a claim because of what it suggests rather than what the evidence establishes.

Second: It has been established that appearance, voice, fame, authority, and a multitude of followers are not, on their own, sufficient to establish the validity of a claim.

Third: It has been established that conflict between groups may develop into a recurrent pattern of denying that those who disagree possess the truth, and that this pattern can emerge among the followers of revealed messages when affiliation becomes a substitute for proof.

Fourth: The court rules that religious, historical, and political narrations (riwāya), as well as digital content, must be subjected to scrutiny according to the nature of the claim and the available evidence, rather than granted immunity because of their source or prevalence.

Fifth: The court rules that responsibility varies according to knowledge, the ability to verify, and intent; unintentional error is not to be equated with deliberate deception, nor is anyone who disregards available evidence or continues to circulate a claim after its falsehood has become apparent to be absolved of responsibility.

Sixth: The court condemns the double standard of accepting what serves one's position without sufficient evidence and rejecting what contradicts it despite the evidence, merely because the outcome is undesirable.

Seventh: In this trial, the court adopts the Qur'an as its reference for intellectual judgment, and requires inquiry to distinguish between the text of a verse, the inference drawn from bringing texts together, and the hypothesis that requires further testing.

⚖️ Judgment

The gravest thing this case reveals is not that a person can be deceived, but that they may turn from a recipient of deception into a participant in its perpetuation.

A person may be deceived without knowing it, and may err despite the sincerity of their effort. Their responsibility changes, however, when evidence they can examine becomes available to them, and they then choose to turn away from it to protect their own inclinations, their group, or their preconceived position.

The problem is not always a lack of information; it may lie in how that information is handled. Possessing evidence is no guarantee of following it, just as an abundance of information does not necessarily mean an increase in knowledge.

A person may possess the text, reason, information, and the means of verification, yet choose what accords with their own inclinations.

At this point, it is not enough to ask: Who deceived me? Rather, truth becomes entitled to ask them:

What did you do when something that contradicted your belief became apparent to you? Did you examine the evidence, or seek a way to reject it? Did you apply the same criterion to your own group and your opponent? And were you prepared to change your opinion if it proved defective?

The court does not condemn a person for having erred, asked, doubted, or reconsidered what they inherited. Rather, it condemns turning belief into immunity from proof, desire into a criterion of truth, and affiliation into a prejudgment of others.

Final judgment: No authority stands above evidence, no affiliation exempts anyone from reconsideration, and no desire grants its possessor the right to call what they crave the truth.

The trial has concluded with the delivery of the judgment, but a person's responsibility for truth does not end when the session closes.

Related Case Materials

The Fourth Court: Putting What Has Been Inherited on Trial

The Third Final Trial: Putting the Witnesses on Trial

The Decisive Trial: The Case of the “Apportioned Share”